

Sidste Nyt fra Albanien, Kosóva og Makedonien

The Latest News from Albania, Kosóva and Macedonia



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Oversigt

Der var Parlamentsvalg i Kosóva lørdag 17. November:

1/ Valgdeltagelsen var *påfaldende* beskeden, kun omkring 45 %.

2/ Kun Kosóva Albanerne stemte, det Kosovo Serbiske mindretal afholdt sig generelt fra at stemme.

3/ Hashim Thaçi og hans Parti fik de fleste Albanske stemmer og ventes at blive valgt til ny Premierminister efter Agim Çeku. Thaçi var i 1999 politisk leder af UÇK med gode relationer til Madeleine Albright, mens Çeku, tidligere kroatisk general, var militær leder. Se nærmere om Thaçi og Çeku på Wikipedia (dansk udgave).

4/ Thaçi har udtalt at han vil udråbe Kosóva som selvstændig stat, når de FN-ledede forhandlinger om områdets fremtid kolliderer i December. Dette har han sagt allerede før valget, og det må opfattes som det vigtigste punkt i hans valgprogram.

Aktuel forhistorie:

<http://bjoerna.net/sidste-nyt/336.htm>

<http://bjoerna.net/sidste-nyt/337.htm>

Aktuelle dokumenter:

A Legal Analysis of Trafficking in Persons Cases in Kosovo, October 2007:

http://www.osce.org/documents/mik/2007/10/27620_en.pdf

PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE MUNICIPAL RETURN STRATEGY IN THE KOSOVO MUNICIPALITIES: http://www.osce.org/documents/mik/2007/10/27601_en.pdf

Kommentarer:

Resultatet blev som venteligt; kun er den Albanske valgdeltagelse ringere end man på forhånd ville have gættet, og det svækker i høj grad den nye regerings politiske mandat.

Flertallet af Albanerne har længe ønsket selvstændighed, og resultatet viser at man *fortsat* ønsker dette, men når valgdeltagelsen har været så ringe, skyldes det - formentlig - at mange vælgere på den anden side *ikke* ønsker at det politiske flertal skal forsøge at sætte kravet igennem med militære eller paramilitære midler (de Kosóva Albanske myndigheder råder ikke over et egentligt militær, man har kun en lille beredskabsstyrke). Men der er givetvis også mere radikalt orienterede vælgere der er udeblevet, fordi de ønsker at protestere imod FN's politiske og militære tilstedeværelse - og mod de Albanske Lederes åbenlyse eller stiltiende accept af samme.

Én ting er hvad Parlamentsflertallet vil vedtage og forsøge at sætte igennem, en anden er hvad udenomsparlamentariske grupper vil forsøge sig med, på egen hånd eller uofficielt støttet af de politiske ledere.

Hvis Parlamentet beslutter at erklære området selvstændigt, må man formode at det Serbiske mindretal tilsvarende vil erklære Nord-Kosovo uafhængigt og søge at tilslutte sig Serbien.

Dette vil Albanerne ikke acceptere åbent eller frivilligt, men man vil være nødsaget til at acceptere det i den sidste ende, for man har ikke midler til - for alvor - at håndhæve sit synspunkt om Kosóva's udelelighed, og der er ingen lande overhovedet, der vil støtte Albanerne i denne henseende. Et forsøg på med politisk eller paramilitær magt at erobre Nord Kosovo er dømt til at mislykkes. Dette véd flertallet af de Albanske ledere, men de vil - kan det formodes - foretrække at blive *tvunget* til at acceptere en Kosovo Serbisk udtræden frem for at acceptere den frivilligt.

Situationen kan hurtigt blive meget anspændt og vil stille store krav til KFOR (den NATO-ledede militære mission) og til Politimyndighederne (både det internationale UNMIK-Politi og det lokale politi) - og overordentligt store krav til den politiske ledelse i USA og i EU-landene. Man vil internationalt gøre hvad man kan for at fastholde at der skal findes en politisk løsning, som kan accepteres bredt (muligvis ikke formelt, men så reelt). Man véd at Albanerne - i virkeligheden ikke kan sætte deres synspunkt om et selvstændigt og udelt Kosóva igennem, og derfor er man ikke skræmt af dem. Taktikken vil være at man vil forsøge at indkapsle problemet geografisk.

Man må formode at de Serbere der er bosat Syd for Ibar i stigende grad vil søge væk, enten bevæge sig mod Nord eller helt til Serbien. Når de ikke allerede er flygtet (som mange gjorde allerede i slutningen af 1990'erne) skyldes det at de - stort set - vil miste hvad de ejer, og at de slet ikke vil blive modtaget med åbne arme.

Serbien vil - i givet fald - se sig tvunget til at støtte det Serbiske mindretal, og vil her blive bakket meget stærkt op af de nationalistisk orienterede kræfter (der er samlet omkring Vojislav Seselj, uanset at der pågår en retssag mod *ham* i Haag - måske nærmest bekræftet af den). Skulle den Serbiske politiske ledelse bøje sig for en Albansk løsrivelse af Kosóva og for en »udlevering« af Nord Kosovo til Albanerne, ville den blive tvunget fra bestillingen. Det véd man hele vejen rundt, både på Balkan og Internationalt.

USA har længe tilkendegivet at man finder det 'naturligt' at 'området' bliver selvstændigt, men på en måde så mindretallets sikkerhedsmæssige interesser tilgodeses. Hvad USA vil mene, når Kosóva har erklæret sig som en selvstændig stat, og Nord Kosovo efterfølgende har erklæret sig for fri af Kosóva osv. er ikke helt klart, men formentlig vil man finde en måde at leve med det på.

I Europa er meningene delte. Men alle mener dog - på hver deres måde - at der skal forhandles en løsning frem med de involverede parter.

FN's Sikkerhedsråd vil skulle ytre sig her i december. Men også hér er meningene delte. Hverken Rusland eller Kina vil acceptere at Kosóva bliver selvstændigt (i hvert fald ikke uden at der findes en løsning for så vidt angår Nord Kosovo og det Serbiske mindretal), og man må formode at man - i sidste ende - vil nedlægge et egentligt veto. De seneste måneders udvikling i Rusland peger klart i dén retning; det virker helt usandsynligt at USA m.fl. ville kunne overbevise Putin til at acceptere en

Kosóva Albansk løsrivelse, og ethvert forsøg på at »købe« Rusland vil tilsvarende mislykkes.

Måske er der enkelte lande der vil anerkende Kosóva som en selvstændig stat (men hvem skulle det være?), men det store flertal vil næppe gøre det, og slet ikke hvis ikke det Serbiske mindretal får betryggende vilkår, sikkerhedsmæssigt set.

Konklusion: Parlamentsvalget og den forventede kollaps af statusforhandlingerne viser at det umiddelbart vil være svært at finde en holdbar løsning. Årsagen er at de Kosóva Albanske og de Kosovo Serbiske interesser er uforenelige, og at ingen af de to parter er i stand til at finde eller umiddelbart at medvirke til en fredelig løsning.

Et løsrevet Nord Kosovo ville kunne udvikle sig sammen med Serbien, men ville - til en vis grad - være udsat for 'aktioner' fra Kosóva Albansk side. KFOR m.fl. ville være nødsaget til at forhindre sådanne aktioner, og det vil muligvis nødvendiggøre at der tilføres flere tropper fra NATO-landene m.fl.

Et løsrevet Kosóva (formelt og/eller reelt uden den Serbiske del fra Mitrovica og mod Nord) ville nok kunne 'fungere', men ikke udvikle sig nævneværdigt og slet ikke i positiv retning. Der vil fortsat ikke være stor interesse udefra for at investere i området - og magtforholdene mellem de forskellige Albanske 'kræfter' vil fortsat medvirke til en fastlåst økonomisk og social situation.

Det siges jævnligt at en løsrivelse af Kosóva vil føre til politisk pres andetsteds, særligt i Bosnien-Hercegovina. Dette skal ikke undervurderes, men der er tale om meget forskellige situationer.

OSCE har udsendt flg.:

OSCE plays indispensable role in Kosovo, says UN's Kosovo administrator

VIENNA, 15 November 2007 - Clarity on Kosovo's future is critical for the communities in Kosovo and to ensuring stability in the region, said Joachim Ruecker, Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General and Head of the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), addressing the OSCE Permanent Council in Vienna today.

In his speech Ruecker also highlighted the OSCE's work in Kosovo. "Its comparative advantage, the extensive field presence, is now, more than ever, an indispensable tool through which the rest of the international community remains well informed on what is happening throughout Kosovo," he said.

On status talks, Ruecker said: "I continue to have faith in a positive outcome. An agreed solution will be optimal outcome, and the easiest to implement. Still, even if no agreement is reached, clarity on Kosovo's future, key to ensuring stability in the region, will have to be forthcoming."

He added: "I echo the words of the UN Secretary-General, when I say that we have to consider how to address a situation in which the sides are unable to reach agreement by the end of the current period of engagement."

On the general elections scheduled to take place this Saturday, 17 November, Ruecker said that preparations were fully on track, and that UNMIK, through the OSCE Mission in Kosovo, was ready to deploy back-up teams to serve as polling stations in case voters in certain areas were refused access to public buildings to cast their votes.

Ruecker said he was confident that the OSCE participating States remained committed to providing "the required continuity to the international presence in Kosovo".

"All the communities in Kosovo, and other international organizations, rely on the presence and contribution of the OSCE Mission in many ways, during this crucial period and in the longer run. I am confident that the 56 participating States of the OSCE are aware of the necessity for the Mission to remain on the ground, and continue its contribution," he said.

The OSCE leads the so-called third pillar under the operational framework of UNMIK, dealing with democratization and institution building.

The Permanent Council is the OSCE's main, regular decision-making body. It meets weekly in Vienna to discuss developments in the 56-country OSCE area and to make appropriate decisions.

NATO's Generalsekretær udtaler 071119:

I welcome the calm and peaceful conduct of this weekend's elections in Kosovo and the assessment of the Council of Europe observers that the voting was in compliance with international standards.

The low general turnout, however, is regrettable. I am especially disappointed by the lack of participation by the Kosovo Serb community; all communities should participate actively in the political process.

I now encourage the political parties to work quickly towards the formation of a new government. The Unity Team should engage in a constructive spirit during the remaining phase of the Troika status negotiations.

KFOR will continue to carry out its UN mandate to ensure security and stability in Kosovo.

Vuk Jeremic: Kosovo's independence nothing else but violent partition of Serbia

Belgrade/London, Nov 19, 2007 - Serbian Minister of Foreign Affairs Vuk Jeremic said today in London that in the event that Great Britain decides to recognise the unilateral proclamation of Kosovo's independence and approve violent partition of Serbia, it would destroy the Serbian people's trust in democracy and its values.

In a speech before the UK parliament's House of Commons, Jeremic said that that would be a huge blow from which Serbia would find it hard to recover.

I would like to appeal to your sentiment of fair play and the feeling of honour. Our country, just as yours, is ancient, with ancient beliefs. And Kosovo is the cradle of our civilisation, the foreign minister underlined.

He asked UK parliament members to help find a compromise solution that will preserve Serbia's sovereignty and give to Kosovo Albanians a true chance to manage their own affairs.

Jeremic warned that imposing a solution that would damage the democratic survival of one side would bear influence on the future of the entire region, and underlined that Serbia offers to Kosovo Albanians a fair and just compromise which will assist the integration of the entire region into Europe. That offer favours the province's development and strengthening of the democratic value of all regional actors.

We offer a unique partnership under a common sovereign roof: institutionally unlimited autonomy with very broad powers of the self-government, but the autonomy which at the same time preserves our sovereignty and territorial integrity, the foreign minister highlighted.

He said that statements that Kosovo's independence would be imposed in case an agreement is not reached by December 10 have obstructed the negotiations because setting such firm deadlines favours only one side, and that is Kosovo Albanians.

According to him, a way out from that crisis is to look on December 10 as a deadline for giving an evaluation of the progress made and nothing else. By re-defining the meaning of this date it is possible to create a favourable climate for finding a historical solution, because in that way an encouragement would be given to both sides for the first time to reach a mutually acceptable solution, which would be in the spirit of the Europe of the 21st century.

Jeremic explained that if a compromise solution is reached, the essential principle of the international system, which was established in Europe through the Helsinki Final Act, would not be brought into question: otherwise, a precedent will be created based on which any country could be divided against its will.

Let's not deceive ourselves. The independence of Kosovo-Metohija is nothing but a violent division of Serbia, stressed the Minister and warned that there are dozens of areas throughout the world with a situation similar to that of Kosovo-Metohija which are just waiting for secession to get legitimacy.

He emphasised that ongoing conflicts in the world may thus escalate, frozen ones may become active again and new ones break out.

Jeremic concluded that Britain, with its unique position in the world and the key role in Europe, must see the dangers of the policy that might undermine the renewal of institutions which should endorse "the new joint European enterprise."

In his address to British MPs, he reminded them of Serbia and Great Britain's alliance in both world wars, as well as the greater part of the 20th century, and stressed that Serbia shares Britain's firm belief in democracy and Europe.

However, there is something amiss in our relations. A cloud of mutual alienation is looming over Serbia and Great Britain and the root of it is the memory of terrifying events in the 1990s and doubts stemming from them, said the Minister.

Jeremic reiterated that Belgrade is doing all it can to ensure that there is no war and misery neither for its citizens nor in the region and added that in the past seven years Serbia established democratic institutions, the rule of law and market economy, strengthened human minority rights, initialled the Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) with the EU two weeks ago and is an active participant in the Partnership for Peace.

Serbia is also dedicated to reconciliation in the region, which it demonstrated by extraditing 42 indictees to the Hague Tribunal, among whom were four former presidents, one prime minister, three heads of the General Staff and one parliament speaker, specified Jeremic and stressed the Serbia is determined to locate, arrest and extradite the remaining few indictees still on the run.

Vojislav Kostunica: Proposal on neutral status for Kosovo another name for independence

Belgrade, Nov 19, 2007 – Serbian Prime Minister Vojislav Kostunica said yesterday that the proposal of EU representative in the Contact Group's troika of envoys Wolfgang Ischinger that Kosovo-Metohija should be given a neutral status is just another name for independence and that is why Serbia will reject it.

Kostunica underlined in a written statement that answer to the question whether Serbia will accept that a new Albanian state is made in its territory under any name should be familiar to everyone for a long time now, and added that it is completely certain that we cannot reach an agreement by making up new names for independence.

He said that now it is the right time that international representatives for the first time propose a solution that will respect Serbia's sovereignty and territorial integrity and reiterated that there is no point in constantly giving proposals for Kosovo's independence.

The proposals so far given by international mediators were monitored independence, limited independence, confederation, as well as different variations of the model of two German states, and finally the neutral status.

Now it is the time that international mediators show some objectivity and propose a form of substantial autonomy. In Brussels we will help them do that by showing them successful examples of substantial autonomies in the world, Kostunica said.

The Serbian Prime Minister concluded that if the result of negotiations is determined in advance and that is that Kosovo will be independent in one or another way, then it should be known in advance that Serbia's response will be that that is a violent policy of force which will bring no good to anyone, nor will it ever make Serbia give up 15% of its territory.

ICTY's Chefanklager Carla del Ponte fratræder 13. December:

The Tribunal's Prosecutor, Carla Del Ponte, will hold a farewell press conference on 13 December 2007 at 3 p.m. at the organization's headquarters in The Hague. As her mandate draws to a close, Prosecutor Del Ponte will reflect on her years at the helm of the ICTY's Office of the Prosecutor.

Carla Del Ponte was appointed Prosecutor for both the ICTY and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) on 11 August 1999 and her first mandate officially began on 15 September 1999. On 4 September 2003, the Security Council reappointed Carla Del Ponte to her position at the ICTY, with effect from 15 September 2003. On 14 September 2007, the Security Council extended Carla Del Ponte's mandate until 31 December 2007. She is the third Prosecutor of the ICTY, following Justice Richard Goldstone of South Africa, who served between July 1994 and September 1996, and Justice Louise Arbour of Canada, who served between October 1996 and September 1999.

ICTY: Sagen mod Ramush Haradinaj. Tilfælde af foragt for Retten. ICTY skriver:

Sadri Selca, a witness in the Haradinaj et al. case, was today arrested following his indictment for contempt of court.

Selca was indicted on 7 November 2007 for contempt of court having failed on 21 June 2007 to appear

before the Trial Chamber without just cause. The indictment was made public today following his arrest.

Throughout the Haradinaj et al. trial, the Prosecution has complained of witness intimidation leading to witnesses refusing to testify. The Prosecution has filed numerous applications for witness subpoenas and trial related protective measures in the case.

The first witness to be charged with contempt in this case, Shefqet Kabashi, refused to testify while taking the oath before his testimony during the trial on 5 June 2007 . He was then charged with contempt of court. Another potential witness in this case, Avni Krasniqi, was last week arrested, transferred to the Tribunal's Detention Unit and charged with contempt of court for failing to comply with an order to appear before the Trial Chamber. He did not enter a plea at his initial appearance, held yesterday, and a further initial appearance will be scheduled in due course.

Ramush Haradinaj surrendered to the Tribunal on 9 March 2005 and was granted pre-trial provisional release from June 2005 to February 2007. The trial commenced on 5 March 2007 and the Prosecution is expected to complete its case-in-chief in the next few days.

Haradinaj, a well known military figure from the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) during the 1998-99 conflict in Kosovo with Serb forces, was after the conflict the leader of a minority political party and briefly served as Prime Minister of Kosovo. He is accused of participating in a joint criminal enterprise aimed at asserting full control in the KLA operational zone of Dukagjin which allegedly was carried out by the unlawful removal and mistreatment of Serb civilians, Kosovar Albanians, Kosovar Roma and other civilians who were, or were perceived to have been, collaborating with Serb forces or not supporting the KLA.