Sidste Nyt fra Albanien, Kosóva og Makedonien

Indholdsfortegnelse Contents

Ugeoversigt Summary

Internationale organisationer   International organizations
FN   UN
Verdensbanken, IMF m.fl.   World Bank, IMF etc.
OSCE, Europarådet   OSCE, Council of Europe (CoE)
EU   European Union (EU)
NATO   NATO
ICTY - Tribunalet i Haag   ICTY

Balkan, generelt   The Balkans
Kosóva   Kosóva [Kosovo]
Øst Kosóva / Presevo-dalen / Syd-Serbien   Eastern Kosóva
Albanien   Albania
Serbien og Montenegro. Serbien (alene)   Serbia-Montenegro. Serbia
Montenegro (alene)   Montenegro
Makedonien   Macedonia [FYRoM]

Grækenland   Greece
Tyrkiet   Turkey
Italien   Italia

USA   United States (US)
England   England
Tyskland   Germany
Frankrig   France
Danmark (Norge, Sverige)   Denmark (Norway, Sweden)

Rusland Russia
Kina China

Fodbold (FIFA's rangorden) Football (FIFA)

»Albansk Almanak 2003« bd. 1-3

Almanak'en for 2003 er udkommet. Her finder du årets nyhedsbreve. Årets litteraturkommentarer vil udkomme hen over sommeren 2005 i »Albanske Studier« ## 3-4.

Bogen findes i trykt form og på CD (som pdf-fil). Papirudgave på 800 sider i 3 bind. Bogen sælges som papirudgave m/ CD og som CD alene. Se pris på: Bestillingsliste.

Udgaven for 2004 ventes at udkomme medio 2005.

»Albanske Studier« bd. 1-2

Kommentarer til Bjøl, Huntington, Machiavelli, Sørlander, DUPI (Humanitær Intervention), Clausewitz, Mao Zedong, Lars R. Møller, Malcolm og flere andre (kommentarerne er suppleret ift udgaver i Almanak'erne m.v.). Englændere på rejse i Albanien: Edward Lear, Edith Durham og Robert Carver. Bøger om slægtsfejder og blodhævn. Diskussion af Anne Knudsen's disputats om blodhævn på Korsika og af Ismail Kadare's roman »Ufuldendt april«. Baggrundsmateriale om den Sønderjyske general Christian von Holstein, der deltog i Habsburgernes felttog ind i Kosóva i 1689-90. Sidst i bogen et forsøg på en sammenfatning i form af nogle 'grundlæggende synspunkter'. Desuden en kommentar til Hans Hækkerup's »På skansen«. På CD'en supplerende materiale om traditionelle Albanske klædedragter og om Holstein.

Du kan downloade indholdsfortegnelsen og kommentaren til Hækkerup fra: http://bjoerna.dk/albansk-historie/studier-2002.htm

Bogen findes i trykt form og på CD (som pdf-fil). Papirudgave 368 A4-sider i 2 bind. Bogen sælges som papirudgave m/ CD og som CD alene. Se pris på: Bestillingsliste.

Til dig der kigger på et ældre nummer af »Sidste Nyt«.

Seneste udgave af denne »annonce« kan ses på:

»Sidste Nyt« (klik)

Seneste 4 udgaver af »Sidste Nyt fra Albanien, Kosóva og Makedonien«:

Sidste Nyt #262 - frem til 10.06.2005 (klik tv.)
Sidste Nyt #261 - frem til 03.06.2005 (klik tv.)
Sidste Nyt #260 - frem til 27.05.2005 (klik tv.)
Sidste Nyt #259 - frem til 20.05.2005 (klik tv.)

Urolighederne i Kosovo / Kosóva marts 2004: Sidste Nyt #206 (klik tv.)

Sagen mod Slobodan Milosevic: (1) Retsmødet 5.7.2004. Udsættelser osv. Links & materiale: Om udskrift af anklageskrifter og retsbøger | (2) Milosevic' indledende forsvarstale; tildeling af Forsvarsadvokater | (3) Afhøring af de første af Forsvarets Vidner. Sagen udsættes til 12.10.2004. Skriftlig begrundelse for at tildele Milosevic Forsvarsadvokater | (4) Forsvarernes appel (29.9.2004; som pdf); (5) Appelafgørelsen der - i høj grad - gav Milosevic medhold (1.11.2004; som pdf); (6) Afhøring af Professor Mihajlo Markovic (Nov. 2004)

Sagen mod Fatmir Limaj m.fl.: Se under: ICTY.

Alle årets udgaver: http://bjoerna.dk/nyt-oversigt.htm

UGEOVERSIGT (resumé)

ICTY: Retsformand Meron og Chefanklager Carla del Ponte har talt om ICTY i FNs Sikkerhedsråd og gjort status. Deres taler er optrykt.

Sagen mod Ramush Haradinaj: Haradinaj er løsladt (indtil sagen skal behandles).

Kosóva: Kontaktgruppemøde om Kosóva.

Det er 6 år siden at KFOR rykkede ind i Kosóva. Det er blevet fejret med en højtidelighed. I forbindelse med årsdagen har også været afholdt pressekonference.

SRSG Søren Jessen-Petersen har holdt oplæg om vejen til Kosovo's endelige status på the Conference on the “Future status of Kosovo”, organized by the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia.

Austerlitz-broen i Mitrovica er genåbnet, ca. 300 Kosovo Serbere har demonstreret mod åbningen.

Et rumænsk indlæg om Kosóva's fremtidige status optrykkes. Det er bl.a. sendt til det Danske UM.

Øst Kosóva: Albansk deltagelse i besluttende organer.

Albanien: Præsidenten har under sit besøg i Kruja-området mødtes med Journalister som stillede ham en række spørgsmål i anledning af valget.

PM Nano er fortsat særdeles flittig med at rejse landet tyndt og støtte Socialistpartiets Kandidater; han har støttet opstillingen af Luan Rama der måtte træde tilbage som Politiminister i 2003 fordi han slog på en Journalist der irriterede ham, og endogså støttet opstillingen af Anastas Angjeli som han engang beskyldte for at være korrupt, men som han ikke har kritiseret siden Partikongressen i December 2003 (hvor Nano indgå en serie samarbejdsaftaler med forskellige dele af partiet). Om aktiviteten vil flytte mange stemmer er tvivlsomt, derimod har det nok en vis betydning at økonomien er væsentligt bedre end under Berisha (omend stadig ikke fremragende), at der er en vis økonomisk fremgang osv.

Mjaft har påstået at nogle af Parlamentskandidaterne har været indblandet i kriminalitet. PM Nano afviser dette fsv angår Socialisterne.

Berisha's Demokrater er også i fuld sving med valgmøder. Det forlyder at både Nano's Socialister og Berisha's Demokrater har skaffet sig professionel bistand forskellige steder i udlandet. Begge partier har gjort noget ved sit ydre; der er skaffet nye kampagnebannere, nye kampagnekasketter og nye kampagnebluser i de rigtige farver. Berisha skal have entreret med det Amerikanske PR-firma Barbour, Griffith and Rogers og med political strategist Stuart Stevens, mens Nano skal have entreret med et Amerikansk og et Israelsk PR-firma.

European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (under Europarådet) har udsendt statusrapport om forholdene i Albanien. Rapporten kan downloades; nedenfor flg. resumé. Det fremgår at forholdene på en række områder er blevet bedre i Albanien, men at der stadig er nogle mangler - fx er minoriteterne ikke repræsenteret i passende grad i det offentlige liv.

Verdensbanken har bevilget lån til udbygning af bjergområderne. Lzazar Semini (AP) skriver bl.a.: The World Bank and other international institutions gave a US$ 19.4 million (euro 15.85 million) grant to Albania to reduce poverty and fight land erosion in its mountainous regions, a bank statement said Friday. The government proposed the project to improve its management of mountain forests and pastures, where the poorest of Albania's 3.2 million population tend to live, chopping down trees for wood to use for heating.

Vejbyggeri i Sydalbanien (Fier/Tepelena-området). Den Europæiske Investeringsbank og Den Europæiske Bank for Rekonstruktion og Udvikling har hver især ydet et lån på 35 mio €. Beløbet skal bruges på at anlægge 35 km ny vej og til at 'genoprette' 33 km eksisterende vej. Foruden de 70 mio € skal investeres 15-16 mio €.

Arbejdsløsheden er meget svagt faldende. Fra midten af 2004 til begyndelsen af 2005 er den registrerede arbejdsløshed faldet fra ca. 160.000 til ca. 156.000.

Børnearbejde. UNICEF m.fl. har undersøgt omfanget af børnearbejde i Albanien. Man mener det er i stigning. Det skønnes at ca. 30 % af unge mlm 13 og 18 arbejder, særligt i landbrugssektoren. Ifølge ny lovgivning må man ikke beskæftige unge under 16.

Makedonien: Økonomien. Der er problemer som Low profitability, low investment, and lack of technological enhancements [which] have prevented Macedonian firms from producing high-value-added and high-quality goods. Er der tale om en Balassa-Samuelson-relation? Boileau Loko and Anita Tuladhar har for IMF undersøgt forholdet mellem produktivitet og 'real exchange rate'; rapporten er for fagfolk, men store dele kan læses af alm. interesserede.

Serbien: Der er faldet dom i en sag mod en Officer der havde dræbt både nogle Serbere og nogle Albanere i Kosóva.

Montenegro: Makfax skriver at man har fundet nogle stjålne Goya-billeder i Montenegro.

Grækenland: 8 Albanere anholdt for tyveri og smugling. Kathimerini skriver: A gang that stole some 2 million euros’ worth of luxury cars and valuables from villas in Attica has been netted after combined operations in Piraeus and Trikala, in central Greece, led to the arrests of eight Albanian nationals, police said yesterday. The seven men and one woman apprehended had operated in two groups, Attica Criminal Investigation Department chief Stefanos Skotis said, and were responsible for at least 26 break-ins between them. Their loot included jewelry, electronic equipment and 12 vehicles. The cars were sold on in Greece, smuggled into Albania and used to transport illegal immigrants, Skotis added. Three gang members were arrested earlier in the week for using two of the stolen cars to traffic 22 migrants. They were given eight-year jail sentences and fined 23,000 euros each. During the raids in Piraeus and Trikala, which were conducted by police officers and border guards, a gun, explosives and small amounts of cocaine were confiscated. Skotis said the police are looking for a Greek man and four more Albanians in connection with the crimes.

USA: Kampen mod terrorismen: The multinational Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). USAs UM Condoleezza Rice og Albaniens UM Kastriot Islami har i fællesskab skrevet - eller måske snarere lagt navn til - en artikel.

Danmark: DIIS har udsendt Udredning om militær magtanvendelse mod de nye trusler. Udredningen kan downloades. Resumé'et er optrykt i nyhedsbrevet.

INTERNATIONALE ORGANISATIONER m.v.

Opmærksomheden henledes på Economic Reconstruction and Development in South East Europe. Adressen er www.seerecon.org. Her kan man finde materiale om aktuelle møder og konferencer.

VERDENSBANKEN, IMF M.FL.

Se under de enkelte lande / områder.

OSCE, Europarådet

Se under de enkelte lande / områder.

NATO

ICTY - TRIBUNALET I HAAG

Retsformand Meron og Chefanklager Carla del Ponte har talt om ICTY i FNs Sikkerhedsråd og gjort status. Deres taler følger nedenfor:

STATEMENT BY JUDGE THEODOR MERON, PRESIDENT, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL 13 JUNE 2005

Mr. President, Your Excellencies,

It has always been a great honour for me to address this eminent gathering. I feel even more honoured today as it is being presided by the representative of France.

Your country, Mr. President, has left a deep imprint on the history of democracy and is considered to be the homeland of human rights. As President of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, I must draw attention to the fact that France has also actively contributed to the establishment and development of the Tribunal and plays a major role in the fight against impunity.

Mr. President, as a representative of a country governed by "civil law", you will no doubt appreciate the gradual evolution of our Rules of Procedure. These changes, dictated by the constant desire to improve the efficiency of the proceedings while not sacrificing the necessity to protect the rights of defence, have significantly modified the role of the judge. The judge has gone from a neutral adjudicator of the "common law" model to an active player in both the pre-trial and trial proceedings. In the debates that came before and accompanied this evolution, French law and judicial practice have often been a source of inspiration.

This is the third report that I have presented to you since the adoption of Council resolution 1534 in 2004, which requested the President and Prosecutor of each ad hoc Tribunal to provide the Council with assessments every six months detailing the progress made toward realization of their respective Completion Strategies. The written report is now before you in document S/2005/343. Through both the narrative and the annexes, it is intended to provide you with a realistic picture of how the Yugoslavia Tribunal is grappling with the challenge of meeting the goals of the Completion Strategy. I shall try in my oral statement not to repeat the details of the report but rather to highlight its salient features and provide you with an update of the information provided therein.

Since the last report submitted in November 2004, the Tribunal’s three Trial Chambers and one Appeals Chamber have been working at maximum capacity, the Trial Chambers handling six cases simultaneously. That means, on the average, that six different cases are being tried by different benches of three Judges each. The written report indicates that two Judgements have been issued since the last report and predicts that by the end of this November, four additional Judgements will have issued in cases involving an additional seven accused. That means of course that by the end of this year, another batch of four cases will begin. The pace is unrelenting.

The new report also highlights the fact that 22 new accused have arrived at The Hague since the last report – meaning that there are now 50% more people awaiting trial than the last time I appeared before the Council. That dramatic increase obviously has significant implications for the Completion Strategy.

With those two critical preliminaries out of the way, please allow me, Mr. President, to survey the major features of the report and in particular to emphasize the relevant updates contained therein.

With regard to internal measures taken to implement the Strategy, we have adopted significant amendments to our Rules of Procedure and Evidence, including one relating to "Judgement of Acquittal" (Rule 98bis), which mandates oral rather than written submissions. I am happy to report that this amendment has already had a salutory effect on speeding up our procedures without sacrificing defendants’ due process rights. Before the amendment, Rule 98bis proceedings would likely have taken up several months of the Trial Chambers’ time.

I have also appointed two Working Groups of Judges for speeding up trials and appeals. The Working Group on trials (chaired by Judge Bonomy) has been exploring ways to speed up trials by, among other alternatives, altering the caseload, finding additional courtroom space, and streamlining our pre-trial and trial procedures. These modalities were the subject of an in-depth and wide-ranging discussion among all the Judges just a week ago today. The Working Group on speeding-up appeals (chaired by Judge Mumba), has focused on the rules governing the admissibility of additional evidence at the appeals stage, as well as on the procedures for translating decisions and judgements for appellants – which can have a major impact on the timely disposition of appeals. By the time the plenary of Judges meets in July, I expect that both Working Groups will have presented concrete and actionable recommendations.

Turning now to ad litem Judges, Mr. President, I very much appreciate the adoption by the Council of resolution 1597 (2005), which amended the Statute of the Tribunal to allow for the re-nomination and re-election of ad litem Judges. Nonetheless, I am very concerned about the lack of a sufficient number of nominations. This has significantly delayed the election of a sorely needed new roster of ad litem Judges. For new trials to be assigned to panels of Judges with no delay, it is absolutely imperative that the President have at his disposal a roster of distinguished jurists who are willing and able to serve the Tribunal, often on quite short notice, at this critical juncture. I appeal to all States that have not yet submitted nominations to nominate experienced jurists for this important position. It provides a unique opportunity for individuals to make a difference in advancing the cause of international justice.

I now come to a key component of the Completion Strategy: the referral of cases involving intermediate and lower rank accused to competent national jurisdictions. I should particularly like to highlight the opening of the War Crimes Chamber of the State Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) on 9 March 2005. After much time and effort devoted to making this event a reality, the Sarajevo War Crimes Chamber is now in a position to accept cases which the Tribunal’s Referral Bench may decide to refer to the authorities of BiH. The Government and people of BiH, the High Representative, donor Governments and the international community as a whole have made this possible, and the Tribunal and its staff are pleased to have been associated with this endeavor.

The report notes that so far, the Prosecutor has filed 10 motions involving 18 accused for such referrals under Rule 11bis of our Rules of Procedure and Evidence. In enclosure V to the report, you will see that of those 10 motions, the Referral Bench has granted the motion in one case, referring the case to Bosnia and Herzegovina for proceedings before the Sarajevo War Crimes Chamber of BiH. This transfer must await, however, the disposition by the Appeals Chamber of filed appeals. You will note that the Referral Bench has already held hearings in six other cases involving 13 accused.

Thus, future decisions on the Prosecutor’s motions to refer cases to competent national jurisdictions are expected in the very near future. In addition, as the Prosecutor points out in her assessments, she is considering filing additional Rule 11bis motions for referral.

As for co-operation of States in the region with the Tribunal, as I have already indicated, there has been a dramatic increase in the number of indictees and fugitives transferred to the Tribunal, mostly thanks to the efforts of the authorities of Serbia and Montenegro, sometimes together with authorities of the Republika Srpska (RS). The impact of these new arrivals will be addressed later in my statement.

With regard to Croatia, while cooperation remains good in some areas, it is of major concern that the last remaining "stumbling block" to achieving full cooperation with the Tribunal is the continuing failure on the part of authorities in Croatia to apprehend and render to The Hague Ante Gotovina.

Concerning the RS, other than assistance with regard to the arrival of some indictees and fugitives, co-operation remains woefully lacking in other areas, in particular the lack of any serious attempts to locate and arrest such notorious fugitives as Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic.

Cooperation has improved with Serbia and Montenegro with regard to the arrival of indictees and fugitives. During a meeting and in-depth discussion with Prime Minister Kostunica of Serbia and President Tadic of Serbia this March, I strongly encouraged them both to ensure the arrival of the remaining fugitives thought to be in Serbia and Montenegro or the RS. The largest impediment on that front is the continuing failure to apprehend and render to The Hague Ratko Mladic.

Allow me to add, Mr. President, that it goes without saying that when and if these three principal fugitives move across borders to avoid apprehension and arrest, the obligation to pursue and arrest them applies in full to the authorities of their temporary "sejour." This also highlights the need for Governments in the region to redouble their efforts for judicial cooperation between their own authorities. I have consistently maintained that if the voluntary surrender of accused war criminals is not forthcoming, the international obligation of the States of the region is to arrest and transfer the accused without delay.

Distinguished members of the Council, as I have said many times, the Tribunal will not have fulfilled its historic mission – and it will not close its doors – until Karadzic, Mladic, and Gotovina have been arrested, brought to The Hague, and tried before the Tribunal in accordance with the full procedural protections recognized by our jurisprudence.

I now turn to the updated prognosis regarding implementation of the Completion Strategy. In my last assessments, I estimated that by 2008 the Tribunal could complete the trials of all accused in our custody at that time (including Gotovina if he arrived before 2006), but warned that any further growth of the trial docket would make achieving that target date entirely dependent on some cases being disposed of by guilty pleas. I also added that if new indictees or fugitives arrive and require separate trials, "it will become likely that it will take at least until the end of 2009 to complete the trials of all accused within the custody of the Tribunal."

As is evident from the report before you now, some of these factors bearing on the implementation of the Strategy have come to pass and others must be addressed. Allow me to take them up one by one:

First, the number of new indictments. As the report indicates, seven new or amended indictments have been submitted since my November report. Five of the indictments will require new, separate trials. For two other cases involving five accused, I understand that the Prosecutor is considering whether to move the joinder of these cases with pre-existing cases.

Second, the number of Rule 11bis motions for transfer granted. As I have just mentioned, one of the 10 outstanding motions has been granted by the Referral Bench and is currently on appeal. Six others have been the subject of hearings. While it might be anticipated that the Referral Bench will render more decisions by the end of the month, it would be neither possible nor appropriate for me to speculate about the ultimate disposition of those motions.

Third, the number of guilty pleas. On that score, I need only mention that there have been no new guilty pleas since my last report.

Fourth, the arrival of new indictees and fugitives. With the arrival of 22 new indictees or fugitives, our projections must be adjusted as I warned in my last report to the Council. As of now, we are working on the assumption that at least 10 of the new accused will be the subject of seven new, separate trials. (Five trials will involve one individual accused; one will involve two accused; and another, three accused.) Of the remaining 12 accused, the Prosecutor has already moved to join three to a pre-existing case. I understand she is also considering moving the joinder of seven accused to another pre-existing case, which would result in a "mega case" of eight or nine accused. Finally, two new arrivals are the subject of a Rule 11bis motion for referral to a competent national jurisdiction. I cannot of course predict how Trial Chambers will decide on motions for joinder, or indeed anticipate the Prosecutor’s ultimate decision about whether to move for joinders in the first place.

Turning to the 10 fugitives who have still not arrived and the impact on the caseload should they arrive: six of the fugitives are on indictments with co-accused already in custody, and therefore new, separate trials for them would not be required. Meanwhile, the Prosecutor is considering the suitability of two others for joinder. And the arrival of Karadzic and Mladic would entail a new, joint trial, provided they arrive more or less contemporaneously. We know that their trial will be lengthy and complex, but it is impossible to know how it will impact the timeline for the overall situation without knowing when they arrive and when the trial could begin for both the Prosecution and defence counsel. Obviously, for purposes of planning and enhancing the prospects of the Tribunal’s completing its work sooner rather than later, the earlier they have been apprehended and transferred to The Hague, the better.

Fifth, the timing of the arrivals of remaining indictees and fugitives. This factor has a critical influence on the Completion Strategy, but it simply cannot be predicted with any degree of certainty. While it might be possible to estimate roughly the length of a trial prior to the arrival of an accused, we have to wait until the accused is actually in The Hague to assess a variety of factors – the readiness of both parties to proceed, whether joinder is possible, and the availability of courtrooms and Judges to hear the cases.

Sixth, the disposition of joinder motions. As I indicated earlier, the Trial Chambers are seised of several motions by the Prosecutor for joinder of cases, and she is considering filing further such motions. Decisions are expected soon on the pending motions. If such motions are granted, there could be trials of up to eight or nine accused. Of course, such joinders are not a panacea, as additional time will be required to dispose of a given case, but they would clearly save time when compared to having separate trials for each of the accused. As my report indicates, I welcome any such major time saving tactic which is consistent with due process and the rights of the accused.

Allow me, Mr. President, to mention another matter of importance. While the arrival of indictees and fugitives obviously complicates our Completion Strategy timetable, it goes without saying that the arrival of alleged war criminals can only be applauded. Persons accused of having committed war crimes must be brought to justice and cannot be allowed to hide, hoping that the Tribunal will close its doors before they are found and arrested. The arrival of such a substantial number of accused moves the Tribunal further to the completion of its mandate: prosecuting those accused of committing war crimes in the former Yugoslavia.

Coming to the current estimate, I should preface my remarks with a cautionary word: any estimates are necessarily tentative, since they can only be based on assumptions subject to unpredictable factors. I could indicate, for instance, that if all possible Rule 11bis motions are granted, if all possible motions for joinder are granted, if no new fugitives arrive, and if no guilty pleas are entered, the Tribunal could complete its current caseload sometime in 2009. But all of those "ifs" indicate that these estimates are based on assumptions that evolving reality will modify.

For example, if the Tribunal’s three most notorious fugitives – Karadzic, Mladic, and Gotovina – are arrested in the near future, their cases would extend the time necessary to complete trials an additional four to seven months, given the possible joinders. As a purely independent matter, if half of the pending and anticipated 11bis motions are denied, the trial completion date would slip an estimated nine months. Further, if one of the large joinder motions – the so-called "mega case" -- is denied, it could add another three months to the time to try them all. Any combination of other contingencies – health-related trial interruptions, guilty pleas, etc. – could also alter the outcome.

Knowing what we know now, the most I can indicate is that trials will necessarily have to be conducted in 2009, and will most likely continue until the end of that year. When the next six-monthly report is presented, the President should be able to provide an assessment based on more factual predictions. It is hoped that by next November, current and possible Rule 11bis and joinder motions will have been disposed of. Arrivals of additional indictees will provide more data on the caseload and target dates. In addition, the Judges would have considered recommendations for speeding up both trials and appeals.

Before concluding, allow me to raise another matter mentioned in my report: the possibility of adding a fourth courtroom. Such an additional courtroom would be very advantageous in my view and would make it possible for us to speed up trials and appeals. The report indicates the advantages to be derived from adding a fourth courtroom. Advantages would arise whether we maintain the existing six trials a day, or – even more – if it were decided to allow three additional ad litem Judges to serve so that a seventh trial bench could be established to help deal with the backlog. I wish to stress that I would not request the cost of constructing such a courtroom to be borne by the United Nations budget, but would rather approach possible donors who would see the long-term advantage of expediting trials and appeals by increased courtroom capacity. This is a matter which we have just begun to explore and no doubt the President will return to the Council on this subject, once the possibilities become clearer. We would welcome any comments which members of the Council might have on the matter and will count, as always, on the guidance and leadership of the Council as we pursue this question.

Before I conclude, Mr. President, let me allude to the approaching tenth anniversary of an atrocity which in its character and magnitude was reminiscent of those committed during World War II. This July will be 10 years since the atrocities – the genocide – at Srebrenica. Let me quote the following from the 19 April 2004 Krstic Appeals Chamber Judgement:

"By seeking to eliminate a part of the Bosnian Muslims, the Bosnian Serb forces committed genocide. They targeted for extinction the forty thousand Bosnian Muslims living in Srebrenica, a group which was emblematic of the Bosnian Muslims in general. They stripped all the male Muslim prisoners, military and civilian, elderly and young, of their personal belongings and identification, and deliberately and methodically killed them solely on the basis of their identity. The Bosnian Serb forces were aware, when they embarked on this genocidal venture, that the harm they caused would continue to plague the Bosnian Muslims. The Appeals Chamber states unequivocally that the law condemns, in appropriate terms, the deep and lasting injury inflicted, and calls the massacre at Srebrenica by its proper name: genocide. Those responsible will bear this stigma, and it will serve as a warning to those who may in future contemplate the commission of such a heinous act." (para. 37 of the Judgement)

It is a shame that Karadzic and Mladic are still at large, 10 years after Srebenica.

As we approach that commemoration, it is worth emphasizing that it is to the Security Council that the international community, the public and especially victims of atrocities turn for leadership and justice for redress of atrocities. The Tribunal is one manifestation of the Council’s commitment to international justice, the rule of law, and the struggle against impunity, as well as to peace and reconciliation. We are there to carry out the mission you entrusted to us.

We commit ourselves to re-double our efforts to see that justice is done for victims and accused alike; that due process is honored; that accused war criminals are not treated with impunity, but rather are afforded a fair trial. With the support of the members of the Council, I am confident we can succeed in our difficult task in the remaining years of our mandate.

Mr. President, I would now like to make a statement in my personal capacity. Over the years, the Security Council has played a critical role in using its power and prestige to resist impunity, to establish individual criminal responsibility for perpetrators of atrocities, and to impose sanctions on those who violate human rights and humanitarian norms. The Council’s decisions, taken under Chapter VII, to establish the ad hoc tribunals in 1993 and 1994 – half a century after Nuremberg – were seminal moments. They led not only to the trial and punishment of senior figures responsible for atrocities in the Balkans and Rwanda, but also to the creation of a whole new corpus of jurisprudence on international criminal law, procedure and evidence, a body of law that will be the historic legacy of the ad hoc tribunals. Of course, much remains to be done to combat impunity outside of the areas covered by the jurisdiction of the ad hoc tribunals. The Council has the power and the responsibility to do all it can to advance these goals. I see the Council’s referral - under Chapter VII - of the situation in Darfur to the International Criminal Court as a critical next step in the historic evolution of the anti-impunity principle. The referral underscores the world community’s resolute commitment to the principle that the perpetrators of such crimes against humanity will be held to account. It also demonstrates the potential of Chapter VII and its beneficial uses in advancing accountability in all parts of the world. Speaking as a scholar of international humanitarian law, I congratulate the Council for its wise action this spring.

Finally, Mr. President, distinguished members of the Council, in mid-November my Presidency of the ICTY will come to an end and I will continue as an Appeals Chamber Judge. This is thus my last appearance before the Council as President. May I take this opportunity to express to you and to all the members of the Council my deep gratitude for your steady support of the Tribunal and of international justice, and for the help you have generously given me in the performance of my duties.

Thank you.

-

ADDRESS BY CARLA DEL PONTE, PROSECUTOR OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL 13 JUNE 2005

Mr. President, Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen,

It is a great honour to be here again to provide an assessment on the progress made in the implementation of the completion strategy. A written assessment was distributed already, and I intend to concentrate now on the major issues. Significant progress can be reported on the key components of the completion strategy. All investigations were completed, and the last indictments issued, by the end of 2004. However, you should know that many victim groups as well as representatives of the civil society simply do not understand how investigations can be closed at this stage. I receive many letters from victims and NGO reports, arguing that there are many more individuals who should be indicted and expressing concern about the capacity of the domestic jurisdictions to render justice fairly and effectively. While there is no going back and we are fully committed to the completion strategy, I simply want to underline to the Council the importance of supporting the national jurisdictions and following their work closely to ensure that justice is indeed done.

There were a number of positive developments since my last report. No less than twenty accused were surrendered since November, including ten who had been fugitives for an extended period of time. The Prosecution has continued to file motions under Rule 11bis for referring indicted cases involving mid- and lower-level perpetrators to domestic judiciaries. Motions were also filed proposing the joining of cases with the same crime base so as to avoid repeating trials with similar evidence and witnesses. Last but not least, the lifting of the recruitment freeze has allowed my office to hire the staff necessary for an efficient preparation and conduct of the remaining trials and appeals.

Unfortunately, these positive developments are overshadowed by the continuing failure of the relevant authorities to arrest and transfer ten fugitives, including those mentioned several times by the Security Council in resolutions taken under Chapter VII of the Charter. As long as Radovan Karadzic, Ratko Mladic and Ante Gotovina manage to escape justice and defy the international community, the work of this Tribunal will remain unfinished.

Ten days ago, I visited Belgrade, Zagreb and Sarajevo to discuss co-operation with the relevant authorities. In Sarajevo, I met also families of victims of the Srebrenica genocide. Despite all the progress made, it is obvious that the great expectations placed by the victims in the international community and in the ICTY have not been met and will not be realized until Karadzic and Mladic are in The Hague. In less than a month, ten years will have passed since Srebrenica happened. There will be commemorations, in Srebrenica itself, and elsewhere. All those attending will wonder: why are the individuals primarily responsible for the genocide still at large, ten years after the fact and ten years after they were indicted? As a sign of protest, I have thus decided not to participate in any commemoration of the genocide unless Karadzic and Mladic are arrested.

There has been a major change in the attitude of the Serbian authorities. Access to documents, including military files, and witnesses, is continuously improving. However, this process remains very slow and cumbersome. Most importantly, following my last address to the Council, Serbia has finally started to transfer fugitives and newly indicted persons. Since December 2004, the Serbian Government, alone or with the assistance of the Minister of Interior of Republika Srpska within Bosnia and Herzegovina, has transferred 14 accused, including half a dozen who are indicted for Srebrenica. Another seven fugitives are within reach of the Serbian authorities, alone or in cooperation with Montenegro and Republika Srpska within Bosnia and Herzegovina: Karadzic, Mladic, Tolimir, Hadzic, Milan and Sredoje Lukic, and Zupljanin. Karadzic, Mladic and Tolimir are the three accused most responsible for Srebrenica. Prime Minister Kostunica gave me assurances that his government will deliver on these remaining fugitives, and I expect him to fulfil his commitment. However, as I understand he is not willing to carry out arrest operations. Since 25 April, when Nebojsa Pavkovic was transferred to The Hague, there have been no further transfers. This seems to indicate that the policy of voluntary surrenders preferred by the Serbian authorities has reached its limits.

It is essential that the authorities in Podgorica and Banja Luka co-operate more closely with Belgrade and also with NATO and EUFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This is the most promising way to locate Radovan Karadzic. Also, the political support of the international community remains of paramount importance. It is encouraging that in Brussels and Sarajevo, I was assured by NATO and EUFOR commanders of their full commitment in respect to this issue.

All my information continues to show that two fugitives, Vlastimir Djordjevic and Dragan Zelenovic, are in Russia. I have passed the relevant information on these two fugitives to the Russian authorities and have expressed my readiness to travel to Moscow to further discuss the matter with the Russian authorities. On 7 June, I received a reply from them informing me that the competent authorities continue to conduct their investigative actions with regard to the persons accused by the ICTY, including Mr. Djordjevic and Mr. Zelenovic. The Russian authorities are confident that the persons, who have committed grave crimes to be tried at the ICTY should be subject of search and prosecution. The Russian authorities also expressed their readiness to further render their assistance to the Tribunal in the investigation and prosecution of the indicted persons.

I remain concerned that the Croatian authorities have not fulfilled their obligation to locate, arrest and transfer Ante Gotovina. In the first part of this year, the efforts made by the authorities were neither pro-active, nor focused, and several incidents occurred where sensitive information was manipulated so as to obstruct the investigation against Gotovina and his protective networks. There were also media campaigns, sometimes based on confidential documents leaked to the media, that tried to discredit the Tribunal or our partners in Zagreb. This indicates that Gotovina can still count on active support networks, including within the State institutions.

In April, Croatia presented an Action Plan aimed specifically at locating Gotovina. It is my assessment that further serious progress in the implementation of the plan should lead to Gotovina. Prime Minister Sanader assured me of his strong personal commitment in this regard. A few more months will however be needed to determine whether the Croatian authorities are, this time, indeed doing their utmost to arrest and transfer Gotovina. Until Gotovina is in The Hague, or until Croatia is providing the precise whereabouts of this fugitive, it is impossible to say, however, that Croatia is fully co-operating with the ICTY.

The transfer to The Hague of the ten remaining fugitives is the most serious obstacle to the completion strategy. It creates uncertainties that are hampering a proper planning of the trials. It may oblige the Court to conduct several trials where a joined trial would have been possible. For instance, Djordjevic could be joined with the six other indictees accused of crimes committed in Kosovo by Serbian forces. Tolimir could be joined with eight other indictees accused of the Srebrenica genocide. Karadzic and Mladic, should they be transferred in the same time period, could be tried together.

Joining cases is a method my office is intending to use whenever possible so as to save court time while preserving all guarantees of due process. Joining cases is clearly more efficient, since the same crime base does not have to be proven repeatedly, and therefore the same witnesses will need to come to The Hague only once. Three motions for joinder were presented so far. A few others are under consideration. This is one of the areas where my office has put an emphasis so as to do the maximum to implement the second phase of the completion strategy.

Another major development in this context is the referral of cases to domestic jurisdictions. My office has continued to help build credible domestic jurisdictions by contributing its expertise to training judges and prosecutors. Furthermore, we have participated in significant efforts made to improve judicial co-operation between the prosecutors of Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia and Montenegro. Last week, we took part in a meeting held in Brijuni, Croatia, aimed at reaching agreements regarding the transfer of proceedings between the countries of the former Yugoslavia. The objective is to ensure that these countries’ legal impediments to the extradition of nationals do not lead to impunity.

As a result of these combined efforts, capacities have been developed throughout the region to take over mid- and lower-cases that, in accordance with Security Council resolutions 1503 and 1534, cannot be tried in The Hague. Moreover, in response to my request, the OSCE decided on 19 May to co-operate with my Office in the monitoring of cases transferred to the region. These positive developments have allowed my office to further implement its policy of submitting Rule 11bis motions to the Chambers for the referral of such cases to local jurisdictions. Four additional motions were filed since I last reported. All in all, ten such motions have been filed so far, concerning 18 accused.

Very recently, I decided to withdraw one of these motions concerning three persons accused for crimes committed in Vukovar. This case had drawn the attention of the international community long ago, since it was the object of Security Council resolution 1207 back in 1998. During my recent trip to the region, I became convinced that the so-called "Vukovar Three" case is extremely sensitive, and any decision by the Chambers to transfer it would provoke deep resentment in one or the other country considered for the transfer, Serbia and Montenegro or Croatia. Therefore, I came to the conclusion that a transfer either to Belgrade or to Zagreb would not be in the interest of justice. In view of these new developments, the best option is to try the "Vukovar Three" in The Hague.

The Chambers took their first decision on a Rule 11bis motion on 17 May, whereby they granted the prosecution motion to transfer the Stankovic case to Bosnia and Herzegovina. My Office is still considering the transfer of a few additional cases.

Mr. President,

By completing all its investigations by the end of 2004, my Office has demonstrated its commitment to the completion strategy. We have also immediately drawn the necessary consequences in terms of resources. More than a third of the posts in the investigation division were abolished. Redeployments from the investigation division to the prosecution division are proposed in the context of the 2006-2007 budget, so as to keep within the investigation division only those staff members necessary for the support of trials, and for the transfer of cases to the domestic jurisdictions. These movements of personnel will also allow us to cope with a heavier workload in the prosecution division and in the appeals section. Our attention is now fully focused on the conduct of efficient trial and appellate proceedings.

While these internal measures increase the chances that the completion strategy is successful, we have seen in the past months dramatic improvements in the external conditions impacting heavily on the completion strategy. Serbia and Montenegro, Croatia and Republika Srpska within Bosnia and Herzegovina are not yet co-operating fully with the ICTY. However, all of them have shown considerable progress in their co-operation. Prime Minister Sanader in Zagreb, Prime Minister Kostunica and Minister Ljajic in Belgrade, as well as Minister Matjasevic in Banja Luka have demonstrated a genuine commitment to solve all remaining issues in their co-operation with the Tribunal. There is now a momentum that has to be used so as to bring the remaining fugitives to justice. The international community must play its part in this process to ensure the success of international criminal justice. NATO and EUFOR’s assets will be invaluable in bringing Karadzic and others to justice. The European Union’s power of attraction remains a key political motivation for the countries of the former Yugoslavia, and this should remain so. The Security Council must keep a constant attention to our work.

In mid-July, it will be ten years since over 7900 Muslim men and boys were summarily executed in what has been recognised by the ICTY as a genocide. A few weeks later, it will be ten years since the two main authors of this genocide, Karadzic and Mladic, have been at large. This situation cannot be tolerated any longer. Now is the moment to end impunity. There is momentum now. We must build on it.

Sagen mod Slobodan Milosevic: (1) Retsmødet 5.7.2004. Udsættelser osv. Links & materiale: Om udskrift af anklageskrifter og retsbøger | (2) Milosevic' indledende forsvarstale; tildeling af Forsvarsadvokater | (3) Afhøring af de første af Forsvarets Vidner. Sagen udsættes til 12.10.2004. Skriftlig begrundelse for at tildele Milosevic Forsvarsadvokater | (4) Forsvarernes appel (29.9.2004; som pdf); (5) Appelafgørelsen der - i høj grad - gav Milosevic medhold (1.11.2004; som pdf); (6) Afhøring af Professor Mihajlo Markovic (Nov. 2004)

Sagen mod Ramush Haradinaj: Haradinaj er løsladt (indtil sagen skal behandles). Kosovo Report skriver:

Kosovo's former prime minister Ramush Haradinaj returned home Thursday after being released by a U.N. tribunal in the Netherlands pending the start of his war crimes trial. [...] He will continue to serve as president of the Alliance for the Future of Kosovo, the third biggest political party in the province and part of the governing coalition, a statement from his lawyer said.

Sagen mod Fatmir Limaj m.fl.: On 13 April 2005, the Prosecution concluded its case. The trial is to resume on 17 May 2005.

BALKAN LANDE, LANDE VED ØSTLIGE MIDDELHAV

BALKAN GENERELT

Udsnit af EU's Europakort 2004. [Udsnittet kan forstørres ved at klikke på det]. Kortet indgår i en præsentationsborchure, der kan downloades som pdf fra: http://europa.eu.int/comm/publications/booklets/eu_glance/20/da.pdf.

KOSÓVA

Bynavne: Angives der to navne på samme lokalitet, er den Albanske nævnt først. Se oversigten på: http://bjoerna.dk/kosova/byer.htm ... Bynavne: Angives der to navne på samme lokalitet, er den Albanske nævnt først. Se oversigten på: http://bjoerna.dk/kosova/byer.htm ... Rapporter fra FNs Generalsekretær ... 040616 SG Kofi Annan udtaler at han agter at udpege Søren Jessen-Petersen som 5' SRSG. Søren Jessen-Petersen blev senere udpeget og tiltrådte i Kosóva 040816. ... 0308 Harri Holkeri tiltrådte som 4' SRSG. Fratrådt 0406 af helbredsmæssige grunde. ... 020214 Michael Steiner tiltrådte i Kosova som 3' SRSG og fratrådte i begyndelsen af 0307. ... En biografi over 2' SRSG Hans Hækkerup kan læses på Danske Politikere. En anmeldelse af hans bog »Kosovos mange ansigter« kan downloades fra: http://neva.hjem.wanadoo.dk/Haekkerup2.pdf (0,4 MB) ... Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-Government. ... Kosova's Regering. ... Webside vedr. 2004-valgene ... UNMIK Politiets oversigt over 2001 (artikler, billeder og statistik i pdf-format (fil'en er forholdsvis stor: 2,6 MB)) ... Kriminaliteten i 2002 - Oversigt kan downloades [klik på titlen]

Parlamentsvalget 2004 [Præsidenten - Ibrahim Rugóva - er valgt af Parlamentet, the Assembly], se: http://kosovoelections.org/eng/

Kontaktgruppemøde om Kosóva. B92 skriver:

BELGRADE, PRISTINA -- Wednesday – Officials of the international Contact Group met today in Belgrade with high officials of Serbia and Montenegro.

They later traveled to Pristina to discuss some of the regions most pressing issues, including free movement, the return of refugees and decentralization.

Contact Group representatives met in Pristina with Kosovo President Ibrahim Rugova, Parliamentary Speaker Nedzat Dachi and Prime Minister Bajram Koshumi. The UN Secretary General’s Special Kosovo Envoy, Kai Eide, was also present at the meeting, as was Kosovo governor Soeren Jessen-Petersen.

After the meeting, President Rugova said that he will continue to call on the US and the European Union to insist on the independence of Kosovo, because this would be the best solution for peace in the region. Prime Minister Koshumi said that there were several differences in opinion when decentralization and free movement issues were being discussed, but added that the Kosovo government will soon launch plot projects in local administrations to see what would work best in the region.

After meeting with Kosovo government officials, the Contact Group representatives and Eide met with Kosovo Serb leaders.

Kosovo Serb official Oliver Ivanovic said that the talks with the Contact Group and Eide were for the most part, constructive, adding that the Serbian leaders in Kosovo plan on working with Eide actively and are expecting a lot from his next report, since he included a lot of stances of the Serb community in his first report last year.

Ivanovic told B92 that because of the situation in Kosovo, a good chance exists that pressure will be put on Eide to change his opinions, and that this is why the “standards before status” plan must be insisted upon.

Regarding his talks with Contact Group officials, Ivanovic said that “They did not insist that status discussions must start no matter what, but a definite level of anxiousness is evident which might influence them to report that the situation in Kosovo is better than it actually is, so that status discussion could begin sooner. I think that this is the wrong way to go about things and it is not in the best interest of the Serbian community. We made sure today to make it clear that standards and the level and quality of life are both unsatisfactory and should be continuously worked on by the temporary institutions. Standards and status should not be directly correlated, we think that the temporary institutions need to continue working on fulfilling all standards as a long-term goal and make it necessary for them to show continual and evident progress, while status discussion can begin at the end of the year as expected.” Ivanovic said.

Det er 6 år siden at KFOR rykkede ind i Kosóva. Det er blevet fejret med en højtidelighed.

SRSG Soren Jessen-Petersen, COMKFOR LTG Yves the Kermabon, President of the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government in Kosovo Ibrahim Rugova (right to left side) during the 6th Anniversary of KFOR ceremony at HQ KFOR on June 11, 2005. (Photo by Mr. Armend Aqifi, HQ KFOR Photographer) [Forsidebilledet ubeskåret]

KFOR har udsendt flg.:

By Stefan Ratzenberger, AU SOC. Photos by Mr. Armend Aqifi, Photographer HQ KFOR

On June 11, 2005 KFOR celebrated the 6th anniversary of KFOR arrival in Kosovo at Headquarters Kosovo Force in Pristina. COMKFOR LTG Yves de Kermabon, SRSG Soren Jessen-Petersen, President of the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government in Kosovo Ibrahim Rugova, Chiefs of international Liaison offices in Kosovo and political and military representatives attended the ceremony.

During the ceremony COMKFOR LTG de Kermabon, SRSG Soren Jessen-Petersen and President Ibrahim Rugova posted a wreath at the KFOR Memorial Stone to remember the 120 KFOR soldiers who lost their lives while performing their duties in Kosovo. Also a six years old tree was plant by an Albanian and a Serbian Child as symbol for the prosperity future of Kosovo; also as result of the work of KFOR, UNMIK and local authorities.

KFOR started its mission with 50,000 troops. Now the quantity of KFOR is 17,000 troops. After six years in Kosovo, the duties of the KFOR peacekeepers have changed – our motto is now to “Restore Confidence”!

Facts and History of KFOR

The Kosovo Force (KFOR) is a NATO-led international force responsible for establishing and maintaining security in Kosovo. This peace-enforcement force entered Kosovo on June 12, 1999 under a United Nations mandate, two days after the adoption of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244.

Whilst continuing to maintain and develop a climate of safety and security, KFOR is to support UNMIK in promoting the transfer of increased responsibility to civil authorities, in order to facilitate the withdrawal from large-scale framework operations in Kosovo. KFOR is also a stabilization institution to set the conditions and provide the platform for peace and prosperity, along with the UNMIK, the International Community, local institutions and authorities, the Kosovo Police Service (KPS), the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC), and all religious or local dignitaries.

KFOR contingents are grouped into four multinational brigades and three subordinate commands. Although brigades are responsible for specific area of operations, they all fall under a single chain of command of Commander Kosovo Force (COMKFOR). The Headquarters of Kosovo Force (HQ KFOR) is located in Pristina, the capital city of Kosovo. Since September 1, 2004 LTG Yves de Kermabon (French Army) is commander Kosovo Force. HQ KFOR reports to the Commander of Joint Force Command Naples (COM JFCN) in Naples, Italy. COM JFCN is Admiral H. G. Ulrich III, U.S. Navy.

All national contingents pursue the same objective, which is to maintain a safe and secure environment in Kosovo. They do so with professionalism and in an even-handed manner towards all ethnic groups.

KFOR troops come from than 35 nations - NATO and Non-NATO nations – and contain more than 17.000 soldiers. During the last six years almost 500.000 KFOR soldiers have served for KFOR in Kosovo. 120 KFOR soldiers died during their mission.

I forbindelse med årsdagen har også været afholdt pressekonference. KFOR har udsendt flg. herom:

Commander KFOR Press Conference

June 10, 2005

COMKFOR’s Initial Statement:

This is a special time of the year for Kosovo and the soldiers of KFOR. The 11th of June tomorrow, will celebrate KFOR’s 6 th anniversary. We remember the 119 soldiers who lost their lives while serving KFOR during these years restoring freedom and confidence for Kosovo’s future. Our progress on this 6th anniversary should be a source of pride of all KFOR soldiers, both past and present. In fact, KFOR success is due to the commitment of our brothers and sisters in arms, these almost 500.000 soldiers who have repeatedly and successfully rendered assistance to the people of Kosovo, in mutual interaction with many institutions since 1999. In that respect, I do believe that the whole International Community efforts have been essential, as far as funding, security and standard implementation are concerned: they truly enabled to shift from the wartime devastation to a more stable and democratic Kosovo - the prevailing situation today. KFOR soldiers, through their sacrifice – and commitment far from home and family - have helped change the face of Kosovo. However, the mission is not completed yet, and I know that there is still much to be done.

First, I insist today on saying that thanks to KFOR commitment, the security situation is good, although it remains (somewhat) volatile.

Our commitment for “a safe and secure environment” is essential for the coming comprehensive review and talks on the status. We all know that perception of security remains a problem and leads to mainly self-imposed limits on freedom of movement, and we all have to stay vigilant and ready to react to prevent any upsurge of violence. Regardless of some minor incidents, and based on the figures and statistics we are sharing with UNMIK, I keep on saying that the security is on track and I also assess that we are witnessing the calmest period since 1999.

The good security situation is due to the great efforts NATO and the troop contributing nations are doing to provide Kosovo with highly skilled soldiers, dedicated assets and funding over the past 6 years. Day after day, these efforts have a positive impact on the population. KFOR is not perceived as an occupation force. KFOR is even requested by the population to stay in Kosovo and to be more present.

Given this positive security assessment, KFOR intends to progressively shift from a static and force-consuming lay out to a more flexible posture one, keeping high visibility to reassure the population, but having a low profile not only because one day, we will leave Kosovo, but first and foremost because KFOR’s role is not to steer police missions: UNMIK-P and KPS are performing that masterly.

Therefore, KFOR should progressively let the floor to police, focusing on hot potential spots with our concept of “blue and red boxes”, preventing direct attacks to the main patrimonial sites, unfixing some force-consuming military and non-military tasks (like escorts and guards), and using quick reaction forces ready to intervene in order to ease the freedom of movement and the returns that are the key points. KFOR restores confidence and cools down all the fears. And Kosovo needs to be self-confident too. We want to promote a better future for all the people of Kosovo.

Secondly, building confidence doesn’t mean just keeping permanent contacts. It requires also the mature people of Kosovo to be now more responsible because the future of Kosovo is their future.

I visit the mayors and the local leaders every week because I appreciate the role of the Mayors played in their municipalities, sometimes in difficult conditions and I believe that personal relationships enable to `de-conflict` any crisis.

The Local Crime Prevention Councils have been established at the municipal level and allow all communities to express their security concerns.

At local level, KFOR Liaison Monitoring Team’s goal is liaise closely with the local administrations, KPS, UNMIK, community leaders and relevant organizations through regular meetings and also increase the local confidence. Let me simply insist that LMTs are a tool dedicated to operate in addition to Intel assets as force multiplier: their situational awareness will provide COMKFOR with early warning as well as a real feeling-picture of Kosovo people.

Usually I usually prefer traveling outside the camps and speak with the people or the media. It is more in my nature to be out in the field instead of in my office. I’ve enjoyed these 9 past months mainly because I’ve been able to meet and engage in conversations with individuals all over Kosovo. You may know that this is my third tour in Kosovo where I learned a lot about the need to travel and meet the population. Today, as COMKFOR, I have kept the motto I used when I was Brigade commander in Mitrovica, three years ago: “Restore Confidence.” I love it, because it is a true, simple and strong motto. By restoring confidence we hope to unite the efforts of all the people of Kosovo, the International community representatives, international media and media of Kosovo and of course yourselves.

Lastly, and looking ahead, there is still more to be done.

The future of Kosovo is a multi-ethnic one, based on tolerance and respect for democracy. This is the only solution to improve the situation and avoid deadlocks. Therefore the returns are very important, and I recently had the great pleasure of meeting the Serbian people who came back who came back to Vuctri. These returns demonstrate that freedom of movement does exist in Kosovo; they were possible with the help of international organizations but also, thanks to the support of KPS and KPC.

We still have displaced people from Kosovo of all ethnic groups. In many areas those people need further improvements such as compliance with the rule of law, civic behavior. Our common job with UNMIK and the international community will not be complete until those people who wish to return home can do so: voluntarily, freely, and in dignity. We should not tolerate any kind of discrimination.

The living conditions also are not satisfactory. Power outages, insufficient access to water and bad infrastructure are hampering the normalization of daily life. Stabilization and security both need to be improved in order to shape a modern economy.

The economy is a major concern. I often stress economy and security as two sides of the same coin. What perspective and hope are to be expected when the rate of unemployment is reaching such an important level? This empty future feeds fears and worries.

Organized crime and extremism also impact on the security of the region. We must all resist these temptations and fight crime together.

To conclude, I will stress again that the security situation is on the right track thanks to the responsible behaviors of all the involved actors. It allows me to point out the very strong dedication of the SRSG in this entire process. The situation is improving even if some challenges are ahead and will have to be met. NATO’s efforts after six years have been decisive and we are now in a trend that will lead to a different presence of the international community. I can already imagine a peaceful Kosovo without KFOR troops. It will happen one day.

For that, Kosovo needs full support to show that freedom of movement for all the communities is possible. Implementing the standards, as you know, will be important to allow the talks on the future status to start.

The basis of any settlement, as you know must include the promotion of security and stability in the Balkans, we are doing that every day in KFOR supporting UNMIK, KPS and KPC; but today, I need all people as a strong ally in my daily mission to restore confidence.

Thank you very much for your attention.

Pressemeddelelser fra UNMIK:

SRSG Søren Jessen-Petersen har holdt oplæg om vejen til Kosovo's endelige status:

UNMIK/PR/1375 Monday, 13 June 2005

SRSG address at the opening of the Conference on the “future status of Kosovo”

PRISTINA SRSG Søren Jessen-Petersen this morning addressed the Conference on the “Future status of Kosovo”, organized by the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia. Following is the text of his address:

I am pleased to address this conference and I thank the organisers, the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia and the Gani Bobi Centre in Pristina, for this good initiative. The conference, bringing together, as it does, Serbs and Albanians in the centre of Pristina to talk about the issues that concern all of us and them most, is in itself a demonstration of an improvement in the climate for inter-ethnic dialogue which has recently taken place in Kosovo.

That the conference is timely is also demonstrated by the choice of topics that delegates will be discussing over the next two days. The issues of security, standards, the reform of local government, ethnic reconciliation and the resolution of Kosovo’s status are some of the most important issues facing all of Kosovo’s communities and the region more generally.

The progress made and the importance of the issues now facing us have indeed been recognised at the highest level. The decision by the United Nations Security Council on 27 May to endorse the recommendation of the Secretary General that a Comprehensive Review of Standards implementation should be carried out, highlighted the continuing progress made by the PISG, but also made clear just how much remains to be done.

The decision to go ahead with a Comprehensive Review has had a galvanising effect on all parties in Kosovo. All Kosovo’s political forces have realised that they need to take a fresh look at their actions in the light of the upcoming Review and possible status talks. The Government in particular has analysed the further work it needs to do on Standards implementation. To this end, it has recently approved and adopted a work plan covering both the shorter and longer term to ensure that priority Standards are met.

Despite some difficult and, frankly, unhelpful disagreements between the Kosovo Albanian parties – which are experiencing the trials of parliamentary democracy and the Government-opposition dynamic for the first time – they have now realised the need for unity on fundamental goals facing Kosovo and have agreed to my proposal to establish a political Forum to discuss the key questions facing Kosovo in the immediate future. Goodwill and flexibility by all will be needed to ensure that there is a constructive dialogue and maximum consensus on those fundamental goals.

I was in Belgrade last Friday and welcomed the fact, in talks with Prime Minister Kostunica, Dr Covic, and representatives of President Tadic and other leaders, that direct dialogue between Pristina and Belgrade has been given fresh impetus recently, with working groups and constructive talks on missing persons, returns of displaced persons, and energy. I also welcome the fact that Kosovo Serbs have begun to take part in some of the political processes in Kosovo. At the same time, I regret – and I expressed that regret last Friday – that Belgrade is still failing to give the Kosovo Serbs the green light to join – and exercise their influence in – those institutions that matter most, the Assembly of Kosovo and eventually the Government.

All the priority Standards deal with the rights of Kosovo’s minority communities

– all of Kosovo’s minority communities. Some Standards are of more concern to minority communities than others and it is on those priority standards that the PISG must focus – and act.

Some encouraging progress has been made. The Special Minority Recruitment campaign launched by the PISG has seen more than 200 applicants for 103 vacancies published across the Ministries. Indeed, minority representation in the government – at approximately 10% is good and improving. The 5th urban return of Kosovo Serb to Klina town took place last week. The Religious Heritage Reconstruction Implementation Commission held a key meeting on 7 June in Decani Monastery, paving the way for funds to be disbursed on church reconstruction, to begin in and around Prizren. On 6 June the Kosovo Police Service took control of the main bridge in Mitrovica from KFOR - a further sign of the improvement in security. Local Community Policing Councils now function in all 30 Kosovo Municipalities. The Kosovo Police Service, or KPS, is multi-ethnic, with a minority component of 16%; Kosovo Serbs make up about 10% of KPS numbers. And the KPC is continuing its drive to recruit minorities and is working to improve conditions in areas where there are returnees – thus encouraging further returnees.

While the security situation in Kosovo is now good - thanks especially to the work of COMKFOR and the excellent collaboration that now exists between KFOR, UNMIK Police, and the KPS – we must at the same time acknowledge that the security situation remains fragile.

The leaders of Kosovo’s majority community must reach out to minorities if the situation is to change from one of fragility to one of irreversible stability. Kosovo Albanians need to pay not just “lip service” to the idea that all Kosovo’s citizens are equal under the law. There need to be more – as well as more consistent and clearer – statements that the leaders of Kosovo’s Albanian majority are committed to minority issues. Whenever there are interethnic incidents – although fortunately they are very rare – it is essential that there be immediate condemnation from leaders. Representatives of central and local government need to do more to get out and meet minority communities and listen to their concerns. Recent visits by ministers, while encouraging and very welcome, have, unfortunately, been exceptions rather than the rule.

Such statements and visits are essential to demonstrating commitment and above all changing the atmosphere in which minority communities live. They are also crucial in showing the majority population that their leaders are committed to protecting the minority. Because, while security and freedom of movement are actually at reasonable levels, perceptions of them are not. How can we expect minority communities to want to travel, say, to markets in majority areas if they are never invited? How can they be invited if Kosovo’s media do not cover all Kosovo’s communities? How can they travel there if road signs are only in one language? How can Kosovo’s communities communicate at all if they do not speak each other’s language and have no opportunity to learn it?

So, Kosovo’s leaders must do their bit, it is true, but Belgrade must also play its part. It is simply not serious to insist that progress be demonstrated on freedom of movement and returns for the Kosovo Serb community, and in the same breath make statements which are far from the realities on the ground and which are directly harmful to such progress. One cannot describe Kosovo in terms which would deter anyone from returning, and at the same time expect IDPs to come back. Minority communities are unlikely to exercise their freedom of movement if they are constantly told by leaders in Belgrade that they are in danger if they move beyond their homes. It is disingenuous to say that one has the best interests of the Kosovo Serbs at heart and then prevent their representatives from returning to the institutions in which they can represent their community’s interests most effectively and where they can make a difference to their situation.

To deny them that right is to deny them the right to shape their own future.

The main players in the international community have made it clear that maintaining the status quo on Kosovo is unsustainable. They have made it clear that the talks on the status of Kosovo are scheduled to begin later this year. It is now up to the political leaders and institutions to show that they are acting to build a stable, tolerant, multi-ethnic, and democratic society in Kosovo – one in which all communities live in peace with each other and which is at peace with its neighbours.

The time has come for all sides to put short-term politics aside and to get involved, to talk openly, frankly, passionately, and constructively about the concrete issues and make the changes which we all recognise are needed.

This conference today is a good start on that road. We need much more of this kind of dialogue.

Thank you very much.

Vurdering af 'sikkerhedssektoren'. UNMIK har udsendt flg.:

Experts to finalise arrangements for review of Kosovo’s internal security sector

PRISTINA – At the invitation of the SRSG, the Security Sector Development Advisory Team (SSDAT) is today beginning its third visit in Kosovo. Following its earlier recommendation to undertake an Internal Security Sector Review (ISSR) to plan for an effective security sector, the SSDAT will now help Kosovo in establishing the most effective mechanisms to carry out the review.

SRSG Søren Jessen-Petersen said, “This is a very important process for the future of Kosovo,” further explaining that the ISSR is “a process that will produce an improved security environment for all and create the conditions conducive for economic investment, peace and justice, and participation in the international community.”

During this visit, the SSDAT will help Kosovo establish the ISSR Secretariat, which will undertake the Review. The Secretariat will be supported throughout the process by UNMIK and UNDP.

Adopting an “inclusive approach”, the planning process will involve extensive consultations with all elements of Kosovo’s society and institutions. “It is only appropriate that a system that addresses the security needs of Kosovans is designed by Kosovans themselves,” the SRSG said, adding that “it is only through the broad participation of all communities that we can ensure that Kosovans are firmly in the driver’s seat.”

The SSDAT arrived in Pristina this afternoon and will be meeting potential donors’ representatives in Kosovo during this week, besides advising on the arrangements for commencing the Review process. “This is a tall order,” the SRSG concluded, “but one that must be met if Kosovo is to have the future prescribed by the Final Status talks.”

Kosovo Serberne er fortsat (eller igen) uenige om hvordan man skal forholde sig mht at indtræde i de forskellige selvstyreorganer. Blic skriver:

Representatives of Serb list for Kosovo and Metohija gave opposite stances at meeting with Contact Group held in Pristina yesterday.

President of SPO for Kosovo and Metohija Randjel Nojkic said that he personally and SPO members in the Serb list were ready to immediately join Kosovo institutions and working groups.

Goran Bogdanovic, president of DS for KiM and Oliver Ivanovic, the first man in Serb list, rejected such Nojkic's stance. They conditioned joining the institutions in Kosovo by the decision and stance of Belgrade.

Ugerapport fra Dansk KFOR. Hærens Operative Kommando skriver (på http://www.hok.dk/):

Landskampspatrulje og operation

Uge 23 i Kosovo. Militærpolitiet (MP) arbejdede sammen med det lokale politi og modtog efterforskningsundervisning af dansk kriminaltekniker. Panserinfanterikompagniet deltog i en operation med Multinational Brigade Center, og Liaison and Monitoring teams (LMT) fik nye kontorfaciliteter.

Af: kaptajn Rikke Louise Mikkelsen, chef for Militærpolitiet

Ugen startede grå og kedelig, med silende regn efter en længere periode med varme og solskin, hvilket mandag tydeligt afspejledes i de ellers så glade garderes ansigter, idet de skulle ud på en cross boundary operation i løbet af ugen. Og vejrudsigten bebudede på ingen måde bedring.

Men af sted kom Panserinfanterikompagniet om tirsdagen trods det dårlige vejr. Af sted til Camp Slimline i Pristina for at deltage i Cross Boundary Operation, som er en operation hvor kompagniet skal arbejde i et andet område end bataljonens normale ansvarsområde. I fem dage skulle kompagniet afløse de slovakiske soldater, der til dagligt patruljerer i området.

For at have en optimal base at arbejde fra, blev kompagniet støttet af et detachement fra stabskompagniet, der på rekordtid byggede en velfungerende lejr af oppustelige telte, suppleret med enkelte containere og med alle nødvendige faciliteter. Til hver gruppe var der et oppusteligt telt med indlagt lys, og lejren var udrustet med bad, toilet, briefing-/operationsrum, køkkentelt, sanitetstelt og opholdstelt til tolke.

Opgaven var at tilvejebringe et forbedret områdekendskab, undersøge rygter om skydning og ulovlig træhugst i området samt, at forhindre transport af smuglervarer og våben på de større veje i området.

Resultatet blev indhentning af virkelig god information om området samt en pistol, der blev konfiskeret ved et checkpoint.

Tilbage i Camp Olaf Rye gik livet sin vante gang, og for MP vedkommende bestod en af rutineopgaverne i joint patrols med det lokale politi - Kosovo Police Service (KPS). Hver uge køres der minimum en joint patrol med hver af de fem politistationer, der er i vores ansvarsområde.

Onsdag aften gennemførte militærpolitisergent (MPSG) Mads Wørmer og marineoverkonstabel (MOKS) Michael Larsen en joint patrol med KPS i Skenderaj, og denne patrulje blev noget ganske særligt, idet det danske landshold, på samme tid som patruljens gennemførelse, spillede landskamp mod Albanien. Stemningen var løftet under hele patruljen, ikke mindst fra de danske SG side, når der fra politiradioen løbende kom meldinger om scoringer ind.

De kosovo-albanske betjente var dog hverken bitre eller vrede, men morede sig derimod over at køre patrulje med modstanderen. Efter kampen og patruljen blev der taget et gruppebillede; et billede der i øvrigt fortæller lidt om, hvor fint et forhold vi har til de lokale betjente.

Som MP skal man være rede til at efterforske alle mulige sager, og derfor er det nødvendigt at træne med cases (øvelser) for at være sikker på, at vi kan løse opgaven, hvis ulykken skulle indtræffe. Her i Kosovo er vi så heldige, at der er masser af erfarne danske betjente, som vi har en god kontakt med.

Disse betjente har en vidensbank, der kun er få forundt, hvorfor vi ind imellem allierer os med dem for at suge noget af deres lærdom til os. Således har vi lige haft besøg af kriminaltekniker Kim Larsen, der har arbejdet med krigsforbrydelser her i Kosovo. Han opstillede en selvmords-case med hjælp fra sanitetsdelingen, som vores MP så skulle reagere på og efterfølgende efterforske. Casen var realistisk, og der blev arbejdet igennem på ulykkesstedet.

Meget skal der jo tages hensyn til i sådan en situation. Nysgerrige skal holdes væk, spor skal sikres, og de rigtige underrettes. Efter endt efterforskning gennemgik Kim hele casen slavisk, mens han påpegede områder, hvorpå man skal være ekstra opmærksom, samtidig med, at han gav en masse gode råd.

Det har også været ugen, hvor vores flittige LMT hold har fået kontorfaciliteter i de lokalområder, de arbejder i. Således har LMT hold 4 fået nyt kontor i Zubin Potok og LMT hold 5 i Skenderaj.

De nye kontorer skal fremme LMT holdenes muligheder for at tage pulsen på lokalområderne, således vi er på forkant med eventuelle problemer, hvis en dårlig stemning skulle brede sig, eller problemer skulle opstå. Men kontorerne skal også skabe tillid og tryghed, således lokalbefolkningen under sikre og præsentable forhold kan komme og fremføre deres problemer og ønsker for respektive LMT hold.

Afslutningsvis kan vi konstatere, at der sker en hel del her i Kosovo. Det har således været endnu en begivenhedsrig uge med masser af arbejde, udfordringer og dårligt vejr. I næste uge bliver vejret forhåbentligt bedre. Mon man skulle prøve at fedte lidt for feltpræsten - han kender vist en med indflydelse på det område, har jeg hørt.

-

AUSTERLITZ-BROEN I MITROVICA ER GENÅBNET, CA. 300 KOSOVO SERBERE HAR DEMONSTRERET MOD ÅBNINGEN. HOK skriver 050615:

Austerlitz broen i Mitrovicia åbnet uden problemer

Til trods for bebudede blokeringer af den meget symbolske bro i byen gav det ikke nævneværdige problemer i forbindelse med åbningen for civile biler i går.

Af: presseofficer Anders Faurschou Mathiesen

Sikkerhedsansvaret på broen blev for et par måneder siden overført fra franskmændene til det lokal politi.

Efter at broen der forbinder Mitrovicia Nord med den sydlige bydel nu har været åben i et par dage kan den danske bataljon i Mitrovicia konstatere at det stort set foregår i ro og fred. Ved den nordlige ende er der samlet en mindre gruppe på omkring 300 personer der overfor bl.a. bataljonens chef giver udtryk for frustrationer over at omverden ikke forstår deres følelser.

Samtidig er der på den fortrinsvis albansk dominerede sydlige side af broen meget fredeligt. De for øjeblikket få biler, fortrinsvis taxa, der har passeret broen er blevet mødt med råb men ikke nogen form for vold eller blokeringer.

Kommentar fra Rumænien (modtaget fra Xhemil Zeqiri; jeg vil kommentere artiklen i # 264):

Open letter, directed to Mr. Nicholas Burns, US State Department Undersecretary, to the Commissions on International Relations from US Senate and House of Representatives, and to Mr. Kofi Annan, UN Secretary-General

"THE LAW OF COMPROMISE" IN SETTLEMENT OF KOSOVA's FINAL STATUS WOULD NEVER EVER BRING PEACE AND STABILITY IN BALKANS.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

As citizen of Europe, I can't remain indifferent towards the countless sufferings of the Albanian people of Kosova and other ethnic territories that are still being conquered and colonized. Allow me, for this reason, to address to you, deeply worried about the manner in which the international community has began to project the settlement of the delicate problems of the colonial issues of Kosova Protectorate, territory of Ethnic Albania.

I welcome the fact that you thought about beginning this process after so much lost time and that this means a scission from the previous situation of Belgrade's direct oppression. However, I have to remind you that Kosova's "file", now lost somewhere in the drawers of UN Security Council and Contact Group, has begun to be written since 1912, since the cruel Serb army's invasion of Albanian territories (historic Kosova), at the beginning of the First Balkan War. Belgrade knew very well that the ethnic composition was including no more than 15 percent of Slavic population (and this percent is also exaggerated), but it took the decision to interfere and to act for the defeat of the anti-Ottoman Albanian revolt, aiming at the conquest and the assimilation of the Albanian people, in full accordance with its plans of territorial Pan-Slavic psycho-pathological expansion!

So, Serbia had occupied since 1912 half of the Albanian territory.

The Albanian territory inhabitated by the Albanians is much larger than what we call today the Albanian state

Tito divided then the Albanian territories through some political and administrative "fireworks", through the creation of the artificial "republics" like "Macedonia" or "Montenegro". The territories that are stretching now outside Republic of Albania, are conquered by Serbia (Presheva Valley, Toplica - Nish zone, ethnically cleansed, after 1878.), by FYROM (Vardar Valley), by Montenegro (Malesia: Ulqin, Plava, Gucia, Tuzi, Hoti, Gruda, Rozhaja, so on) and Greece (the territory named Chameria, no ethnically cleansed from the Albanian population, exiled in 1947 as a consequence of the Greek general Napoleon Zerva's command ).The narrowed Kosova is remaining half-conquested (Belgrade is involving in its affairs, with UNMIK acceptance) and its future is still seriously endangered.

This glance within history is necessary in determination of historic Kosova's real situation: a territory under the savage colonization of the Serb and its artificial sisters, which have not respected even for a second the life of the Albanians and their historic rights for living in a full freedom, in a single national state. I thing that only starting from this historic basis you would really appreciate how it must be solved the status of Kosova Protectorate.

It is also a common mistake to call the conflict that arises from this unacceptable situation as interethnic, because all the communities (Albanian, Serb, Slavic-Macedonian, Montenegrin, so on) have been living in peace and quiet, even that the cudgel of Slavic administration is still brandishing over Kosova, over Presheva and Vardar Valley, over Malesia and until Chameria. And to this cudgel we can reply, in the beginning, with political and diplomatic arguments, but also with popular resistance and anti-colonial war, taking into account the dreadful crimes and the behaviour of this government which promoted the idea of genocide. The Slavic regimes not only have adopted a policy of discrimination of Albanians in their ethnic territories, but also have brought crimes, expulsions, ferocious repression and terrible massacres upon the colonized Albanian people.

All these tragic events could have been avoided if the Serb and Montenegrin conquests of historic Kosova and of Malesia had accepted through "the law of compromise" between the opposite European alliances, at the Conference of Ambassadors from London (1913).

This was an "achievment" against the will of nation and of its legitimate representatives that had gathered in Vlora, proclaiming in 28 November 1912 Albania's independence and the unification of all Albanian territories within this state. Maybe this decision of the European states delayed with one single year the beginning of the First World War. Although, these absurd events and decisions have opened one of the most terrible and lasting conflicts in Balkans. Conflict that you, like your forerunner diplomats are trying to settle, using "the right of compromise". And this doesn't reflect the principle of correctness or the desire of creating a real peace in this zone of powder and blood.

It is more than visible that Russia, with China and France, are asking with all their force and political-diplomatic arsenal be maintained Serbia's colonial conquest on Kosova, also encouraging Belgrade to have a harsh voice against a status that could be favorable for the majority of the Albanian people in Kosova.

Esteemed ladies and gentlemen,

You have to accept that for this reason the international community's dialogue with "parts" is unilaterally. The Serb "diplomats" have been opened many international doors, enabling them to express openly. Meanwhile Albanians must always have the mouth closed and accept all the orders arisen from the "scientific researches" of the omnipotent UNMIK.

Serbia is not a permanent member in the Security Council and also it hasn't there a temporary mandate, but Serb politicians came there several times with a policy of beating with the boot on the table for the respect of the "sovereignty" of the Serb colonial metropolitan above its former colony, Kosova, in many meetings of this UN organism!!!

Anyway you have to know and not to forget who are your Serb interlocutors, because they aren't "pro-western democrats", but they are trying to appear at such a high level, where the future of the Albanian people is being decided.

Let's take a "noisy" example; Serbia's Foreign Affairs Minister, Vuk Draskovic, former "dissident" given the dictator and sometimes supporting him had during the '90-ies a "rebellious" position only in some aspects of the Serb interior politics. But referring to Kosova and to Albanians, it should not be forgotten the fact that "the Knife" savagely animated the Serb public opinion with a rhetoric containing some completely anti-Albanian "literary theories". He demanded publicly at a precise moment that the Yugoslav government would have to apply some discriminatory measure against the growing birth rate of Albanians in Kosova, allowing them to have only four children. "If you want five or more children -said Draskovic to Albanians - you will lose all the material profits that the Yugoslav state gives to the families with four children. And more, you will pay a double tax if you have five children, a treble tax at six children, and so on. If you come and say to me that Allah had obliged you to have ten children for monopolizing the Serb state, I answer to you that also Allah to pay you for this" (!)

This hurricane of anti-Albanian floods is still alive even today, exactly because some people of this kind achieved after Milosevic's collapse, so highly in the Serb state's hierarchy, becoming presidents, prime ministers, foreign ministers of this country. In the future months this will turn into a big hindrance in your attempts to re-orient Serbia to a real European course. And, how do you think you could do this, when Serbia has in its essence a political and psycho-sociologic substratum (collective stereotypical thinking and non-rational behavior) that can be very easily manipulated, that is still having its nationalist-aggressive anchor thrown in the emotional myths and legends of Kosova as "Serbia's heart", "cradle" or its "Jerusalem"? But, if you encourage these Serb chauvinistic personalities to be your interlocutors, even if the Serb political system is still the hostage of the anti-Albanian romantic and chauvinistic legacy that bring huge blockages in politics, economy and in the interethnic communication, you are doing a very big mistake.

Belgrade manipulated the reality about the situation of the Serb minority from Kosova, convincing you that Albanians living there want to revenge on this minority and that this false thesis really happened at the time of the popular protests of March 2004. I wouldn't wonder if Belgrade itself ordered to its paramilitary units from Kosova or to some Albanian-speaking elements to burn the churches and the Serb houses during the time of protests, judging the political capital won by Serbia for this reason.

A real inquiry, based on facts, is still not being done.

UNMIK began foolishly to arrest innocent persons, while Serbia was rewarded at a international level for this cunning plan that was used on terrain. The same feudal and arrogant UNMIK didn't tell any single precised word (as well as the entire international community) for the fact that Serbia is helping with money and logistics the Serb paramilitary bands, bringing them also an enforcement of Serb regular army's units and of the secret service, BIA (and at Belgrade it was publicly declared by Serb officials the presence in Kosova of BIA agents) This Serb militarist presence is a full disregard on the Kumanova Agreement (signed between Serbia and NATO) in 1999 and represents an aggression against the Albanian people of Kosova. And Belgrade encroaches upon it with both legs, because the armed troops of this aggressor state, not only have the aim to prepare the terrain for scission of the northern part of Kosova, but also they are making incursions in its territory, kidnapping Albanians. The last case is the kidnapping reported by local police in zone of Peja, where two Albanians became victims of this form of Serb state terrorism!!

These troops are also the Belgrade's guarantee of the fact that Serb minority wouldn't integrate in the society and in politics with the lack of the Serbia's administration order. So, without taking harsh measures against the different kind of troops "made in Serbia", the demands of the international community for return of the Serb minority would be perceived in Belgrade only as chatter that aren't to be taken into account. (!)

I cannot understand how can UNMIK come in this situation with a policy without correspondent in reality, and to inaugurate the dialogue Prishtina-Belgrade!!!

Belgrade has never proved that is sincere and it will discover cunningly, with this "democratic step", a manner to imply in Kosova's affairs, after the achievement of its final status. In case of a second Albanian state's creation, this would have its head into the pot of a old-styled "coexistence", namely of the Tito's modernized "brotherhood-union", taking into account the existence in Kosova's politics of some different collaborationist elements, which have served to Belgrade during and after its direct rule.

But Prishtina's political class is now educated by UNMIK to do only the things that are commanded to it, although there are also absurd decisions and proposals.

One of this is the game with the policy of standards.

The men of UNMIK thought to apply the principle "bread and circus", they have to give some trouble to the Albanian politicians, for stopping them to come with actions from their initiative, for the future of Kosova. "Standards" had the role of delaying of the situation of Kosova Protectorate, until its doomsday.

This chaotic situation is convenient for Nebojsa Covic and for his Centre for Coordination for Kosova, how his speech from the Security Council's meeting is proving. But this is not for the sake of the Albanian people from Kosova or of the international community, which pumped during this period a lot of money for the functioning of the UNMIK administration.

Esteemed ladies and gentlemen,

Concerning this point of standards it must be affirmed a thing:

neither the classical slogan of "standards before status", nor the new concept of "standard with status" it is not and it can't be a realist idea. Simultaneously, this is not a legal idea, taking into account that the UN General Assembly has approved some resolutions, where it is very clearly said that the level of development in different political, economical, social directions cannot be used as a blocking wall in the determination of a status for a territory under trusteeship. See for this the text of the General Assembly's resolutions 648 (article 3 and 4), 742 (article 6 and 7), 1514 (article 3).

Kosova had been for approximately a century a colony of Serbia and after NATO's bombardments against Yugoslavia it came under the UN trusteeship's mandate. This mandate should have been as short as possible, like in other territories in the same situation and it should have the role of preparing the terrain for organizing a referendum, in which the people of Kosova should decide alone for their future.

For equalizing the balance of powers at an international level, without any judgement for the situation, things were delayed.

I know, really, that pragmatism is needed for renouncing now at this irrational hindrance, in order not to put the settlement of status into a labyrinth of "examinations" and "reviews" referring to the implementation of standards, which is endangered to be overcame only with the speed of a paralyzed snail.

The policy after the motto "do not solve today, let it for tomorrow, maybe it won't be necessary", enforced also by the establishment of standards, could prove a turn against the initial goals of the international community, because unseen storms are hiding under the cloths of quit and "stability".

The protests of March 2004 have proved that the affairs in the international policies have to be settled in time and not when a unreachable situation of crises explodes. The analysts have predicted what could happen with the entire region, if they continue not to take into account the real situation, the general atmosphere and the future tendencies

And also you are aware that something must be done for hindering the escalation of this situation in this part of Balkans.

Unfortunately, not even one international organization or any country with inffluence in the world's politics hasn't been thinking about finding a lasting settlement to the Albanian issue, part of whose belongs also a decision about Kosova's status. "The law of compromise claims only the achievement to a compromise between the blocs that are in opposition at this point on the global level, respectively with a dialogue between Serbs and Albanians on a Balkan level. Through this dialogue you are also equalizing the victim (Kosova's Albanians) with the aggressor (Serbia), while the mocking political games can be reflected even now, through the conditions that the Group of Contact have put with the aim of maintaining the status-quo that will result after the end of the process.

Having as a "analytical basis" the International Crisis Group's report Nr.161 for Europe, you will not achieve to find peace and stability in Balkans.

Actually the region is stigmatized by some phenomena that mustn't have happened, especially by a foolishly status quo, in which Albania is bordering upon its territory and people.

The phenomenon of globalization has appeared in the entire world and because of it, states are in a growing interdependence. In Balkans, the greatest enemy of this process is the aggressive nationalism that supposes also the colonization of the Albanian territories. And it cannot be made any step forward towards the integration in Euro-Atlantic structures in this situation, even less through the policy of "centralization-planification" of a part of the international community, which desires to maintain the Serbia-Montenegro and FYROM's colonization on Albanian territories.

The most coherent and adequate settlement for the issue of Kosova it is suggested by a significant quote from the book of M.S.Korowicz "La souverainete des Etats et l'ouvenir des droit international" (page 945):

"States, in order to be interdependent, must be independent, but to depend on the international law"

Ladies and Gentlemen,

This is what the administration of Belgrade and Skopje, with their traditional allies (Russia, France, China), with International Crisis Group and those who signed the Rambouillet agreement (Rugova, Thaçi, Qosja, Surroi) for stopping the changes of the borders between Kosova and Serbia, want to avoid. This agreement, which is included in that "famous" Rambouillet agreement, must be annulled because it is obsolete. The international and the local representatives said at that moment: "after three years the people of Kosova will decide for its future", while, until now, 6 years have passed and nothing happened. Really, where it is the international justice for the Albanian people, that it has suffered so much?!.

And now, "the law of compromise" is coming into play and this includes an "examination of standards" and "a negotiated solution" for Kosova. How much do you think the Albanian people can endure?!.

A just decision of the international community referring to Kosova Protectorate and to other Albanian territories would necessarily include stipulations, which strictly respect the international law - the right of self-determination and of de-colonization. You have to permit to the Albanians of Kosova Protectorate, of Vardar and Presheva Valley, of Malesia to organize an inter-Albanian referendum, in which they would decide what they want for their future, if they want to live divided into five states, with two Albanian countries and a growing implication of the Slavic-Greek neighbors into their affairs, or to live together in a state, in the Reunited Albania?!

For the achievment of this purpose is also necessary your determination, so we could say "goodbye" to the "law of compromise", which has characterized the international relations in the last century, bringin so much suffering, tragedy and wars in the violent Balkans.

With great respect,

Mona Agrigoroaiei

Romania, 30 May 2005

ØST KOSÓVA / PRESEVO-DALEN / SYD-SERBIEN

For nemheds skyld bruges betegnelsen Øst Kosóva / Presevo-dalen om det omstridte område med byerne: Presheva, Medvegja og Bujanoci (Albansk stavemåde). Ca. 75 % af befolkningen skønnes at være etniske Albanere - måske omkring 70.000. En modstandsgruppe har været i funktion, men synes nu at være »lukket ned«. Gruppen kaldtes i forkortet form UCPMB (som står for noget i retning af: Ushtria Clirimtare e Presheva, Medvegja dhe Bujanoci; på Engelsk: Liberation Army of Presheva, Medvegja and Bujanoci). Gruppen sagde at den intet havde at gøre med Kosova's UCK, og at den var en lokal gruppe.

Albansk deltagelse i besluttende organer. B92 skriver:

BUJANOVAC -- Wednesday – Serbian Minister of Education, Slobodan Vuksanovic, and Justice Minister Zoran Stojkovic will be in South Serbia today meeting with regional officials.

The two ministers met with Coordination Center President Nebojsa Covic and Bujanovac, Presevo and Medvedja municipal officials Nagip Arifij, Rizo Halimiji and Slobodan Draskovic. According to Minister Stojkovic, the main topic of discussion was including the Albanian representatives into the workings of the legislative institutions of South Serbia.

“It has been agreed for the Albanians to hand in applications for positions in the criminal and justice courts. We have agreed to find some office space in Presevo where people could work without disruption and we have scheduled for them to come and take some tests, since UNMIK’s diplomas are accepted. They are already working in certain agencies and there is nothing standing in the way of getting this done, and the next step will be to bring in bilingual procedures, which is already stipulated by law, so we should have no problems with that.” Stojkovic said.

ALBANIEN

Klik på kortet, hvis du vil have det forstørret / click http://bjoerna.dk/kort/Albanien.gif to enlarge it

Info fra Albaniens Statistik: Befolkningstal: 3,1 Mio (1.1.2004). GDP (Gross Domestic Product): 630 Mia Lek (2002, current prices); GDP-structure: Agriculture: 26 %, Industry 10-11 %, Construction: 7-8 %, Services: 55-56 %. Export: 54 mia lek (2003) [heraf til Danmark: 23 mio lek; størrelsesorden 1,2 mio kr], Import: 226 mia lek (2003) [Heraf fra Danmark: 855 mio lek; størrelsesorden: 45-50 mio kr], Tradedeficit: 171 mia lek (2003). Største import fra Italien (75 mia lek) og Grækenland (45 mia lek), største eksport til Italien (40 mia lek). Unemployment: 14-15 % (2004-III)

Det Engelske Udenrigsministeriums 'Country Advice' til rejsende kan findes på adressen: http://www.fco.gov.uk/servlet/Front?pagename=OpenMarket%2FXcelerate%2FShowPage&c=Page&cid=1007029390590&a=KCountryAdvice&aid=1013618385522. Det Danske UM har pt ingen rejsevejledning, men henviser til det Engelske UM. Den Norske Ambassade kan findes på: http://www.norvegji.org/. Det Amerikanske UM har Juni 2004 offentliggjort en 'Background Note' om Albanien: http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3235.htm

Mother Teresa: http://bjoerna.dk/albanien/Teresa.htm.

Præsident Moisiu's aktiviteter [Billederne i denne sektion kan som regel forstørres ved at klikke på dem (mens man er på nettet)]:

Præsidenten har under sit besøg i Kruja-området mødtes med Journalister som stillede ham en række spørgsmål i anledning af valget. Præsidentkontoret har udsendt flg.:

The President of the Republic, Alfred Moisiu answering to the interest of journalists regarding the implementation of the Code of Conduct in this electoral campaign stated: “The Code of Conduct is a new step and a good effort to introduce a new political morality in Albania, which we need so much. As any new thing, it is being assimilated with difficulty, although lately I have noticed a harshening of the tones. I would suggest especially to the leaders of the main parties to be more careful, for themselves and for their collaborators.”

President Moisiu, while praising those who resigned, stressed that there many things that are not foreseen by the law, but that must be kept in mind for the future.

Regarding the resignation institution, President Moisiu stated that: “It is the first time it is gaining the citizenship in our country and this process must continue.”

The answer of the Head of State to the question about Nano-Berisha debate was: “The debates are positive, but they always must be held in calm tone and alternatives about the future, not on the past.”

Præsident Moisiu har (igen) haft møde med Den Centrale Valgkommission, denne gang dog kun med Formand Celibashi. Præsidentkontoret har udsendt flg.:

The President of the Republic, Alfred Moisiu called in a meeting the Head of the Central Election Commission, Ilirjan Celibashi.

The Head of CEC informed President Moisiu about the actual progress and problems of the electoral process. The Head of State stressed once again how important is for the July 3 elections to be a turning point in the electoral processes in Albania by conducting free and fair elections in accordance to the international standards.

Further on President Moisiu suggested that the Central Elections Commission must compile and publish periodical technical reports on the problems of the elections, to issue clear and public guidelines on specific issues, especially about the procedures during the voting day, to seriously and transparently review the demands of various electoral parties, to continue with the training of the commissioners and to intensify the sensitizing campaign about the voting participation.

Other problems of the electoral process were also discussed in the meeting.

Præsident Moisiu har deltaget i en højtidelighed på Børnecenteret Betania i Bupq i Kruja-området. Institutionen er Italiensk Katolsk orienteret: Præsidentkontoret har udsendt flg.:

The President of the Republic, Alfred Moisiu inaugurated today the new premises of the children’s Center “Betania” in the Bupq Commune in the district of Krujë. On this occasion, the president of the “Betania” Association, Antonietta Vitale welcomed President Moisiu, the Archbishop of Durrës and Tirana, Monsignor Rrok Mirdita, representatives of the Commune and also Albanian and Italian teachers, children and inhabitants of this Center. Well-prepared and experienced personnel take care and are dedicated to eighty-six needy children of the Center.

In his greeting speech, Mr. Moisiu praised the humane work and contribution in the interest of this category of children and called this work a great example to all in our country, first of all to the business people, who must be close to people in need. “The possibilities of business do exist and they can come to the aid of the families and children. There are these businessmen who pour millions and millions in the electoral campaign; if they would donate a percentage to these needy people, it would have been the greatest help. It is time to have more humanism and more care paid to those that are in need. The Government too must be more attentive in this direction. Children here receive not only the economical aid, but they are kept away from the streets and hardships that accompany this phenomenon. And this is the greatest thing that you have done.”

On this occasion President Moisiu bestowed upon Mrs. Vitale “The Medal of Gratitude” for the dedicated, sensitive and passionate work done assisting the communities in Albania.

After the ribbon cutting ceremony, President Moisiu visited the internal premises of this Center and discussed about the work carried out and problems with the directors and the present personalities.

PM Fatos Nano's aktiviteter: [Billederne i denne sektion kan som regel forstørres ved at klikke på dem (mens man er på nettet)]

PM Nano er fortsat særdeles flittig med at rejse landet tyndt og støtte Socialistpartiets Kandidater; han har endogså støttet opstillingen af Anastas Angjeli som han engang beskyldte for at være korrupt, men siden Partikongressen i December 2003 (hvor Nano indgå en serie samarbejdsaftaler med forskellige dele af partiet), har der ikke været flere beskyldninger mod Angjeli. Om aktiviteten vil flytte mange stemmer er tvivlsomt, derimod har det nok en vis betydning at økonomien er væsentligt bedre end under Berisha (omend stadig ikke fremragende), at der er en vis økonomisk fremgang osv.:

Fushë-Çidhe og Peshkopisë i Dibra-området, hvor Ilir Gjoni kandiderer

Kreds 32 i Tirana hvor Luan Rama kandiderer (Rama måtte træde tilbage som Politiminister i Efteråret 2003 fordi han havde slået på en Journalist der irriterede ham):

Kreds 38 i Tirana hvor Anastas Angjeli kandiderer:

Kreds 33 i Tirana hvor Arben Ahmetaj og kreds 37 i Tirana hvor Shpëtim Idrizi kandiderer:

Prrenjasit, hvor Rrapush Tola stiller op:

Pogradecit - hvor Fatmir Xhafaj stiller op:

Korca-området hvor bl.a. Pandelit Majko og Ben Blushi kandiderer:

Vlora-området, “Musa Çakërri”-skolen:

Vlora-området, 'rehabilitering af et vejstykke':

Perondise i Kuçove hvor Bashkim Fino opstiller:

Kozares i Kuçove hvor Marko Bello opstiller:

Parlamentsvalget i 2005 [Præsidenten vælges af Parlamentet for 5 år, næste gang i 2007]:

Valgloven for 2005 kan hentes i pdf-format på: http://www.osce.org/item/14076.html (Engelsk) og http://www.osce.org/item/14076.html?lc=SQ (Albansk).

HTML-udgaver: http://www.osce.org/item/14076.html?html=1 (Engelsk) og http://www.osce.org/item/14076.html?html=1&lc=SQ (Albansk)

Den Centrale Valgkommission har udsendt flg. meddelelser:

The CEC concludes the collection of information by Local Government Units

[14.06.2005] The Central Elections Commission declares that the deadline of collecting information on the number of voting centers and the number of voters for each voting center of local units has ended. The deadline ended the past midnight, and only 357 local units have delivered the respective information to the CEC.

The chairmen of local units have responded to the public appeal of the Central Elections Commission, thus making possible the collection of information and its processing. The start of the printing process of ballot papers is the next step the CEC shall take.

Only 27 local units have not observed their legal obligation on the delivery of information. The Central Elections Commission shall compile, within today, the act of penal denunciation for the chairmen of these local units on hindering the election process. The penal denunciation shall be made at the Prosecution of the respective districts.

The Central Elections Commission assesses that the obstacle of the last days is overcome and makes an appeal to all the structures of implementation of the election process to show a greater will and cooperation in order to manage successfully the July 3, 2005 elections to the Albanian Assembly.

The CEC warns the chairmen of local units of Albania

[11.06.2005] The declaration of today regards the lack of data on the number of voting centers and the number of voters on the final list for each voting center. This lack is due to the fact that chairmen of local governments, except for the Mayor of Elbasan Municipality, have not filed with the CEC the information regarding the number of voting centers for each local government unit and the number of voters on the final list for each voting center.

If until June 13, 2005, the CEC shall not receive the number of voting centers for each local government unit and the number of voters on the final list, then the 3 July 2005 election process is seriously endangered. From the physical and time point of view, it is impossible that the ballots be printed, packed for each voting center and all the other election material be organized for each voting center.

If the delays go beyond the deadline I just declared, it is sure that 3 July 2005 elections shall be endangered, in the sense that it would be impossible to vote in all the territory of the Republic of Albania. The CEC considers it an absolute irresponsibility of local government authorities and of other authorities which in one way or the other might be related to this issue, because they have had all the necessary time to prepare all the information to be sent to the CEC.

It is noticed that some local units’ chairmen have started to add voting centers, beyond the terms established by law and by CEC decision. The law clearly provides that the process of division of voting centers and their union ends with the preparation of the preliminary voters list. The CEC has set May 16 2005 as the deadline, within which the chairmen of local government should have carried out and taken all the decisions in regard to the union and division of VCs. Every division of the VC beyond this deadline constitutes a serious violation of the law and CEC decisions.

I hope that the local units start reflecting through this public appeal, otherwise the responsibility shall be not only penal but also administrative. The CEC is preparing the respective draft-acts to apply other sanctions, except for those applied, and at the same time we shall denounce to the prosecution authority all the local government chairmen, who, until Monday, 13 June 2005, shall not submit the information regarding the number of voting centers and the number of voters on the final list.

Mjaft har påstået at nogle af Parlamentskandidaterne har været indblandet i kriminalitet. PM Nano afviser dette fsv angår Socialisterne. ADN skriver:

The major political forces rejected the statements of the Mjaft! (Enough) Movement that persons with a criminal background are running in the July 3 parliamentary elections. The chairman of the Socialist Party (SP), Fatos Nano said at a news conference on Wednesday that the candidates of the ruling parties had undergone all the necessary verifications before the list of candidates was compiled.

Berisha's Demokrater er også i fuld sving med valgmøder. Demokraternes avis - »Rilindja« - havde forleden ovenstående forside. Det forlyder at både Nano's Socialister og Berisha's Demokrater har skaffet sig professionel bistand forskellige steder i udlandet. Begge partier har gjort noget ved sit ydre; der er skaffet nye kampagnebannere, nye kampagnekasketter og nye kampagnebluser i de rigtige farver (det kan man dog ikke se på billedet lige ovenfor). Berisha skal have entreret med det Amerikanske PR-firma Barbour, Griffith and Rogers og med political strategist Stuart Stevens, mens Nano skal have entreret med et Amerikansk og et Israelsk PR-firma.

Kampen mod terrorismen: The multinational Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). USAs UM Condoleezza Rice og Albaniens UM Kastriot Islami har i fællesskab skrevet - eller måske snarere lagt navn til - flg. artikel:

PSI at Two Years: Counter-Proliferation Practice Makes Perfect

Condoleezza Rice, U.S. Secretary of State, and Kastriot Islami Foreign Minister of Albania

(This joint article marks the second anniversary of the Proliferation Security Initiative's launch by President Bush in Krakow in May 2003.)

A train is rolling through the Polish countryside toward the Czech border. Among its dozens of freight cars carrying shipments of commercial goods and commodities are materials that are used as precursors to chemical weapons. These materials appear to be bound for a legitimate manufacturer in Prague. But intelligence services and foreign ministries have good reason to believe otherwise. They have shared information, and defense and law enforcement officials in Poland and the Czech Republic are on alert. The train will be boarded and inspected at its first stop inside Czech territory. Next week, a private aircraft will fly westward from Italy and the plane will be intercepted by Spanish fighters after similar information is received about its suspected cargo.

Fortunately, these alarming events are not real. They are training scenarios that participants in the multinational Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) are using to stop the real-life spread of weapons of mass destruction.

May 31st marked the Proliferation Security Initiative’s second anniversary. Under this Initiative, nations across the globe – including the United States and Albania – are working in partnership to reduce the risk of weapons of mass destruction falling into the hands of terrorists, rogue states, or black marketeers. Over the past two years, a variety of participants have led fourteen interdiction training exercises in Europe, Asia, and the Americas. Later this year, Singapore and Norway will lead PSI-related activities.

In another example of close bi-national collaboration both Albania and the United States are committed to ensuring that Albania's chemical agents stockpile left over from the communist era is eliminated in accordance with the Chemical Weapons Convention. The mechanism for this dangerous legacy's destruction is the U.S. Cooperative Threat Reduction, also known as Nunn-Lugar Program, launched for the first time outside of the Former Soviet Union here in Albania at the end of 2004.

Over 60 countries already participate in the PSI, and additional participants are welcome. Most recently, Argentina, Georgia and Iraq have endorsed the Initiative. PSI has – and needs – no formal support structure, secretariat, headquarters, or chairperson. Rather, PSI consists of an agreement among participating states to take concerted action against proliferation through cooperation among their law enforcement communities, militaries, and foreign ministries. The PSI Statement of Interdiction Principles sets out the core objectives and cooperative methods of the Initiative. All actions taken by partner countries must be consistent with national and international laws, regulations and procedures. Participants also are considering how these existing frameworks might be strengthened.

PSI advances the spirit and letter of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1540, which calls on all UN member states “to take cooperative action” to prevent trafficking related to weapons of mass destruction. UN Secretary General Kofi Annan has applauded the work of all countries active in the Initiative and highlighted it as an example of the type of cooperative action that nations should be pursuing to reduce the current global proliferation threat. The Secretary General’s 2004 “High Level Panel Report on Threats, Challenges and Change” cites the smuggling network of renegade Pakistani scientist A.Q. Khan as a reminder of the need to take new actions to interdict clandestine trade in components required for nuclear, chemical, biological or radiological weapons development.

As we have learned from the unraveling of the A.Q. Khan network, proliferators are employing increasingly sophisticated and aggressive measures to obtain materials related to weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems. They rely heavily on front companies and brokers in their quest for arms, equipment, sensitive technology, and dual-use goods and they hide their illicit trafficking amid legitimate commerce. An early success of the PSI – the 2003 interdiction of the BBC China – shows how cooperative international efforts can stop proliferators in their tracks and prevent the exploitation of vital trade flows.

For the terrorist, the acquisition of a nuclear, chemical, biological or radiological device can only mean one thing – mass murder and devastation on a scale far worse than that of the September 11, Beslan, Madrid, Bali and other attacks of recent memory combined. Every day, the U.S., Albania, and more than 60 other nations participating in the PSI are working in partnership to ensure that such a nightmare never occurs – here or anywhere else within our international community.

European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (under Europarådet) har udsendt statusrapport om forholdene i Albanien. Rapporten kan downloades; nedenfor flg. resumé. Det fremgår at forholdene på en række områder er blevet bedre i Albanien, men at der stadig er nogle mangler - fx er minoriteterne ikke repræsenteret i passende grad i det offentlige liv:

Third report on Albania

Executive summary

Since the publication of ECRI's second report on Albania on 3 April 2001, progress has been made in a number of the fields highlighted in the report. A "National Strategy for the Improvement of Living Conditions of the Roma" has been developed that sets out to eliminate discrimination towards Roma in different fields of life. A Special State Committee on Minorities has been established and mandated to make recommendations to the government with respect to the promotion of the rights of minorities. Furthermore a pre-screening procedure has been put in place in order to determine the status of non-citizens caught in the country in an illegal situation and ensure that persons who are trafficked, asylum seekers and those seeking repatriation are each treated in the manner appropriate to their situation. A National Strategy to Combat Trafficking has also been adopted. Moreover police at all levels have been provided with training in human rights.

However, a number of recommendations made in ECRI's second report have not been implemented or have only been partially implemented. In particular, ECRI is concerned about the representation and participation of persons belonging to minority groups in public life, an issue which is of special concern to ECRI. There have been few detectable improvements in the situation of Roma and Egyptians who suffer from a situation of particular marginalisation and neglect in Albanian society. Egyptians have also found themselves discriminated, as a result of discussions over their identity, in respect of their opportunities to bring their specific problems and concerns to the attention of the authorities. The reportedly disproportionate number of Roma and Egyptian children who are victims of trafficking is also a problem of particular concern to ECRI. Moreover ECRI notes that a nation-wide census including information on national, ethnic and religious belonging has still not been carried out. ECRI also raises a number of issues relating to the legal framework for combating discrimination, minority language education, registration in the civil register and housing.

ECRI recommends in this report that the Albanian authorities take further action in a number of fields. It calls, inter alia, for a wide range of measures aimed at improving the participation and representation of members of some minority groups in political decision-making bodies and political processes at national and local level. ECRI recommends that measures be taken to ensure the full inclusion of Roma and Egyptians in all aspects of social, economic and political life and urges the authorities to take further measures to combat the trafficking of Roma and Egyptian children. It also recommends to the authorities to ensure that Roma are consistently involved in all aspects of the implementation and evaluation of the "National Strategy for the Improvement of Living Conditions of the Roma" at national and local level and that Egyptians do not experience discrimination with respect to their participation and access to State institutions. In addition, ECRI recommends to the authorities to consider the adoption of a specific National Strategy aimed at improving the situation of Egyptians in Albania. ECRI furthermore recommends the collection of data enabling the situation of different minority groups in the country to be assessed. It also recommends the authorities to take further measures to ensure the thorough investigation of allegations of ill-treatment by police and to ensure that the rights of asylum seekers and migrants continue to be guaranteed.

Verdensbanken har bevilget lån til udbygning af bjergområderne. Lzazar Semini (AP) skriver bl.a.:

The World Bank and other international institutions gave a US$ 19.4 million (euro 15.85 million) grant to Albania to reduce poverty and fight land erosion in its mountainous regions, a bank statement said Friday. The government proposed the project to improve its management of mountain forests and pastures, where the poorest of Albania's 3.2 million population tend to live, chopping down trees for wood to use for heating.

Vejbyggeri i Sydalbanien (Fier/Tepelena-området). Den Europæiske Investeringsbank og Den Europæiske Bank for Rekonstruktion og Udvikling har hver især ydet et lån på 35 mio €. Beløbet skal bruges på at anlægge 35 km ny vej og til at 'genoprette' 33 km eksisterende vej. Foruden de 70 mio € skal investeres 15-16 mio €.

Arbejdsløsheden er meget svagt faldende. Fra midten af 2004 til begyndelsen af 2005 er den registrerede arbejdsløshed faldet fra ca. 160.000 til ca. 156.000. Figuren overdriver faldet i ledigheden (fordi den nederste - og store - del af kurven er skåret af). Albaniens Statistik skriver:

During the first quarter 2005, the number of employed persons remain in the same level with the end of year 2004. Labour force in total is decrease with only 1 thousand persons because the number of registered unemployed persons in the labour offices is reduced. In the first quarter, number of unemployed persons fall in 156 thousands. But the number of persons receiving unemployment benefits is decrease with five hundred and in this group are included even the persons treated by special schemes of payment based on Government Decisions. The unemployment rate during this period is 14.3 per cent. The average monthly wages of the public sector is increased with 3 percent compared with the average of the fourth quarter 2004. This comes because according of Government Decisions for same special branches of employed persons in system of Education (pre university education), and in same groups of employed under the system of Health, the wages are increased begging from the end of 2004.

Nedenfor følger supplerende tabelmateriale (tallet 17 vedr. gnstl. løn i det Offentlige i 2005/I er forkert; det skal snarere være ca. 27.000 - som er det tal der står i den Albanske udgave af tabellen).

Børnearbejde. UNICEF m.fl. har undersøgt omfanget af børnearbejde i Albanien. Man mener det er i stigning. Det skønnes at ca. 30 % af unge mlm 13 og 18 arbejder, særligt i landbrugssektoren. Ifølge ny lovgivning må man ikke beskæftige unge under 16.

Figur fra IMF-rapport. Bemærk data for Albanien. Se under: Makedonien.

ADN skriver at Nationalbanken har godkendt salget af aktierne i Dardania Bank til Italienske Købere. Interesser i Kosóva har øjensynlig været involveret, men hvilke?:

TIRANA - The Supervisory Council of the Central Bank (BoA) has okayed the transfer of 100 per cent of Dardania Bank shares to Banca Popolare Pugliese and Francesco Mariano Mariano (Italy), local media reported Wednesday. BoA approved early this week the transfer of 100 per cent of Dardania Bank shares to its main shareholder account, the "Fonds der Republik von Kosova" in Germany, which was also recognized as the official owner of the Dardania Bank.

Direktøren for Nationalbanken - Ardian Fullani - har holdt oplæg på et Sortehavsmøde. Nedenfor følger hans CV og andre informationer om Nationalbanken:

BANK OF ALBANIA, PUBLIC RELATIONS DEPARTMENT

Speech held by Governor of Bank of Albania, Mr. Ardian Fullani at the Black Sea Business Day in Yerevan, Armenia, 6th June 2005

Distinguished Ladies and gentlemen,

Dear participants,

It’s a great pleasure for me having the opportunity to participate in this regional meeting of Black Sea countries. I have always appreciated this initiative as a special opportunity for all the countries being involved in.

In my long career, I have realized that the success of this business consists generally in the ability it has to gain public confidence. Nevertheless, the overall economic, political and social environment of the country is playing also an important role. During my career, I have been witness of many events which directly or indirectly have damaged the banking system.

The monetary collapse of the banking system at the end of the communist era, the flourishing and degenerating of the fraudulent investment schemes, as well as many other social, political and economic problems that have associated the Albanian transition, made the banking system “suffer” for a long time. However the reputation of the Albanian Banking system is in place recently. It’s enough if I just refer to the latest problematic episode occurred in Albania, in early spring of 2002, when due to the lack of public information and to political speculation with the introduction of the deposit guarantee scheme, the confidence of households was traumatized, leading to a considerable deposit run from the banking system.

Having a look at all the statistical indicators, it results that the banking system at that time it was sound and growing continuously. But, all this was insufficient since the memories of year 1997 (the collapse of fraudulent schemes) were still present and households sensitivity to them was very high.

Inspite of the recent significant achievements I would like to stress that still there is a high potential of fragility in our economy and the entire region as well. As a consequence, I think that we have to be much more prudent and much more diligent when speaking about the financial stability of the country. This episode suggests, inter alia, the necessity to associate the reforms with concrete preparatory steps and, certainly, combined with back-up plans in the case of failure. For this purpose the market needs to be intensively prepared and elaborated since in early stages of the implementation of reforms. It is imperative that the decisionmakers should themselves know in advance the the market behavior and sentiments.

Last spring, a joint assessment of the Albanian financial sector conducted from both the International Monetary Fund and World Bank (FSAP) concluded that: the financial sector consists mainly of a regulated and supervised banking system. The Stress-Test indicated that the level of different risk exposure to the banking system is rather low, an argument that supports this conclusion.

The banking system has experienced remarkable developments over 2004. After the licensing of Popular Bank, with Albanian capital, the number of banks increased from 15 to 16, and a preliminary license is granted to Union Bank, which is expected to raise the number of banks to 17 over 2005. The system assets have further increased by 14 percent while there was an increase of banking products and an expansion of their network. During this year there will be sold the public shares of both the Italian Albanian Bank and United Bank of Albania, which will lead to an increase of effectiveness and banking competition, paving the way to the processes of selling, merging and acquisitions towards a new consolidation of the banking system.

The lending activity increased by 38 percent where one can distinguish inter alia the significant growth of medium-term and long-term loans compared to short-term loans.

The map of coverage of the country with the banking system has further expanded, including new areas ever covered before. At the end of 2004, the total number of branches reached 88, or 11 branches more that the end of the previous year, while the number of agencies recorded for the first time a full three-digit number, 100 and the number of the employed people increased by 26 percent.

The high increase of the number of branches relative to agencies shows that banks are not interested only in providing the service of collecting deposits but also in providing other products like crediting to the economy. These developments, besides their positive contribution in enhancing the financial intermediation speak for a better perception of the investing potential from banks, in Albania.

An outstanding development is mainly related to the client service, which is accompanied through electronic terminals by the increasing number of electronic cards in circulation. Banks offer already debit and credit cards in co-operation with international companies such as Visa and MasterCard. Six banks provide the ATM service and the number of ATMs reached 108 by the end of February 2005.

The banking system results to have a profit level, which has been increasing to Lek 5.1 billion. Return on equity (ROE) was estimated at 21 percent while problem credits represent only 4.2 percent, from 4.6 percent in the previous year.

On the other hand, for the rest of the financial sector the FSAP reports indicates many problems, which simultaneously contain many themes including essential issues such as their supervision. Although, due to their small dimensions, these problems do not present imminent risks for the time being, they still should be carefully examined and resolved.

Returning to the assessments made under FSAP in other countries similar to Albania (I mainly refer here to South East European Countries, SEEC) and to many other financial reports referring to this region, we realize that these problems are similar and these countries suffer more or less similar symptoms. If one has a look back at the history, it realizes that it can not happen differently. The regional tradition is poor, of little inheritance in institutions, market rule and behaviour, and financial intermediation. However, today, about 15 years after the big collapse of the communist regime it seems that South East European Countries (SEEC) have been engaged in an irreversible process of their stabilization and integration with the rest of Europe.

Supplerende info:

Pursuant to Article 53, Law “On the Bank of Albania” No. 8269, dated 23.12.1997, the Governor shall serve as the Chief Executive Officer of the Bank of Albania in charge of the day-to-day business of the Bank of Albania and Chairman of the Supervisory Council of the Bank of Albania.

The Governor shall be responsible to the Supervisory Council for the execution of its decisions, including the implementation of monetary, credit, and exchange rate policies, and for the direction, control and supervision of the administration and operations of the Bank of Albania. In particular, the Governor is vested the power to take all actions required or deemed advisable by him for the administration or operations of the Bank of Albania.

The Governor is appointed by the Assembly on the proposal of the President of the Republic. The term of the Governor shall be seven years, and he may be eligible for reappointment.

By Decision No. 152 of the Albanian Parliament, dated October 28, 2004, Mr. Ardian Fullani is appointed Governor of the Bank of Albania.

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Mr. Ardian Fullani graduated in Economics, Finance branch, and in Law, at University of Tirana, respectively in 1977 and 1991. His experience in the field of banking is very rich. He first started working at the State Bank of Albania as Deputy Director of Foreign Department during 1987 - 1990 and later on at the Albanian Commercial Bank as Head of Foreign Department till 1992. His experience with the Italian Albanian Bank includes the period 1997-2004, first in the position of Director of Finance and Development Department, and recently as General Manager. He has been working also in the capacity of President of the Albanian Association of Banks and the Institute of Banking Studies and Assistance, as well as Commissioner of the Albanian Security Commission.

Mr. Ardian Fullani started his work in the field of central banking in 1992, in the position of Deputy Governor of the Bank of Albania and further on, during 1993-1996, as Director of Foreign Department. During his activity in this field, he gave his valuable contribution in creating the Central Banking in Albania, in preparing rules and regulations of the Bank, especially with regard to the foreign exchange market, foreign reserve management policies and strategies of the Bank of Albania intermediation, as well as enhancing the fruitful collaboration with the IMF, WB, EBRD and other international financial institutions important for the development of the banking and financial system in Albania.

Mr. Fullani worked also as Coordinator of foreign-financed investment programs, mainly for German-Albanian financial and technical co-operation (including FEFAD, Foundation for Enterprise Finance and Development); Albanian Coordinator for the establishment and licensing of the first joint-stock commercial banks (Italian Albanian Bank and Arab Albanian Islamic Bank); Coordinator and participant with the Albanian External Debt Committee of the Paris Club and Advisory Committee of 40 creditor banks, to restructure and settle Albania's outstanding external debt, etc.

His experience is extended as well to the field of consultancy on the national and international development projects, where it is worthy mentioning, inter alia, the German-Albanian projects on financing small and medium-size enterprises in agriculture and agro-industry; the restructuring and institutionalization of the foreign exchange market and the development of capital market in Albania; the analysis on capital market in Albania, as well as the study on risks and consequences of the formalization, restructuring or transformation of pyramid schemes in Albania.

He participated in several long-term and medium-term training courses offered by the IMF, WB, EBRD, the Central Bank, foreign commercial banks, etc. He also wrote many articles and scientific papers on economic issues.

He is fluent in English, Italian and German.

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Former Governors:

Prof. Dr. Shkëlqim Cani (August 1997-October 2004)

Qamil Tusha (April 1997-August 1997)

Kristaq Luniku (December 1994-April 1997)

Dylber Vrioni (September 1993-December 1994)

Ilir Hoti (May 1992-September 1993)

SERBIEN og MONTENEGRO. SERBIEN (alene)

Det Amerikanske UM har Juli 2004 offentliggjort en 'Background Note' om Serbien - Montenegro: http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5388.htm ... Det Engelske Udenrigsministeriums 'Country Advice' til rejsende kan findes på adressen: http://www.fco.gov.uk/servlet/Front?pagename=OpenMarket%2FXcelerate%2FShowPage&c=Page&cid=1007029390590&a=KCountryAdvice&aid=1013618386622 ... En biografi over tidligere Forbundspræsident Kostunica kan læses på Serbiske Politikere ... Mht ICTYs sag mod tidligere Præsident Milosevic, se (evt.) under ICTY ovenfor.

Præsidentvalg i Serbien. Boris Tadic blev i Juni 2004 valgt som Præsident. Seneste Parlamentsvalg: 031228.

Kosovo / Kosóva: Der er faldet dom i en sag mod en Officer der havde dræbt både nogle Serbere og nogle Albanere i Kosóva. UM i Serbien-Montenegro skriver:

FORMER SPECIAL OPERATIONS UNIT OFFICER SENTENCED FOR MURDER OF CIVILIANS IN KOSOVOBELGRADE,Jun 14 (Tanjug) - Former Special Operations Unit (JSO) officer Goran Veselinovic was sentenced Tuesday to 40 years by the Kraljevo District Court. Veselinovic was found guilty of killing two Serb and two ethnic Albanian civilians in Kosovska Mitrovica in 1999, Belgrade media said.

Den Amerikanske Ambassade i Beograd har udsendt flg. om Srebrenica

Remarks by Mr. Roderick Moore, Charge d'Affaires

"Srebrenica - Beyond a Reasonable Doubt", June 11, 2005

First of all, I would like to applaud the organizers of today's conference. As we approach the solemn anniversary of the Srebrenica massacre, it is appropriate that we commit ourselves to remembering what happened there ten years ago. The crimes committed in Srebrenica, the most heinous and destructive in Europe since the Second World War, must not be forgotten. This tenth anniversary year should be seen as an opportunity - for introspection, for reflection, for reconciliation, for healing, and, most importantly, for justice.

I would also like to take this opportunity to express publicly my admiration of Natasa Kandic and the Humanitarian Law Center for their inspiring courage, boundless energy, and relentless drive to ensure that the perpetrators of war crimes be brought to justice and that the victims of those crimes be appropriately honored and remembered. Natasa, you and your colleagues are embarked on a noble crusade that deserves the profound gratitude and support of all people who believe in justice.

" Beyond Reasonable Doubt." This is a fitting name for this conference and a fitting topic for us to be discussing. It is an indisputable fact that, ten years ago, Serb forces under the command of Ratko Mladic massacred almost 8000 Bosnians in the enclave of Srebrenica. This atrocity has been documented through thousands of testimonials by witnesses and relatives, through the discovery of numerous mass graves, and even through last year's admission by the government of the Republika Srpska that Serb forces conducted the killings. More recently, the appearance of the now famous videotape should remove the doubts from the mind of any reasonable person about the scope and brutality of this massacre.

Unfortunately, a sense of denial has prevailed among large segments of the population about war crimes committed by Serbs. In public remarks I made on May 12, I noted that polls showed that just over one-third of Serbs believed that war crimes were committed at Srebrenica, despite the acknowledgement of the RS Government itself that these crimes occurred. I noted that less than one-third of Serbs believed that the bodies of over 800 Kosovar Albanians, most of them brutally executed, were located in mass graves in Serbia -- despite the fact that your own government acknowledges this fact. Indeed, these graves contained the bodies of three young American citizens -- the Bytyqi brothers -- who were summarily executed after being illegally detained at the Petrovo Selo MUP facility.

And, more recently, a student group at the Belgrade Law Faculty sponsored a conference that aimed to cast doubt on the crimes at Srebrenica. By attempting to propagate such a dangerously irresponsible myth, they sought to excuse the war crimes perpetrated there. While we respect the right of free speech, the opinions expressed there dishonoured that right in an attempt to fan the flames of chauvinism and ethnic hatred. Such vitriol disgraces the dead on all sides of the Balkan conflicts of the 1990s.

Let me emphasize two points. First of all, we recognize that there were many Serb victims of war crimes during the 1990s -- in Croatia, Bosnia, even Kosovo. But the argument I most frequently hear -- that all sides were guilty of crimes -- does not justify the many crimes committed by Serbs or excuse the perpetrators of those crimes from punishment. Secondly, many in Serbia have reacted defensively to the videotape, demanding that Serbs not be condemned collectively for crimes committed by individuals. I absolutely agree. We do not, nor have we ever, condemned the Serbian people as war criminals. The Serbian people did not commit these crimes; ruthless and unscrupulous individuals committed them. It is these individuals who must face justice before ICTY or domestic courts.

I hope that the broadcast of the Srebrenica videotape, which of course displayed just one tiny fraction of the inhumanity inflicted there in July 1995, will bring about a national catharsis in Serbia. I hope that this image of ethnic cleansing in its most brutal form will cause Serbs throughout this country to more openly face the past. I hope that the tape will remind us that there are still many perpetrators of war crimes living freely and openly among us and that it will stimulate your law enforcement and judicial organs to more aggressively bring such people to justice. I hope that it will persuade the 60% of Serbs who oppose the extradition to The Hague of Ratko Mladic, who was in charge of the forces at Srebrenica, to change their minds. I hope that those who organized the Law Faculty conference and the 50% of Serbs who do not believe that the Srebrenica massacres occurred will acknowledge the magnitude of crimes committed by Serbs in the wars of the 1990s. I hope that they will recognize that their "heroes" of Srebrenica were capable of cowardly shooting frightened, helpless, bound teenagers in the back. And I hope that it causes all of us here to reflect again on the scope of the Srebrenica massacre - a massacre that sent to the grave a number of people equal to --- times the number of attendees in this room right now.

I also hope that the appearance of this tape will invigorate efforts to prosecute and convict the murderers of the Bytyqi brothers and the many other victims whose killers still live freely and openly among us.

I harbor these hopes because I firmly believe that confronting this awful truth represents a critical step towards reconciliation among the peoples of this region and toward ensuring that justice will be fairly meted out to the perpetrators of war crimes.

I believe there is room for some optimism. We applauded the rapid and vigorous action of the Government of Serbia in arresting those involved in the videotaped killings. We welcomed the Government's announced intention to ensure that these and other perpetrators face justice for these crimes. We welcomed the recent transfers to ICTY of numerous individuals accused of complicity in organizing and/or carrying out the Srebrenica massacres. And we have welcomed the assurances by senior Government officials that those indictees still at large, most notably Ratko Mladic and Radovan Karadzic, will be delivered to The Hague soon.

We also welcomed the announcement by President Tadic and other leaders here that they will travel to Srebrenica on July 11 to honor the victims of that atrocity. As Under Secretary Nicholas Burns emphasized here on Thursday, this anniversary represents an historic opportunity for Serbia to distance itself from what occurred in 1995 and to promote an enduring reconciliation among the peoples of this region. Let us look forward to this future, while not forgetting the victims of the past.

MONTENEGRO (alene)

Præsidentvalg 030511: Filip Vujanovic blev valgt. Seneste Parlamentsvalg 021020.

Makfax skriver at man har fundet nogle stjålne Goya-billeder i Montenegro:

The painting of "Count Ugolino della Gheradesca" attributed to Spanish master Francisco de Goya, which has been stolen in Italy few years ago, was found in Dolna Gorica hamlet, near Montenegrin capital of Podgorica, local police said.

The oil painting portraits Count Ugolono, one of Italian history's dark characters. It was insured for more than 500.000 euros.

The painting was found during a search operation in a house. The investigation is due to establish how the expensive painting, dating 19th century, got in Montenegro.

The painting was stolen in 2001 during a tour of temporary exhibition at the Torino-Esposizione site, without being spotted by security guards. The size of a sheet of letter paper, the oil painting portrays Ugolino, known as the "cannibal count," and two boys.

MAKEDONIEN

Det Engelske Udenrigsministeriums 'Country Advice' til rejsende kan findes på adressen: http://www.fco.gov.uk/servlet/Front?pagename=OpenMarket%2FXcelerate%2FShowPage&c=Page&cid=1007029390590&a=KCountryAdvice&aid=1013618386163 ... Det Amerikanske UM har Maj 2004 offentliggjort en 'Background Note' om Makedonien: http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/26759.htm

Der er omkring 25 % etniske Albanere i Makedonien. Folketælling afholdtes 021101-021105.

Præsidentvalg i Maj 2004: Branko Crvenkovski - hidtidig PM - blev valgt (efter Boris Trajkovski som omkom ved en flyulykke). Seneste Parlamentsvalg fandt sted 020915. Der kan henvises til flg. OSCE/ODIHR-oversigtsside: http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/field_activities/skopje2002/.

Folkeafstemningen 041107 om decentralisering (= imødekommelse af Makedonien-Albanske interesser): Folkeafstemningen "faldt". Stemmedeltagelsen var kun omkring 26 %. Hvis afstemningen skulle have kunnet udvirke en ændring af decentraliseringslovgivningen, skulle deltagelsen have været mindst 50%, og desuden skulle der have været flertal mod lovgivningen. Det var ventet at stemmedeltagelsen ville have været noget større, selv om både Regeringspartierne og den Albanske minoritet anbefalede at man blev hjemme. Man kan nu gå videre i overensstemmelse med Ohrid-aftalerne.

Mediernes pålidelighed. MIA skriver:

Macedonia is at the top regarding independence of media, in comparison to the other countries from Southeast Europe, reads the latest analysis of the International Research and Exchange Board (IREX) on "Development of Sustainable Media in Europe and Eurasia".

The Media Sustainability Index 2004, which gives a review of the quantitative and qualitative analysis of the development of the media in 20 countries in Europa and Eurasia, places Macedonia on the third place, after Croatia, which as the top, and Bulgaria.

"Overall, the media situation was in satisfactory condition. Journalists enjoy constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech. There are no legal restrictions on access to public information, international news, or employment as a journalist. There is competition in the media market and open access to anyone who wants to set up a print media outlet. There is plurality and a wide range of sources of information. People in Macedonia have free access to international publications, broadcasts, and the Internet, aside from normal market and financial restrictions", reads the report.

Macedonia has made progress in Media Sustainability Index 2004 from 2,32 in 2003 to 2,53 last year. Only for a comparison, the index in 2001 was 1,73. Macedonia, according to the report, is ranked among those countries, which have accomplished media sustainability through legal standards, professionalism and working environment.

The analysis has been made with a comparison of index points for: free speech, professional journalism, plurality of new sources, business management and supporting institutions.

Freedom of speech places Macedonia on the fourth place with index of 2,47, contrary to 2,20 in 2003. The index shows that Macedonia is on the level of "near sustainability", i.e. the ccountry has progressed in meeting multiple objectives, with legal norms, professionalism, and the business environment supportive of independent media. The maximum level is "sustainability".

The second parameter - professional journalism, places Macedonian on at the second place after Bulgaria, which index is 2,38.

Macedonia, regarding "plurality of new sources", is on the sixth place with 2,61 index, while regarding "business management" index is on the fourth place with 2,40 index, contrary to the one of 2,33 in 2003.

"Media Sustainability Index (MSI) panel discussion noted some improvement, particularly in terms of increased plurality. Panelists agreed that there are no restrictions to access to domestic and international sources. The panel also said journalism practice had reached a generally higher professional level, even though selfcensorship continued along with some overemphasis on politics and an absence of issue-based reporting on social and cultural concerns", the report reads.

Økonomien. Der er problemer som Low profitability, low investment, and lack of technological enhancements [which] have prevented Macedonian firms from producing high-value-added and high-quality goods. Er der tale om en Balassa-Samuelson-relation? Boileau Loko and Anita Tuladhar har for IMF undersøgt forholdet mellem produktivitet og 'real exchange rate'; rapporten er for fagfolk, men store dele kan læses af alm. interesserede. Den kan nedtages fra: http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2005/wp05113.pdf. IMF skriver bl.a.:

Figur fra rapporten. Bemærk data for Albanien

Despite the depreciation, trade indicators remain grim. Export performance has weakened as is evident from the declining market shares of Macedonian exports to the European Union and the United States. This decline is in contrast to the increasing market penetration by regional neighbors. Furthermore, the export sector has been unable to diversify into new product lines.

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In the same vein, we argue that PPP [purchasing power parity] fails in FYR Macedonia because the domestically produced tradables goods are imperfect substitutes of foreign produced tradables and the economy is unable to catch up by move up along the value-added chain of goods. We make this case based on the declining trends in productivity growth and prices in FYR Macedonia compared to major trading partners. This trend is consistent with a gradual specialization in lower quality goods with lower prices.

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Several indicators point to a structural labor market rigidity in FYR Macedonia. The unemployment rate has been persistently high at around 30 percent or above. Yet real net wages have not declined and have grown by around 4 percent annually. Centralized wage bargaining, indexation of wages to industry average, high social contribution rates and costly dismissal procedures contribute to high labor market rigidities.

We conclude that the depreciating real exchange rate in FYR Macedonia reflects a prolonged transition process associated with relatively low technological growth and a declining quality of its tradable goods basket vis-à-vis its trading partners. The B-S effect does not play an important role in explaining the depreciation of the exchange rate. Macedonian producers are caught in a vicious cycle of low growth, low productivity, low profitability, and low investment. Firms lack the technology to produce higher-quality exportable goods owing to lack of investment and technology improvements. Investment incentives are low owing to relatively low productivity and low profitability. Policies should therefore focus on enhancing productivity growth in the tradable sector by lowering barriers to private investment and implementing labor market reforms.

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Forfatterne opsummerer:

This paper seeks to investigate the transmission mechanisms linking productivity to the real exchange rate in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. At first glance, the stylized facts-low labor productivity growth and a trend real depreciation-suggest that a Balassa-Samuelson effect is in play. We find that the relationship between the two is not a result of the traditional Balassa-Samuelson effect. Instead, the depreciation of the real exchange rate reflects mainly the behavior of prices in the tradable sector. We argue that the depreciating real exchange rate may reflect a prolonged transition associated with slow technological growth and the low quality of the country's tradable-goods basket.

GRÆKENLAND

Seneste Parlamentsvalg 040307. Olympiade 13.-29. August (se Græsk side: http://www.athens2004.com/athens2004/ og Dansk side: http://www.dif.dk/index/ol-3/ol-ol2004.htm).

8 Albanere anholdt for tyveri og smugling. Kathimerini skriver:

A gang that stole some 2 million euros’ worth of luxury cars and valuables from villas in Attica has been netted after combined operations in Piraeus and Trikala, in central Greece, led to the arrests of eight Albanian nationals, police said yesterday. The seven men and one woman apprehended had operated in two groups, Attica Criminal Investigation Department chief Stefanos Skotis said, and were responsible for at least 26 break-ins between them. Their loot included jewelry, electronic equipment and 12 vehicles. The cars were sold on in Greece, smuggled into Albania and used to transport illegal immigrants, Skotis added. Three gang members were arrested earlier in the week for using two of the stolen cars to traffic 22 migrants. They were given eight-year jail sentences and fined 23,000 euros each. During the raids in Piraeus and Trikala, which were conducted by police officers and border guards, a gun, explosives and small amounts of cocaine were confiscated. Skotis said the police are looking for a Greek man and four more Albanians in connection with the crimes.

TYRKIET

UMs rejsevejledning: http://www.um.dk/da/menu/Borgerservice/FoerRejsen/Rejsevejledninger/RejsevejledningTyrkiet.htm.

Seneste Parlamentsvalg blev holdt 021103. Det blev i December 2004 aftalt (med EUs Regeringschefer)at der i Oktober 2005 skal indledes forhandlinger om optagelse af Tyrkiet i EU.

LANDE UDEN FOR BALKAN OG ØSTLIGE MIDDELHAV. NATO-LANDE

ITALIEN

Mother Teresa. I anledning af saligkåringen ('beatificeringen') 031019 har Vatikantet etableret en internetside: http://www.vatican.va/news_services/liturgy/saints/ns_lit_doc_20031019_index_madre-teresa_en.html

USA

Kampen mod terrorismen: The multinational Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). USAs UM Condoleezza Rice og Albaniens UM Kastriot Islami har i fællesskab skrevet - eller måske snarere lagt navn til - flg. artikel:

PSI at Two Years: Counter-Proliferation Practice Makes Perfect

Condoleezza Rice, U.S. Secretary of State, and Kastriot Islami Foreign Minister of Albania

(This joint article marks the second anniversary of the Proliferation Security Initiative's launch by President Bush in Krakow in May 2003.)

A train is rolling through the Polish countryside toward the Czech border. Among its dozens of freight cars carrying shipments of commercial goods and commodities are materials that are used as precursors to chemical weapons. These materials appear to be bound for a legitimate manufacturer in Prague. But intelligence services and foreign ministries have good reason to believe otherwise. They have shared information, and defense and law enforcement officials in Poland and the Czech Republic are on alert. The train will be boarded and inspected at its first stop inside Czech territory. Next week, a private aircraft will fly westward from Italy and the plane will be intercepted by Spanish fighters after similar information is received about its suspected cargo.

Fortunately, these alarming events are not real. They are training scenarios that participants in the multinational Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) are using to stop the real-life spread of weapons of mass destruction.

May 31st marked the Proliferation Security Initiative’s second anniversary. Under this Initiative, nations across the globe – including the United States and Albania – are working in partnership to reduce the risk of weapons of mass destruction falling into the hands of terrorists, rogue states, or black marketeers. Over the past two years, a variety of participants have led fourteen interdiction training exercises in Europe, Asia, and the Americas. Later this year, Singapore and Norway will lead PSI-related activities.

In another example of close bi-national collaboration both Albania and the United States are committed to ensuring that Albania's chemical agents stockpile left over from the communist era is eliminated in accordance with the Chemical Weapons Convention. The mechanism for this dangerous legacy's destruction is the U.S. Cooperative Threat Reduction, also known as Nunn-Lugar Program, launched for the first time outside of the Former Soviet Union here in Albania at the end of 2004.

Over 60 countries already participate in the PSI, and additional participants are welcome. Most recently, Argentina, Georgia and Iraq have endorsed the Initiative. PSI has – and needs – no formal support structure, secretariat, headquarters, or chairperson. Rather, PSI consists of an agreement among participating states to take concerted action against proliferation through cooperation among their law enforcement communities, militaries, and foreign ministries. The PSI Statement of Interdiction Principles sets out the core objectives and cooperative methods of the Initiative. All actions taken by partner countries must be consistent with national and international laws, regulations and procedures. Participants also are considering how these existing frameworks might be strengthened.

PSI advances the spirit and letter of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1540, which calls on all UN member states “to take cooperative action” to prevent trafficking related to weapons of mass destruction. UN Secretary General Kofi Annan has applauded the work of all countries active in the Initiative and highlighted it as an example of the type of cooperative action that nations should be pursuing to reduce the current global proliferation threat. The Secretary General’s 2004 “High Level Panel Report on Threats, Challenges and Change” cites the smuggling network of renegade Pakistani scientist A.Q. Khan as a reminder of the need to take new actions to interdict clandestine trade in components required for nuclear, chemical, biological or radiological weapons development.

As we have learned from the unraveling of the A.Q. Khan network, proliferators are employing increasingly sophisticated and aggressive measures to obtain materials related to weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems. They rely heavily on front companies and brokers in their quest for arms, equipment, sensitive technology, and dual-use goods and they hide their illicit trafficking amid legitimate commerce. An early success of the PSI – the 2003 interdiction of the BBC China – shows how cooperative international efforts can stop proliferators in their tracks and prevent the exploitation of vital trade flows.

For the terrorist, the acquisition of a nuclear, chemical, biological or radiological device can only mean one thing – mass murder and devastation on a scale far worse than that of the September 11, Beslan, Madrid, Bali and other attacks of recent memory combined. Every day, the U.S., Albania, and more than 60 other nations participating in the PSI are working in partnership to ensure that such a nightmare never occurs – here or anywhere else within our international community.

ENGLAND

TYSKLAND

FRANKRIG

DANMARK (NORGE, SVERIGE)

DIIS har udsendt Udredning om militær magtanvendelse mod de nye trusler. Udredningen kan downloades fra: http://www.diis.dk/sw12383.asp. Man skriver:

Udredningen NYE TRUSLER OG MILITÆR MAGTANVENDELSE er i dag blevet afleveret til udenrigsministeren. Udredningen er udarbejdet i DIIS på anmodning fra regeringen og afgives i henhold til DIIS’s bestemmelser på bestyrelsens ansvar.

Regeringen anmodede i sit kommissorium DIIS om at udbygge Dansk Udenrigspolitisk Instituts (DUPI) rapport om humanitær intervention fra 1999 med en politisk-juridisk analyse af mulighederne for at anvende militær magt mod de nye trusler mod international fred og sikkerhed i form af global terrorisme og spredning af masseødelæggelsesvåben. Særligt behovet for udvikling af kriterier for kollektiv brug af militær magt blev fremhævet.

Udredningen foretager en tilbundsgående politisk-juridisk analyse af denne problemstilling med udgangspunkt i en sondring mellem lovlighed og legitimitet. Beslutninger om militær magtanvendelse træffes ikke på grundlag af juridiske overvejelser alene. Politiske og moralske overvejelser indgår også i sådanne beslutninger og har en central betydning for deres legitimitet. Gældende folkeret giver stater ret til at forsvare sig med militær magt mod de nye trusler, når staten er blevet angrebet, eller hvor et angreb er overhængende (foregribende selvforsvar), men omfatter ikke magtanvendelse mod trusler, der ligger længere ude i fremtiden (forebyggende magtanvendelse). Det er forebyggende magtanvendelse, som står i centrum for udredningen. Forebyggende magtanvendelse skal have et mandat fra Sikkerhedsrådet for at være lovlig. Det rejser samme dilemma som den humanitære intervention i Kosovokrisen i 1999: Hvad gør man, hvis Sikkerhedsrådet er ude af stand til at bemyndige forebyggende magtanvendelse i en situation, hvor mange stater både i og udenfor Rådet anser det for berettiget? Udredningen identificerer i lighed med DUPI rapporten om humanitær intervention fire politisk-juridiske strategier, som kan tages i anvendelse for at håndtere dette dilemma.

Kapitel 2 præsenterer de nye trusler og foretager en politisk-strategisk vurdering af, hvor ofte behovet for forebyggende magtanvendelse kan forventes at opstå fremover, og hvor effektiv denne option i givet fald vil være. Analysen konkluderer, at forebyggende militær magtanvendelse sjældent vil være effektiv mod stater, som efterstræber masseødelæggelsesvåben, og at behovet for meget nøjagtige efterretninger vanskeliggør brugen af magt mod terrorister. Når de fornødne efterretninger kan indhentes, giver det dog god strategisk mening at anvende militær magt mod dommedagsterrorister som Al Qaeda, der ikke kan afskrækkes, og som ikke vil tøve med at anvende masseødelæggelsesvåben, hvis de får muligheden herfor. Isoleret set må angreb på sådanne terroristgrupper forventes at stige, da de kan være effektive og generelt nyder stor opbakning i verdenssamfundet. Problemerne og omkostningerne ved at anvende militær magt forebyggende mod stater betyder derimod, at denne option sandsynligvis ikke vil blive anvendt særligt ofte, og at risikoen for, at stater vil føle sig tvunget til at bruge magt uden om Sikkerhedsrådet, er følgelig mindre, end mange har frygtet.

Kapitel 3 foretager en juridisk analyse af selvforsvarsretten under gældende folkeret med særligt henblik på de nye trusler. Det konkluderes, at retten til selvforsvar er blevet justeret efter 11. september 2001 for at tage højde for truslen fra international terrorisme. Det er således blevet bekræftet, at selvforsvarsretten ikke kun omfatter magtanvendelse for at imødegå et igangværende angreb (reaktivt selvforsvar), men også for at forhindre sandsynlige nye (terror)angreb. Endvidere konkluderes, at selvforsvarsretten formentlig også gælder i tilfælde af et overhængende angreb (foregribende/anticiperet selvforsvar), hvorimod gældende folkeret ikke anerkender en ret til selvforsvar mod ikke-overhængende trusler (forebyggende magtanvendelse).

Kapitel 4 foretager en juridisk analyse af Sikkerhedsrådets adgang til at bemyndige forebyggende magtanvendelse, som ikke er omfattet af retten til selvforsvar. Det konkluderes, at Sikkerhedsrådet er kompetent til i medfør af FN-Pagtens Kapitel VII at bemyndige forebyggende magtanvendelse. Det anføres, at Sikkerhedsrådets legitimitet ville blive styrket, hvis Rådet tilsluttede sig de fem generelle kriterier for magtanvendelse, som FN’s Højniveaupanel har foreslået i sin rapport fra 2004:

1) Truslens alvor. Der må foreligge en alvorlig trussel, der umiddelbart kan berettige anvendelse af militær magt.
2) Det rette formål. Det primære formål med anvendelsen af militær magt skal være at afværge truslen.
3) Sidste udvej. Der skal være rimelige grunde til at antage, at truslen ikke kan elimineres gennem ikke-militære foranstaltninger.
4) Forholdsmæssige midler. Den militære magtanvendelse må kun omfatte det minimum, som er nødvendigt for at afværge truslen.
5) Afvejning af konsekvenser. Der skal være rimelige udsigter til, at den militære aktion vil lykkes og ikke vil gøre mere skade end gavn.

Disse kriterier er grundlæggende vage og upræcise, selv om de i et vist omfang kan præciseres i lyset af Sikkerhedsrådets hidtidige praksis vedrørende terrorisme og masseødelæggelsesvåben. Sikkerhedsrådsproceduren udgør imidlertid en stærk garanti mod misbrug af adgangen til forebyggende magtanvendelse. Samtidig indebærer sikkerhedsrådsproceduren, og navnlig vetoretten, dog også en uundgåelig risiko for, at Sikkerhedsrådet i et konkret tilfælde ikke vil kunne nå til enighed, selv om der er bred international konsensus om, at kriterierne for magtanvendelse er opfyldt.

Kapitel 5 foretager følgelig en juridisk og politisk analyse af muligheden for forebyggende magtanvendelse uden et sikkerhedsrådsmandat. Det konkluderes, at uautoriseret forebyggende magtanvendelse savner et retligt grundlag i gældende folkeret. Det anføres, at farerne for den internationale retsorden ved uautoriserede militære aktioner er åbenbare, men at der kan tænkes exceptionelle situationer, hvor sådan magtanvendelse alligevel kan hævdes at være politisk-moralsk berettiget. Der opstilles otte kriterier, som kunne anvendes til at legitimere uautoriseret forebyggende magtanvendelse. Det drejer sig foruden de førnævnte fem generelle kriterier om følgende:

6) Sikkerhedsrådet er blokeret. Sikkerhedsrådet skal have undladt at godkende anvendelse af militær magt som følge af et (faktisk eller forventet) stormagtsveto.
7) Alternativt forum for legitimitet er at foretrække. Der bør søges en støtteerklæring fra Generalforsamlingen; hvis dette ikke kan opnås, bør der søges godkendelse eller støtte fra en (sub-)regional organisation eller et tilsvarende organ.
8) Multilateral aktion er at foretrække. I alle tilfælde bør aktionen gennemføres af den bredest mulige koalition af stater for at undgå beskyldninger om misbrug.

Det vurderes imidlertid, at det i praksis vil være særdeles vanskeligt at legitimere uautoriserede forebyggende militære aktioner mod de nye trusler på grundlag af disse otte kriterier, ikke mindst fordi de centrale kriterier er vage og upræcise. Risikoen for uenighed og misbrug er derfor åbenbar i fravær af en betryggende beslutningsprocedure.

Udredningen anbefaler derfor, at man undgår at komme i en situation, hvor det er nødvendigt at overveje en uautoriseret forebyggende militær aktion. Det kan Sikkerhedsrådet gøre ved at skride til handling tidligere (Status quo + strategien).

Da det imidlertid ikke kan udelukkes, at Sikkerhedsrådet i nogle tilfælde vil være ude af stand til at handle mod de nye trusler, kan det overvejes at koble denne strategi sammen med en fjerntliggende beredvillighed til at gennemføre uautoriserede forebyggende aktioner, som kun retfærdiggøres ud fra moralske og politiske grunde, i de yderst exceptionelle situationer, hvor der måtte være generel international enighed om, at alle kriterierne for forebyggende handling er opfyldt (Ad hoc-strategi). Denne strategi indebærer, at man anerkender, at en sådan handling udgør en overtrædelse af folkeretten, og at det skal vedblive at være sådan. Skulle den specifikke politiske og moralske begrundelse imidlertid finde støtte i det internationale samfund, kunne dette anses som formildende omstændigheder i forhold til det formelle folkeretsbrud.

Derimod kan det ikke anbefales at søge at udvide retten til selvforsvar til at dække uautoriserede forebyggende angreb eller på anden måde skabe et folkeretligt grundlag herfor (Generel/Subsidiær ret-strategierne), da det ville have potentielt ødelæggende følgevirkninger for den internationale retsorden.

Kapitel 6 opsummerer udredningens konklusioner og ser på fremtidsperspektiverne for så vel humanitær intervention som forebyggende militære aktioner.

DUPI's rapport t om 'Humanitær Intervention' er diskuteret i: »Albanske Studier« bd. 1, s. 99-109 (2002), se: http://bjoerna.dk/albansk-historie/studier-2002.htm

Ugerapport fra Dansk KFOR. Hærens Operative Kommando - se under: Kosova.

LANDE UDEN FOR BALKAN OG ØSTLIGE MIDDELHAV. IKKE NATO-LANDE

RUSLAND

UMs Rejsevejledning: http://www.um.dk/da/menu/Borgerservice/FoerRejsen/Rejsevejledninger/RejsevejledningRusland.htm

KINA

Fodbold: FIFA meddeler med. Juni at Albanien ligger som nr. 86 med 503 points [forrige nr.: 93]. Andre lande: Makedonien nr. 94 [96], Serbien Montenegro nr. 49 [46], Grækenland nr. 13 [12], Italien nr. 11 [10], Tyrkiet nr. 14 [14], USA nr. 10 [10], Frankrig nr. 5 [4], Spanien nr. 9 [8], Tyskland nr. 21 [19], England nr. 7 [6]. Danmark nr. 16 [19], Norge nr. 35 [36] og Sverige nr. 12 [13]. - Brasilien ligger som nr. 1 [1].

Kvalifikationskampe til VM-slutrunde 2006 i Tyskland. Danmark skal møde Albanien, Georgien, Grækenland, Kasakhstan, Tyrkiet og Ukraine.

Du må citere hvis du angiver hovedsidens adresse: bjoerna.dk ... Siderne om Albanerne: bjoerna.dk/albanerne.htm ... Søgning på internettet: bjoerna.dk/soegning.htm