The preferred strategy of the European Union (EU) and the U.S. to bring Kosovo to supervised independence through the United Nations Security Council has failed, following Russia’s declared intention to veto. With Kosovo Albanians increasingly restive and likely soon to declare unilateral independence in the absence of a credible alternative, Europe risks a new bloody and destabilising conflict. To avoid chaos on its doorstep, the EU and its member states must now accept the primary responsibility for bringing Kosovo to supervised independence.

The risks to Europe of inaction are substantial. Before the end of the year, Kosovo Albanian leaders will be under what is likely to be irresistible internal pressure to declare independence, with or without external support. If they act and are not supported, Kosovo would fracture: Serbia reclaiming the land pocket north of the Ibar River, Serbs elsewhere in Kosovo fleeing, and eight years of internationally guided institution-building lost. The implosion would destabilise neighbouring countries, increasing pressure for further fractures along ethnic lines. The EU would quickly experience refugee flows and feel the impact of the boost that disorder would give to organised crime networks in the Balkans that already distribute most of Europe’s heroin, facilitate illegal migration and are responsible for nearly 30 per cent of women victims of the sex trade worldwide.

Failure to act would also discredit the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and its efforts to project itself as a credible international actor in conflicts elsewhere. As its own official security strategy declares, “the credibility of our foreign policy depends on the consolidation of our achievements [in the Balkans]”.

The sooner the EU, or a significant majority of its member states, declares itself ready to back an independent Kosovo, the better the chances of forestalling such damage to the EU. The six-nation Contact Group (France, Germany, Italy, Russia, the UK and U.S.) that has been guiding Kosovo policy has authorised a four-month period for new talks between Pristina and Belgrade. These started in the second week of August but, given entrenched positions, are highly unlikely to achieve a breakthrough. The EU members and the U.S. should ensure that they do not unravel the blueprint for Kosovo’s supervised independence crafted by the UN Secretary-General’s special envoy, former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari, during a year of painstaking diplomacy (the Ahtisaari plan). They should also use the four months to secure an alliance that will coordinate Kosovo’s transition to independence.

The U.S. has considerable responsibilities, both to match its strong rhetoric on behalf of Kosovo independence with more consistent action toward that goal – President Bush signally failed to press Russian President Putin at their recent seaside summit in Kennebunkport – and to use its unparalleled influence with the Kosovo Albanians to keep them cooperative and constructive during the sensitive months ahead. But ultimately the EU is the key. The Ahtisaari plan foresees it sending a special representative with a large staff to coordinate civilian supervision of conditional independence and a rule of law mission, as well as providing through its membership candidacy processes the economic support and motivation that can ensure an independent Kosovo does not become a failed state. The EU has backed the Ahtisaari plan but a number of its members are sceptical about proceeding with it in the absence of a Security Council blessing. The EU members of the Contact Group need to do heavy lifting to prepare the organisation to meet its responsibilities.

UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon has requested that the Contact Group report back to him on the Belgrade-Pristina talks in four months, by 10 December. This is the point at which, assuming, as seems overwhelmingly likely, that no agreed solution emerges from those talks, the EU, U.S. and NATO need to be ready to start coordinated action with the Kosovo government to implement the essence of the Ahtisaari plan, including the 120-day transition period it envisages. That transition period should be used to accumulate statements of recognition of the conditionally independent state from as many governments as possible; to adopt and set in place the state-forming legislation and related institutions foreseen by the Ahtisaari plan; for the Kosovo government (the present one or, depending on the date of elections, its successor) to invite the EU and NATO to take up their responsibilities and for those organisations to do so; and for the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) to withdraw in an orderly fashion. At the end of this period – in April/May 2008 – Kosovo would be conditionally independent, under EU and NATO supervision.

Not all EU member states need to recognise Kosovo during the transition or even in April/May 2008. The EU has procedures – “constructive abstention” and “enhanced cooperation” – that allow decisions to be taken and action to be set in motion when unanimity is not available. What is vital is to get the EU missions into Kosovo (and to reform the NATO mission) in a timely fashion. If that minimum degree of EU unity is not possible, the U.S. and some major European states would have to try to reproduce the basic elements of the international supervision and protection missions out of their own resources.

How sustainable such an ad hoc effort would be by those making it, and how effective it could be in giving Kosovo the motivational prospect of eventual European integration it needs to flourish, would be questionable. What would not be in doubt is the huge damage the EU would inflict on itself by having so obviously failed to act as a coherent international player to meet a major security challenge on its borders.

Without UN Security Council cover for independence, Serbia will be even more reluctant to let go of Kosovo. The new state will be haunted for years by an unrevoked Security Council Resolution 1244, which in 1999, at the end of the conflict with NATO, acknowledged Serbia’s formal retention of sovereignty for the interim period over the province it turned over to the UN. Serbia will continue to claim that sovereignty and, with Russia, will try to block Kosovo’s membership in international institutions. Belgrade will challenge Pristina’s ownership of the Serb-majority north all the harder, and international authority to defend Kosovo’s territorial integrity will be the weaker. Russia may seek to use the outcome for its own purposes in the frozen conflicts in the South Caucasus and Moldova.

These are all undesirable consequences, and ones that could largely have been avoided if the Security Council had paved the way to Kosovo’s independence under the Ahtisaari plan. But the consequences of inaction by the EU will be worse – for Kosovo, the Balkans and the EU itself. It is time to recognise this and act.

RECOMMENDATIONS

To the Quint (France, Germany, Italy, the UK and U.S.):

1. Hold the Contact Group to the principles it has already adopted for Kosovo’s status resolution, including no partition.

2. Proceed on the assumption that agreement with Russia on a Security Council resolution authorising implementation of the Ahtisaari plan is not achievable and that there will be no agreed settlement emerging from the Belgrade-Pristina talks authorised by the Contact Group, and concentrate efforts on implementing that plan so as to achieve orderly, conditional (supervised) independence for Kosovo supported by all or a large majority of EU member states and the U.S. by April/May 2008.

3. Engage intensively with EU member states sceptical about Kosovo’s independence, explaining clearly and publicly the high cost of inaction in terms of Balkans and thus European stability, and the credibility of EU Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).

4. Adopt the following attitude toward the Belgrade-Pristina talks:

(a) they should last no longer than four months and conclude no later than 10 December 2007, the reporting deadline set for the Contact Group by UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon;

(b) the Kosovo delegation should be put under no pressure to make concessions beyond the terms of the Ahtisaari plan, which it has already accepted, but should be encouraged to consider limited further measures with respect to Serb majority communities in the event the Serbian delegation is prepared to consider accepting independence;

(c) use the period of the talks to build maximum support within the EU for implementing the Ahtisaari plan, make clear to the Kosovo authorities and Kosovo Albanians the intention to achieve conditional (supervised) independence pursuant to that plan by April/May 2008, and lay the ground work for cooperation with the UN Secretariat in arranging the orderly withdrawal of the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) pursuant to that schedule; and

(d) if the parties have not reached an agreement by 10 December 2007, proceed in coordination with the Kosovo government and as many EU member states as possible to implement the Ahtisaari plan for conditional (supervised) independence, including a declaration of such independence that incorporates a 120-day transition period, to be completed in April/May 2008.

To the European Union and its Member States:

5. Recognise that failure to achieve a united position in support of Kosovo’s conditional (supervised) independence will discredit the EU’s CFSP and European Security Strategy.

6. Prioritise Kosovo as the EU’s most urgent, currently foreseeable security issue, devoting to it the time and energy required to reach agreement that:

(a) there is no practical alternative to Kosovo conditional (supervised) independence on the basis of the Ahtisaari plan, which should be achieved no later than April/May 2008;

(b) as many member states as possible will recognise Kosovo when it declares conditional (supervised) independence in accordance with the Ahtisaari plan following the end of talks in December 2007;

(c) the EU will provide the majority component of the international supervision envisaged by the Ahtisaari plan by deploying an International Civilian Office/European Union Special Representative (ICO/EUSR) mission and a rule of law (European Security and Defence Policy, ESDP) mission in a timely fashion, so that they can take up their responsibilities, on invitation from the Kosovo government, between the declaration of conditional (supervised) independence after talks end in December 2007 and its entrance into force upon completion of a 120-day transition period in April/May 2008;

(d) sceptical member states will not refuse consensus to deploying these missions but may choose to constructively abstain pursuant to Article 23 of the Treaty on European Union; and

(e) in the alternative that sceptical member states do not wish to be associated with the deployment and operation of the ICO/EUSR and rule of law missions to the limited extent that the constructive abstention provision provides, a coalition of willing EU member states should use the enhanced cooperation provisions of Article 27 a-d of the Treaty for this purpose and make appropriate use of EU mechanisms.

7. In advance of full consensus on the above, as many member states as possible, including EU members of the Quint, should state their willingness, in the absence of an agreed settlement emerging from the Belgrade-Pristina talks, to support a Kosovo declaration of conditional (supervised) independence on the basis of the Ahtisaari plan after 10 December 2007 and bring it to fruition in 2008.

8. Encourage Kosovo institutions and working groups to work more urgently on preparation of the package of state-forming legislation, including the constitution envisaged in the Ahtisaari plan, and authorise EU officials in Kosovo including the planning groups for the ICO/EUSR and rule of law missions, to participate more actively and widely in the process, including by vetting drafts, so that the package is ready within the envisaged schedule for conditional (supervised) independence.

9. Make clear to Serbia, in official statements and through messages passed by member states sympathetic to it, that progress on a Stabilisation and Association Agreement and more generally its relationship with the EU depend importantly on resolution of the Kosovo issue.

To NATO and its Member States:

10. NATO should consult with member states contributing troops to its Kosovo mission (KFOR) to ensure that none which fundamentally oppose recognising Kosovo’s conditional (supervised) independence are fielding contingents by early 2008, and that their contributions are replaced by those of nations prepared to recognise that status.

11. Following a Kosovo declaration of conditional (supervised) independence and recognition by the U.S. and EU member states, NATO should remain deployed in Kosovo, and carry out the tasks specified for it under the Ahtisaari plan.

12. If the NATO Council does not agree to continued deployment, the U.S. and those EU member states which have recognised Kosovo’s independence should deploy their forces to carry out the relevant security tasks.

To the UN Secretariat and UNMIK:

13. Allow Kosovo’s institutions to work on preparations for implementation of the Ahtisaari plan, including adoption by the Assembly of a constitution and other state-forming laws.

14. Respond to a Kosovo declaration of conditional (supervised) independence and recognition of Kosovo by the U.S. and EU member states by turning responsibilities over to the incoming EU missions and withdrawing UNMIK in an orderly fashion.

To the Kosovo Leadership:

15. Adopt an Assembly resolution stating that:

(a) the Assembly will work to adopt during its life as much of the package of state-forming legislation envisaged in the Ahtisaari plan as possible;

(b) the Assembly (or, depending on the date of elections, the expectation that the successor Assembly) will formally declare acceptance of the Ahtisaari plan and start a 120-day transition to conditional (supervised) independence on the basis of that plan after 10 December 2007; and

(c) the Assembly expects the Kosovo government to use the 120-day transition to coordinate with the EU, NATO and the member states of those organisations on a strategy for the independence transition, including a security plan, and to issue invitations for them to take up the roles envisaged in the Ahtisaari plan in a timely fashion before conditional independence takes effect upon expiration of the 120-day period (April/May 2008).

Pristina/Belgrade/New York/Brussels, 21 August 2007

Kommentar: Per Nyholm - der er særdeles kyndig hvad Balkan-forhold angår - havde 070823 i »Morgenavisen Jyllands-Posten« en artikel om Kosovo-problemet. Efter hans opfattelse er enhver idé om et forenet Kosovo, hvor man respekterer hinanden - et multietnisk Kosovo - den rene illusion. En deling er for længst blevet en realitet og på den ene eller anden måde også en nødvendighed. Nyholm mindede om vores egne erfaringer mht Slesvig. (Dén der ikke tidliere har fået læst Tage Kaarsted's disputats - Påskekrisen 1920 - og som er interesseret i Kosovo, kan få stort udbytte af at læse netop dén bog).

Siden 1864, hvor 'vi' tabte Slesvig, ændrede forholdene - demografien - sig afgørende, hvad enten man brød sig om det eller ej; forholdene var ikke som forskellige danske 'nationalister' forestillede sig.

Som bekendt kom det til en afstemning i 1920. Nord for den nuværende grænse var der klart dansk-orienteret flertal; syd for et lige så klart tysk-orienteret - herunder til fleres overraskelse også i Flensborg by. Skønt tallene var meget tydelige, tog man fra Dansk 'national' side og fra dele af erhvervslivet forskellige initiativer for at få en ny afstemning mod syd (og for at påvirke stemningen inden da) - og desuden overtalte man kongen, Christian X, til at indsætte en ny regering, selv om der ikke var flertal imod den siddende. Resultatet blev imidlertid at grænsen blev trukket som stemmeresultaterne viste, og at det herefter desuden stod klart at Kongen måtte afholde sig fra manøvrer som den pågældende og overlade alle politiske aktiviteter til politikerne.

Forholdene i Kosóva og i Danmark kan ikke uden videre sammenlignes, det er klart, men bogen minder om dét mere generelle at man gør klogt i at tage udgangspunkt i virkeligheden, herunder mht befolkningens selvforståelse, og ikke i drømme på virkeligheden.

Der var (og er) ikke etniske forskelle mellem Danske og Tyskere, men nok tydelige sproglige og kulturelle forskelle, som dog sagtens kan overvindes, hvad de også er blevet i årenes løb; i dag er der et ret intenst samvirke mellemn Danske og Tyske i grænselandet. Tiden har ført til det og fremsynet Dansk og Tysk politik har bidraget - først gennem drøftelserne i 1955 og Tysklands optagelse i NATO, senere gennem Tysklands og Danmarks medlemsskab af EU.

I Kosóva er der derimod både en grundlæggende sproglig og kulturel forskel og en grundlæggende etnisk forskel mellem Serberne og Albanerne (Dansk og Tysk tilhører samme sproggruppe, Serbisk og Albansk ikke). Det har fx i årenes løb været overordentligt sjældent at Albanere og Serbere har giftet sig med hinanden. Desuden er det en meget klar og tydelig opfattelse blandt Kosóva Albanerne at de ikke vil høre til Serbien; de mener at de - på forskellige måder - er blevet undertrykt af dem fra 1912 og frem, og det er der også tydeligt belæg for.

Det er svært at forestille sig at der - i lange tider - skulle kunne opstå et tæt samarbejde mellem Kosovo Serbere og Kosóva Albanere, og slet ikke nogen grundlæggende tillid.

Oversigtsskema	Kosóva-Albanerne	Kosovo-Serberne og Serbien	Andre i Kosovo/Kosóva og udenfor
Demografisk	Ca. 90% af befolkningen er Albanere. De bor i den største del af Kosóva Syd for Mitrovica/Ibar (enkelte bord Nord for eller er flygtet derfra til andre dele af Kosóva)	Den Serbiske minoritet bor Nord for Mitrovica/Ibar og i mindre lommer Syd for (eller er flygtet derfra til Serbien; tallet på flygtningene er usikkert men er formentlig over 100.000. Der har - med UNMIK's og NATO's bistand - været gjort forsøg på tilbageflytninger, men omfanget - og successen - har været begrænset).	Dertil kommer andre mindre befolkningsgrupper (bl.a. Roma'er)
Kulturelt (klostre m.v.)	Der var i 2004 omfattende, hæslige 'etniske' udladninger fra Albansk side - se: http://bjoerna.net/sidste-nyt/206.htm. Der er en vis risiko for, at der kan ske - større eller mindre - udladninger, hvis der ikke snart sker noget tydeligt mht Kosóva's fremtidige status. Forhåbentlig har de Albanske ledere lært noget positivt af hæslighederne i 2004, som i bund og grund havde Albansk årsag, selv om en del Albanere stadig tror at urolighederne var fremkaldt af Serbiske overgreb. Forhåbentlig vil man gå massivt ind for at forhindre gentagelser, men det er langt fra sikkert - også selv om PM Agim Çeku synes at være en både stærkere og mere fremadskuende politiker end flertallet af de øvrige.	De vigtigste Serbiske Klostre og Kirker ligger Syd for Ibar, således fx Gracania Syd for Prishtina og flere 'steder' i Prizren (se fx: http://www.coe.int/t/DG4/Expos/expoprizren/index.html).	-
Økonomisk	Betydelig Kosóva-Albansk interesse i ejerskabet til miner og virksomheder i Trepça-området. Man har forventninger om at minedrift og fremstillingsvirksomhed (foruden støtte fra EU) skal finansiere en genopbygning. En stor del af økonomien er 'grå' (dvs. uden for beskatning) eller 'sort' (kriminel). Udenlandske kommercielle investeringer er særdeles begrænsede. Den officielle arbejdsløshed er meget høj.	Betydelig Kosovo-Serbisk interesse i ejerskabet til miner og virksomheder i Trepça-området. Serbien har siden 1999 været økonomisk engageret Nord for Ibar (fx mht finansiering af offentlig virksomhed).	EU har siden 1999 været involveret i økonomisk genopbygning og er indstillet på et fortsat engagement. Man kalkulerer med at Trepça-aktiviteter i det lange løb skal bidrage til den økonomiske 'opretning' af området.
Politisk	Kosóva Albanerne mener at Kosovo (der formentlig også déngang havde et klart Albansk flertal) blev besat af Serbien i 1912. Man er siden da - og frem til 1999 - blevet undertrykt, især i Rankovic-perioden og i Milosevic-perioden. Man har i mange år krævet at Kosóva skulle være en selvstændig stat. Det politiske lederskab har relativt meget fokus på selvstændighedstemaet, hvorimod man har vist påfaldende behersket interesse for at vise imødekommenhed over for det Serbiske mindretal. Man var meget langsomme mht at tage afstand fra de Albanske overgreb på Serberne i 2004. Man satser relativt meget på Amerikansk bistand til at sikre uafhængighed.	Kosovo Serberne (og mange Serbere i øvrigt) mener at den Serbiske nation siden Middelalderen har haft sit sæde i Kosovo (omend den blev 'elimineret' af det Osmanniske styre, der 'sad' på området fra 1400-tallet og frem til sit sammenbrud i begyndelsen af 1900-tallet). Kosovo som helhed tilfaldt Serbien ved Versailles-traktaten. Kosovo har været en del af Serbien eller en provins i Serbien siden da, og man har ikke - i 1999 - givet afkald på suveræniteten over området.	-

Sammenfattende kommentar

Forhistorien, se fx: http://bjoerna.net/sidste-nyt/274.htm

Radioprogram om 'Selvstændighedsbevægelsen og Albin Kurti', se: http://www.dr.dk/P1/orientering/indslag/2007/08/16/183556.htm

I. Skulle man i dag drage en konklusion 1/ ud fra fra de historiske erfaringer i Slesvig, 2/ ud fra præmissen i Helsinki-aftalen (at grænsedelinger uden gensidig accept må afvises), 3/ ud fra de demografiske, kulturelle og økonomiske forhold og 4/ ud fra sandsynligheden for at alle dele af området: Albansk Kosóva, Serbiske Kosovo og Makedonien - må forventes at skulle indgå i EU-helheden, så må den være at man må opgive tanken om et multietnisk samfund, og at man i stedet må etablere et selvstændigt Kosovo/Kosóva, hvor der samtidig etableres en meget vidtgående autonomi for både den Serbiske og den Albanske del - og hvor der endelig etableres en fælles politisk ledelse (med ansvar for fælles ressourcer m.v.).

Dette er en model der ligger overordentlig tæt på Ahtisaari's model, og som sammenlagt - og set udefra - forekommer at være den teknisk bedste løsning for alle parter. Det skal i øvrigt være en klar forudsætning at det siges tydeligt at der ikke under nogle omstændigheder kan opnås international støtte til at ændre grænserne i forhold til Montenegro, Makedonien og Albanien.

II. Men går det - som man må vente - at Kosovo Serberne og Kosóva Albanerne ikke kan enes om (eller i det mindste acceptere) denne løsning, så er der næppe andre realistiske alternativer end at skride til en veritabel opdeling med mulighed for at den Kosovo Serbiske del 'træder ud' og forenes med Serbien (som Serbiske Kosovo allerede er en formel del af).

En sådan løsning kan der indvendes forskelligt imod af folkeretlig karakter, for ifølge Folkeretten, herunder Resolution 1244, er Kosovo en del af Serbien. 1244 har ikke lovet - og kunne ikke love - Kosóva-Albanerne selvstændighed, netop kun en vidtgående autonomi. Der er Albanere der har ment at 1244 garanterede en folkeafstemning og senere selvstændigheden, men Rusland og Kina (sikkert også nogle af EU-landene) ville i 1999 kun støtte 1244 (og dermed sikre interventionens 'lovlighed') på betingelse af at man anerkendte Serbiens suverænitet.

Det kan også indvendes at en stor del af naturressourcerne og produktionsapparatet i Trepça - alt andet lige - i så fald vil tilfalde Serbisk Kosovo. Værdien af disse ressourcer er dog omdiskuteret (hvortil kommer formelle uoverensstemmelser om ejerskabet). Ét står dog klart - at finder man at det er muligt at udvinde, bearbejde og eksportere ressourcerne, så skal der investeres massivt i et moderne produktionsanlæg, og det vil blive en kostbar affære.

Det virker imidlertid ikke indlysende at den tilbageblevne større del, Albansk Kosóva, skulle være økonomisk bæredygtig i sig selv. Dette samfund vil kun kunne eksistere ved en fortsat tilførelse af ressourcer fra EU og evt. USA.

Én ting er hvad en række ledende Serbiske politikere evt. mener i deres stille sind. Noget ganske andet hvordan de tolker de politiske muligheder.

Måske forholder det sig sådan at de Serbiske ledere vurderer at Serbien har en del at vinde ved at være samarbejdsvillige i en lang række henseender for at sikre en tættere tilknytning til EU, men at blive stående på at Kosóva stadig - formelt - skal være en del af Serbien. Formentlig vil disse politikere mene at EU og USA har mere at vinde ved at fastholde Serbien i 'båsen' og at udbygge det politisk-økonomiske samarbejde med landet - end at gå i konflikt om et problem, der slet ikke har den samme materielle betydning for dem som et udbygget samarbejde med Serbien.


III. Kan en opdeling heller ikke gennemføres, må tingene forblive nogenlunde som de er - med en vis risiko for at der fra tid til anden vil opstå uroligheder. Kosóva-Albanerne får hvad de har - dvs. begrænset selvstændighed over den Albanske del, en håbløs økonomi med triste sociale konsekvenser, og Kosovo-Serberne vil tilsvarende bevare selvstændigheden i deres område. Dé der vil tabe mest på at fortsætte i en status quo, er formentlig Albanerne - og EU. EU fordi det vil forsinke en 'normalisering' og 'modernisering' af området. Albanerne fordi de stort set ikke opnår noget som helst, i det mindste ikke positivt. Dén sympati Albanerne fik i 1999 har de stort set tabt, og der er ikke umiddelbart nogen sandsynlighed for at de vil kunne genvinde den. Kosóva Albanernes største fjender er i dag ikke Serberne eller andre ydre kræfter, men sig selv. Interesserede man sig mere for genopbygning og integration i Europa og var man i stand til at se så langsigtet på problemet, at alle og enhver kunne forstå at man var virkeligt imødekommende over for det Serbiske mindretal, ville tingene se meget anderledes ud.

Imødekommenhed ville ikke indebære at man skulle give køb på områdets selvstændighed, men at man anerkendte og beskyttede Kosovo Serbernes rettigheder. Hvis man desuden kunne udvikle et økonomisk, socialt og politisk samarbejde med Serberne, ville det være glimrende, men - realistisk set - må det komme langsomt, og efterhånden som lejlighed byder sig.

Der er en del Kosovo Serbere (og Serbere i Serbien) der ikke er det mindste interesseret i en opblødning af konflikten og i at Albanerne skal vise imødekommenhed. Det burde Kosóva Albanerne sætte sig helt ud over.

- - -


Hvad mener Wolfgang Ischinger egentlig? Formentlig at han er åben for enhver løsning, som der kan skabes tilslutning til, herunder en evt. opdeling af Kosovo/Kosóva hvis det ikke kan være anderledes:



Wolfgang Ischinger, officielt foto.


Den Tyske Ambassade i London skrev 070730:

Ambassador Wolfgang Ischinger has been appointed as the European Union's representative for the forthcoming negotiations over the future of Kosovo. Ambassador Ischinger will work alongside representatives from the US and Russia to jointly mediate the talks between Serbia and the Kosovo-Albanians. In a statement on 29 July, Foreign Minister Steinmeier said: "I am very pleased that Javier Solana has decided to appoint a German to represent the EU in the troika for the Kosovo talks. We suggested Ambassador Ischinger because he is one of the top experts on the region. What is crucial now is that all parties seize the opportunity offered by this process to finally reach – if at all possible – an agreed solution."

Extracts from Ambassador Ischinger's interview in the 'Süddeutsche Zeitung' 17 August 2007

On 16 August, the Süddeutsche Zeitung published an interview with Ambassador Ischinger on the subject of the Kosovo negotiations. Below are some translated extracts from this interview.

On partition

“I didn’t propose partition or anything else. The basis for the Troika’s work is UN Resolution 1244 … which rules out partition. What is new is that we have agreed within the Troika we will accept any outcome freely agreed by the two sides – any outcome. The Troika has no intention of putting forward its own proposals in this negotiating process.”

The further process

“At the end of this month we’ll have a second meeting with the Serbs and Albanians in Vienna. We’ll talk first with one side, then the other. Then we plan another meeting in September, very probably in the same format of separate discussions – so there won’t at this stage be any direct negotiations.”

A European solution

“This is about a region of Europe which has already experienced too much bloodshed and hatred; it’s about the people who live there. We must do everything we can to resolve this European problem in a European way – amicably, peacefully, and with a European perspective.”

The EU role

“Until recently not all European governments were convinced that everything – but everything – had been done to avoid a unilateral solution. That’s why we came up with the Troika. No one should be able to say later on, in some EU capital: ‘Perhaps something else would have worked, you didn’t try hard enough.’ In the Kosovo Troika, the EU speaks with one voice, and even if the Troika’s mission fails, it must continue to speak with one voice.”

---

Albanien: Bamir Topi (50), fremtrædende medlem af det Demokratiske Parti, professor i landbrugsbiologi og tidligere landbrugsminister, blev fredag 20.7. valgt som ny Præsident (ved fjerde afstemning i løbet af den senere tid); han nedlagde derefter sine poster i det Demokratiske Parti og aflagde tirsdag 24.7. ed i Parlamentet, idet de Socialistiske Parlamentsmedlemmer dog udeblev i protest.

Når Topi blev valgt, skyldtes det at 6 Socialister - med tilknytning til tidligere PM Fatos Nano - deltog i valget og dermed brød partilinien. De 6 er nu ekskluderet af Socialistpartiet, partiwhip'en - Ben Blushi - er trådt tilbage og partiformanden, Tiranas Borgmester Edi Rama, er rasende over at hans taktik slog fejl. Rama havde sigtet på at få valgt en Præsident han kunne acceptere, subsidiært at der blev udskrevet parlamentsvalg.




Bamir Topi (Det Demokratiske Parti's internetsted)


Valget af Præsident foretages af Parlamentet ved hemmelig afstemning. For at blive valgt kræves ifølge forfatningen 84 mandater (nemlig 3/5 af 140); Topi fik 85 stemmer - den afgående Præsident, tidligere General Alfred Moisiu fik for 5 år siden 97 stemmer. Var der ikke blevet valgt Præsident ved Juli måneds udgang - dvs. ved udgangen af Præsident Moisiu's periode - skulle der have været udskrevet Parlamentsvalg.


Længere nede følger Parlamentets meddelelse om valget. OSCE's Formand har udtalt sig temmelig lakonisk om valget; nok anderkender man valget og siger tak til Præsident Moisiu, men man indskrænker sig til 'best wishes' for så vidt angår Præsident Topi; mere tørre kan glædestårerne dårligt være.

MADRID, 24 July 2007 - The OSCE Chairman-in-Office, Spanish Foreign Minister Miguel Angel Moratinos, welcomed today the conclusion of the presidential election in Albania.

The OSCE Chairman-in-Office extended his best wishes to President-elect Bamir Topi for his term in office and offered appreciation to outgoing President Alfred Moisiu for his contribution to the strengthening of democracy in Albania.

Fatos Nano (foto: Bjørn Andersen, Tirana 2004)


6 Socialister - vist fra Fatos Nano-fløjen - deltog i afstemningen og satte sig dermed sig ud over dén boykot som Partiformanden Edi Rama havde iværksat; efterfølgende har partiwhip'en - Ben Blushi - trukket sig tilbage som whip, og de 6 Parlamentsmedlemmer er blevet ekskluderet. Edi Rama har udtalt at valget af Topi er et led i dén korrupte måde Demokraterne fører politik på; andre Politikere fra Oppositionen mener dog at en stor del af ansvaret for misèren skyldes Rama's taktik. - Formentlig vil Nano nu gøre alvor af sin tidligere trussel om at etablere en selvstændig partigruppe.




Neritan Ceka, Parlamentsmedlem, Professor i arkæologi (foto: Bjørn Andersen, 2006)


Modkandidaten Neritan Ceka, der for flere år siden samarbejdede med Berisha, men som har etableret et lille parti, der samarbejder med Socialisterne, fik i den sidste afstemning ganske få stemmer (langt færre end ved den tidligere runde, hvor tidligere PM Fatos Nano i øvrigt blev slået ud; Nano har kun fået ubetydelig støtte til sit kandidatur - herunder fra Socialisterne, som han engang var formand for.




Bamir Topi tv, Præsident Moisiu th. I midten - vist nok - én af Præsidentens Rådgivere Muhamet Kapllani (UM 22.2.1991-6.12.1991). Billedet stammer fra Præsidentens internetside og er taget 12.1.2007, hvor Partirepræsentanter underskrev en aftale om de dengang forestående lokalvalg.


Kommentar: Ganske vist er Topi valgt med de nødvendige 3/5 af mandaterne bag sig, men man kan - som det fremgår - ikke betragte ham som en konsensus-kandidat, én som der er bred tilslutning til, og derfor vil der nemt kunne opstå mange problemer i de kommende år. De forventelige problemer kunne have været undgået med større smidighed fra Berisha's og Rama's side. Forhåbentlig vil Topi vise sig som en uafhængig Præsident. Forhåbentlig vil Socialisterne bide i det sure æble - hvad Præsidentvalget angår - men dét gør de dog næppe. Ilir Meta - tidligere Socialist, i de senere år leder af LSI - Det Socialistiske Integrationsparti - synes at ville acceptere valget af Topi, for han har udtalt en forhåbning om at Topi ville træde op som hele landets Præsident, og en sådan tilkendegivelse ville være meningsløs, hvis Meta ville anfægte valget. Sandsynligvis vil Socialisterne - mht Præsidenten - komme til at stå ret isolerede.




Edi Rama. Foto fra Socialistpartiets pressekonference


Demokraternes og Socialisternes Ledere har kørt sagen op i en spids og har ikke vist dén samarbejdsvilje og duelighed der er nødvendig for at løse spørgsmålet om at vælge en Præsident i enighed, og som de 'Internationale' har lagt stor vægt på blev demonstreret - især tidligere. Dé boykotter som Edi Rama har grebet til i de seneste år (fx op til Lokalvalgene tidligere på året), eller truet med, viser at der er temmelig langt igen, før det Albanske Parlamentariske system kan siges at fungere på fornuftig måde.

Nogle Socialister mener at Partiet er blevet snydt, og at Parlamentet burde have valgt en Præsident, som Socialisterne havde peget på; de henviser til at Moisiu i sin tid blev valgt på Demokraternes forslag, da Socialisterne sad på regeringsmagten. Det er en forestilling der har en vis folkelig appel - jeg har i det mindste mødt den flere gange på besøg i Albanien.




Sali Berisha. Officielt foto


Det er ikke kun Rama og Socialisterne der kan kritiseres, det samme gælder Sali Berisha og Demokraterne. Man kunne have genvalgt den nuværende Præsident, Alfred Moisiu, der - udfra set - har gjort sit arbejde ganske godt, og som for nylig tilbød sig for en ny periode, men Berisha er i stigende grad blevet utilfreds med ham, fordi han ikke har gjort hvad Demokraterne har forlangt (fx har Moisiu ikke villet afskedige den ledende Statsadvokat - Sollaku - som Demokraterne er stærkt utilfredse med). Berisha har derfor insisteret på at der kom en anden i Præsidentstolen.



General Zaimi tv, dav. Præsident Moisiu th. Billedet er fra 23.07.2007, da Zaimi og andre Officerer blev forfremmet.


Et forslag om at vælge General Arjan Zaimi - som Socialisterne ville støtte, og som Demokraterne først ville acceptere - kunne ikke gennemføres, da Berisha sprang fra.

Måske det alligevel ville være en idé at overgå til direkte valg? Det ville fjerne nogle af de aktuelle problemer, men naturligvis ikke fjerne risikoen for samarbejdsproblemer, hvad der kunne være slemt nok - men Præsidentens opgaver er trods alt af ret begrænset karakter?

---

20 July 2007 – Parliament elects the new President of the Republic [Info fra Parlamentet]

Presided by Speaker Jozefina Topalli, on Friday, July 20 2007, at 19:00, the Parliament convened and held the fourth voting for the new President of the Republic. Voting outcome 85 votes in favor of Mr. Bamir Topi, thus the newly elected President of Albania.

On behalf of the Secretariat for Voting Procedures, Mr. Arian Madhi declared open the voting for candidates Bamir Topi and Neritan Ceka.

90 deputies attended the voting session and following the administration of the voting ballots the Secretariat announced no invalid ballots.

At the end of voting process, based on article 87 of the Constitution of Albania, the Secretariat proclaimed Mr. Bamir Topi as the new President of the Republic with 85 votes in favor, while the other candidate Mr. Ceka with 5 votes.

After the Secretariat for Voting Procedures announced the result, Speaker Topalli, wishing Mr. Topi for the election as President of the Republic, said: "I would like to thank all left and right-wing lawmakers who, in respect of the Constitution, elected the new President of Albania. Also. Allow me to thank Mr.Ceka for the constitutional and civilized competition. Today is a great day. It is a victory of the law and parliamentarism; it is a victory of each Albanian citizen. On behalf of all lawmakers, including those who were not present today, allow me to wish to the new President a successful performance in his important and noble duty,” said Speaker Topalli.

In the speech in front of lawmakers, Mr. Topi, addressing his colleagues, fellow nationals and media representatives, expressed his feelings for the election at the position of the President of the Republic, due to the Parliament voting.

Mr. Topi appraised the contribution of Mr. Ceka, who, as Mr. Topi underlined, made it possible for the process to return into its constitutional frame. Mr. Topi committed himself to respect the constitution, the rule of law, as well as to preserve stability in the country, standardize institutions, in compliance with the European family, which Albania aspires to join. Integration into the European Union and NATO, said among others Mr. Topi, remain two major challenges for our country.

During his address to the Parliament, the newly elected President thanked the President of Kosovo, Fatmir Sejdiu, who was the first to congratulate him considering this as a very significant momentum: we are all waiting for Kosovo’s independence, to the benefit regional and global peace.

At the end of his speech, Mr. Topi extended an invitation for cooperation, to create the domestic climate everyone aspires for.

Speaker Topalli informed publicly that, the oath ceremony of the new President of the Republic, will take place on Tuesday, [24] July 2007, at 18:00, Plenary Session Hall.

The session for the election of the new President ended at 21:10.

---

Info fra Det Albanske Parlament


TOPI, Bamir Myrteza
Datëlindja: 24.4.1957
Vendlindja: Tiranë
Adresa: Kuvendi i Shqipërisë, Bulevardi "Dëshmorët e Kombit", Tiranë.
Edukimi: Shkencat biologjike.
Profesor Doktor.
Veprimtaria profesionale:
Profesioni: Biolog.
Kërkues shkencor në fushat biologjike të aplikuara; Drejtor i Institutit të Kërkimeve Veterinare.
Veprimtaria politike: Deputet në tri Legjislatura; dy herë Kryetar i Grupit Parlamentar të PD-së; dy herë Nënkryetar i PD-së; 1996-1997: Ministër i Bujqësisë dhe Ushqimit.
Zgjedhur në: Legjislatura: XVII
Zona zgjedhore: 31
Qarku: Tiranë
Nr. i votave: 9756
Përqindja: 53,4%
Deputet edhe në Legjislaturat XIV, XVI.
Grupi dhe komisionet parlamentare:
Grupi parlamentar: PD - Kryetar
Komisioni parlamentar: Komisioni për Veprimtaritë prodhuese, Tregtinë dhe Mjedisin, anëtar.
Sekretare komisioni Valbona MIHO Tel.: +355 4 234607
Publikime: Shumë botime shkencore në periodikun shqiptar dhe të huaj, si dhe analiza politike frekuente.

---

Udtalelse af Edi Rama (på Albansk)

Rama: Zgjedhja e Presidentit, proces i turpshëm korruptiv

Shpreh të gjithë trishtimin tim për një tjetër akt të shëmtuar në skenën e politikës së vjetër.

Presidenti i ri i Republikës së Shqipërisë u zgjodh jo përmes konsensusit me opozitën, por përmes korruptimit politik e jo vetëm politik të një grupi deputetësh që vendosën të dalin nga Partia Socialiste dhe të shpëtojnë qeverinë e Sali Berishës nga ballafaqimi me votën e popullit.

Duke zgjedhur për president të shqiptarëve nënkryetarin e Partisë Demokratike, kjo shumicë e re, e krijuar me duart e pista të politikës së vjetër, e thelloi krizën demokratike të vendit dhe e zgjati edhe dy vjet të tjera vuajtjen e çdo shqiptari nën këtë maxhorancë që simbolizon imoralitetin ekstrem të kësaj politike të korruptuar, kundër së cilës unë jam sot më i vendosur se kurrë.

Dua t’i siguroj të gjithë shqiptarët që kërkojnë një politikë të re dhe një parti socialiste të çliruar nga hijet e së shkuarës, se sot, më shumë se dje, misioni im është i qartë, vetëdija ime është e plotë dhe vullneti im është i hekurt. Jam i vendosur që së bashku me të gjithë socialistet e progresistët, në të gjithë Shqipërinë, t’u japim shqiptarëve alternativën e daljes nga tranzicioni, partinë e shpresës e të së ardhmes, dhe t’a mundim të keqen që sot është ulur kembëkryq në të gjitha institucionet e vendit me ndihmën e së keqes brenda nesh, të ciles i ka ardhur fundi.

Do të doja ta uroja Presidentin e ri të Republikës, por ai nuk e meriton sot urimin e Partisë Socialiste të Shqipërise, jo vetëm sepse është pjesëmarrës i drejtëpërdrejtë në ndërtimin e procesit të turpshëm korruptiv që e vuri në krye të shtetit, por edhe sepse në deklaratën e tij të parë nuk foli si presidenti i te gjithëve, po si vartesi i doktor Berishës. Për sot Bamir Topit mund t’i them veëm se duhet t’i vijë turp, duke e siguruar se kur ta meritojë fjalën e mirë të opozitës ajo nuk do t’i mungojë.

Nuk do të kemi zgjedhje të reja. Në vend të tyre do të kemi përballë një aleancë të re të së keqes, të së vjetrës, të së shkuarës. Të cilën do ta mundim me një bashkim të madh opozitar, jo vetëm mes partive që sot janë në opozitë, por me të gjithë qytetarët e ndershëm e punëtorë të këtij vendi. Nuk do të kemi më shumë drita, ujë, punësim. Në vend të tyre do të kemi edhe dy vjet të tjera një qeveri të korruptuar, të paaftë e geënjeshtare. Të cilën do ta luftojmë me një vullnet të ri qytetar, me një projekt të ri politik, me një marrëveshje të re me shqiptarët nga Vermoshi në Konispol. Nuk do të kemi reformat e mëdha për të cilat i shtrimë dorën maxhorancës, e cila në vend se të bashkëpunojë me ne si në çdo vend normal demokratik, zgjodhi të kapërcejë çdo kufi të moralit politik e qytetar dhe të blejë një President Republike. Por do të kemi, pa asnjë dyshim, një frymë të re që do të pushtojë çdo zemer e mendje që punon për një Shqipëri të re, për një klasë politike të rë, për një rrugë të re për shqiptarët e ndershëm.


Udtalelse af Ben Blushi (på Albansk)

Blushi: Deputetët u vetëpërjashtuan, grupi formalizoi vendimin e tyre

Ben Blushi, i cili u dorëhoq para pak ditësh nga detyra e kreut të grupit kuvendor të Partisë Socialiste, është shprehur pas mbledhjes së parë të grupit, pas zgjedhjes së presidentit se "Mua m'u kërkua që të vazhdoj të jem kryetar i grupit, duhet të sqaroj publikisht që dorëheqja ime, padyshim ishte pasojë, nuk ishte shkak.

Shkaku ishte votimi i 6 deputetëve në parlament, unë e konsiderova për momentin që ajo ishte përgjigja e domosdoshme, etike dhe politike e thyerjes së disiplinës parlamentare. M'u kërkua nga të gjithë deputetet e grupit parlamentar që të vazhdoj detyrën dhe besoj që në rrethanat që flasim kjo është e pamundur, sepse konsideroj që problemet e brendshme të Partisë Socialiste nuk më lejojnë të bëj detyrën për këtë sezon që jemi", citoi Blushi.

Në përfundim të mbledhjes së parë të grupit, pas dorëheqjes së tij, Blushi theksoi se "Në pritshmëri janë mbledhjet e forumeve të munguara të PS-së, e Asamblesë dhe Kryesisë të cilat duhet të rishikojnë kursin politik të PS-së dhe unë kushtëzoj për sezonin e ri legjislativ kryesinë e grupit, me ndryshimin e kursit politik të PS-së, e cila pavarësisht nga divorci me gjashtë deputet që është një gjë e papëlqyeshme natyrisht, por problemi mbetet pa dyshim. Pasi është kriza e dyshimit. Kjo krizë besimi nëse nuk kurohet brenda nesh, kryesimi i grupit parlamentar është i pamundur. Shpresoj që në shtator gjerat të ndryshojnë".

Më tej sipas Blushit "secili nga ne mund të ndryshoj diçka, kur të kthej kokën pas dhe të shohë që në dy vjet duhet të ishim orientuar ndryshe në raportet e brendshme, raportet me aleatët, dhe natyrisht, unë besoj, që në të ardhmen ne duhet të investojmë shumë për të gjetur ekuilibrat e brendshëm dhe më pas me pjesën tjetër të opozitës. Nga kjo që ndodhi, jo vetëm PS, duhet të paguaj çmimin e vet, por sigurisht dhe aleatët nuk kanë qenë luajal dhe ata kanë përgjegjësi".

Ai e ka parë jo si të pamundur kapërcimin e situatës në PS duke shtuar se "Ne e kemi në dorë që ta mbyllim këtë çarje dhe të vazhdojmë të bëjmë një opozitë cilësore. Unë dua t'ju bëj thirrje të gjithëve, që sigurisht Partia Socialiste ka problemet e veta, dhe do të përpiqet t'i kurojë, por Shqipëria ka probleme më të mëdha sesa problemet e Partisë Socialiste. Ajo ka probleme ekonomike dhe financiare.

Ne jetojmë sot një katastrofë ekonomike, me të cilën ne duhet të merremi në të ardhmen e afërt deri në vitin 2009, për ti dhënë përshtypjen të gjithëve se PS bënë një opozitë cilësore dhe jep garanci për të qeverisur pas 2009", përfundoi Blushi.

---

Billeder fra Præsident Topi's edsaflæggelse:













Præsident Moisiu's fratrædelsestale. Moisiu hæfter sig i sin tale ved de positive ting der er sket i Albanien - og i Albansk politik - i de senere år, men han er ved dét han ikke siger, temmelig syrlig og kritisk over for begge de politiske hovedkræfter. Set i sammenhængen viser Moisiu at han er meget skuffet over at det ikke denne gang lykkedes at blive enige om en ny Præsident.

Palace of Brigades, July 24, 2007

Distinguished Mr. President, Bamir Topi
Excellencies Ambassadors,
Distinguished Ladies and Gentlemen,
Friends and Guests,

In the history of the Albanian state, this is the second time when an official ceremony is being organized to handover and to receive the duty of the President of the Republic. Being such, today’s ceremony comes as an expression of the democratic normality which has been already established in the Albanian political life.

We had the opportunity to witness during my mandate a peaceful and democratic rotation of power and today we are witnessing another calm and democratic rotation of the high duty of the head of state. These present two proofs of the political maturity and of the fact that regardless of the momentary difficulties, our overall democracy and the Rule of Law do function having as their guidelines the country’s constitution, law and interests.

Five years ago the consensual choice of the political parties and the secret parliamentary ballot bestowed upon me the trust to exercise the high function of the head of state. While I was serving my mandate I have tried to justify the trust bestowed upon me and to create a presidential model in full compliance to the requirements of the Constitution and the will of the citizens.

I am proud today to observe that Albania has taken steps forward in the path towards strengthening of democracy, consolidation of independent institutions and aligning them with the European Union and NATO. The initialing of the Association-Stabilization Agreement and the possible upcoming invitation for NATO accession are proofs of this success.

At the present Albania can count many friends around the world; it has a voice that is listened to and respected in the regional policies and decision-making; it is a country that is giving a recognized contribution in the peacekeeping missions and the war against international terrorism. The historical visit of the United States President, George W. Bush was a confirmation of the determined Euro-Atlantic policies and partnership of Albania.

Historical developments have taken place in Kosova as well: a country which looks forward to gain officially as well the much deserved independence. We have considered and continue to consider the quick solution of this issue as vital for the security of our region.

Naturally each one of us would like the progress to have been greater because the opportunities were there and the needs and requests of the country and citizens are far greater. Our state resembles to a new home whose foundations have been laid and the main floors have been already built, but where regardless of the ongoing construction and problems it is a place where people live and work. It needs to grow taller, become greater, more beautiful, furnished and the family inside needs more harmony, reciprocal trust and hope for the future.

In order to make all these happen, the citizens elect their decision making leaders every 4-5 years, who because of this reason are temporary in the post entrusted upon them and bear the responsibility at any time to serve with all their energies the citizens who elected them.

During the days and weeks of my engagement at the head of state, I have had the opportunity to meet many common people, to visit remote villages, communes and cities, to talk with ignored social groups, victims of crime and poverty, etc.

All this experience made me believe in and emphasize the significance held in our country by the preservation of social balances, the elimination of the deep gap among areas, levels and districts and the channeling of all the political energies without wasting anymore time in vain towards solving the problems created by poverty and economic transition.

I would also like to stress the great need of our society for the deeper enrooting of democratic culture, the culture of the law, dialogue, greater respect and trust on one another and what is more important: the respect for the state institutions. There is no better way for the development and harmony of a small family than that of understanding, dialogue, respect and common responsibilities to deal with any significant issue that affects and interests us all.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Five years ago from this very podium I promised that I would be led by the principle that honesty is the best policy in the life of man.

The Albanians, exhausted from dictatorship and long transition needed and still need an honest leadership, capable and idealistic that believes in and is led by the principles of democracy, law and constitution. Availing myself of the opportunity today, I would like to express my heartfelt gratitude to all the Albanian citizens, who continuously through their free thoughts, media, polls and other forms of expressions have entrusted their full trust on the honesty and integrity of the high institution of the head of state. My thanks go also to all those politicians, state officials, diplomats and institutions with whom I have had the opportunity to collaborate to the benefit of the country and citizens.

Today the new President, elected in a constitutional manner, was sworn in.

This allows us to hope that we will experience a new spirit of dialogue and collaboration among all the Albanian political factors. The wish of everyone is to keep on moving this way, to carry out common and long-term reforms so the country can successfully overcome on time the major challenges of Euro-Atlantic integration.

The achievements towards strengthening the independence and integrity of the constitutional institutions need further incitements because as it has been demonstrated throughout the past years, only a modern, democratic and functional state is able to prevent and resolve crisis as a good guarantee for the future of the country and society.

On this occasion I would like this time to publicly congratulate the newly elected President, Mr. Bamir Topi “Good luck and many successes in Your honorable and very delicate duty as the Head of State; to assure You about my will to support You in Your high duty” and at the same time to invite all the politicians and citizens to stand alongside You in support of the Head of the Albanian State.

Once again Mr. President, good luck and successes during your mandate as the Head of State. I am handing to You the fundamental law of our State: the Constitution.

Thank you!

Nedenfor følger Præsident Moisiu's statement om den ledende statsadvokat [14.10.2006]:

THE STATEMENT OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC, ALFRED MOISIU REGARDING HIS DECISION ABOUT THE ATTORNEY GENERAL.

October 14, 2006

Distinguished journalists,

Because of the importance of the issue and the promise I made to you about a month ago, I am here today in front of you to communicate my constitutional decision regarding the issue of the Attorney General. Respecting the constitutional communication, I have officially sent my decision on this issue to the Directorate of the Assembly on October 13th, the day before.

I am not required by the Constitution to make public clarifications and to offer the reasons on which the decision that was taken was based, by recognizing this as a competence that the Constitution and the constitutional jurisprudence have bestowed in discretion upon the President. However, respecting the decision of the Assembly and public opinion, I have marked the constitutional reasons on which my decision has been based in the material sent to the Assembly. The need for transparency, which is so great in a democratic system, the importance of the issue and the institutional moral and ethic induce me today to make public the decision making and the reason where it is founded.

The issue of Attorney General has preoccupied me a great deal, not only because of my institutional involvement, but also as an issue of the inter-institutional relations in a young and fragile democracy such as ours. In my view point about the Rule of Law, although it functions as a whole and the constitutional institutions are dependent on one another in their activity, within this institutional interdependence and cooperation, the independence and autonomy in carrying out the constitutional functions stands at the core. I do view the independence of the branches of power and constitutional institutions as a mean to cover their malfunction or as an exclusion from responsibilities and control, but as a fundamental opportunity for administering the state according to the principles on which the Rule of Law functions. From this view point and based on the constitutional competence, I assessed with maximal efforts the decision of the Assembly of the Republic and the entire documentation on which that decision was based.

From the formal side, the decision of the Assembly has not been presented in the form required by Article 149, paragraph 2 of the Constitution and the procedure required by Article 114 of the Assembly’s Rule. Contrary to the constitutional regulation, the decision of the Assembly is not a direct proposal to dismiss the Attorney general, but a passing of the Rapport of the Parliamentary Investigating Commission. Also, contrary from the definitions in the Assembly’s Rule, this body has decided by a single voting the passing of the Rapport of the Investigating Commission and the request to dismiss the Attorney General. Regardless of this aspect, which however carries its own significance, I paid more importance to the content of the Rapport than the procedures that was followed. After carefully reviewing and intensively consulting with a group of Albanian, European and United States jurists, as it has happened in similar cases in Hungary, Lithuania, etc., I reached the following conclusion:

The rapport of the Investigating commission has considered grave infractions of the law by the Attorney General during the exercise of his functions, his actions or non taking actions on a series of cases listed in the rapport. The Commission took upon itself to judge whether the decisions taken by the prosecutors for penal cases are or not based on the law. In each case, the Commission has assessed as being wrong the non initiations, ending or suspending of the analyzed penal cases. In my judgment, this position of the commission which was later approved by the Assembly, goes contrary to the Constitutional principle of separation of powers, foreseen by its Article 7 and also to the Law for organizing and functioning of investigating commissions and the Code of penal Procedure, according to which the decision making for penal proceeding is the competence solely of the prosecutor body. According to the Albanian legislation the exercise of this discretion to initiate, suspend or halt a penal proceeding is the right solely of the Attorney General and other prosecutors. By being a fundamental principle of a judicial system in a democratic country, the discretion of the prosecutors in a decision making for penal proceeding cannot be substituted by another branch of power. Various views of other branches of power on the decisions of the prosecutors are part of a political reality, but the intervention of politics in the decision making of prosecutors is inopportune and a dangerous precedent for the Rule of Law. The decisions making regarding the exercise of functions of the prosecutors can be assessed only in hierarchic ways from the highest prosecutor all the way up to Attorney General. The controlling function over these decisions cannot be taken by the Assembly, but only by the Court and all this is done based only on the complain presented the interested sides. For this reason, our Constitutional Court, through its decision of 2003 has stated that “the parliamentary control must be exercised in such a way so it cannot interfere in the activity of other branches of power. The Investigating commission, by investigating in a specified field within the competences included in the constitutional responsibility of the Assembly, can manage to find data which consist in a reason to be assessed by it, but without entering in the sphere of investigating and judicial bodies.”

My second assessment is connected to the make up of the Investigating commission and the positions of some of its members. By reviewing them, I reached the conclusion that we are dealing with an infraction of the principal of a fair legal process and presumption of innocence. This, because specific members of the Commission have taken upon themselves to declare an already proven all the claimed infractions and accusations, which had not been yet reviewed by the Investigating Commission. The Attorney General has been considered guilty before the Commission can exercise the function of verifying the accusations and facts, by infracting his constitutional right to be entitled to a just legal process and presumption of innocence.

Based on the above mentioned arguments and after assessing the procedures about founding and functioning of the Parliamentary Investigating Commission and the Rapport passed by the Assembly, directly referred also to the decision number 75, dated April 19, 2002 of the Constitutional Court, it results to me that throughout the activity of Attorney General, none of the conditions foreseen by Article 149, paragraph 2 of the Constitution for his dismissal are met. More concretely, it does result to me that the Attorney General has infringed the Constitution, has committed grave infractions of the law while exercising his functions, nor that he suffers from mental or physical disabilities or that he has committed acts or behaved in such a way that gravely discredit the position and figure of the Attorney General. As a result, since the proposal for his dismissal has no foundation on the criteria and procedures foreseen in the Constitution and constitutional jurisprudence, I as the President of the Republic have no other choice but, respecting the Constitution, to proclaim the decision not to dismiss the Attorney General.

This decision is in full compliance to my oath taken at the very first moment of beginning the high post of the President of the Republic that throughout my activity I would be led by the Constitution and the law, by not allowing, for as long as it is in my competence, infractions of the Constitution of our Republic.

I have naturally understand the concerns of some political parties, institutions and media about the fight against organized crime and corruption as phenomena that bring grave consequences for the entire society. I have supported and support this initiative, because it is in line with my conviction and our national interest, but in any case my advice has been and remains that such battles require collaboration and coordination of all the responsible institutions by respecting at the same time also the responsibilities of each one of them.

In the future also, as I have done until today, I will be an active supporter of any legal and constitutional initiative against organized crime and to the benefit of the country and strengthening of our democratic institutions. I expressed the same unwavering stand also in my determination to respect the constitutional institutions and their functions, which cannot be replaced by other constitutional institution, be it the Assembly of Albania. My advice and invitation is that, instead of political accusations and tendencies to shift the responsibilities. There must be the sustainable and long-term respect and coordination among the constitutional powers and institutions in our country.

In conclusion, I would like to publicly demand from the Attorney General to continue the work and learn the necessary conclusions from the constructive criticism of the Parliament and public opinion for the reformation and upgrading at the right level of the activity of the Prosecutor’s Office.

I also call upon the political forces and the Assembly to stay away from the political speculations and interests of the moment and to be on the required level of democratic ethic and culture while assessing the decisions of the President of the republic in order to demonstrate this way that Albania has put behind the period of conflicted transition and that it has already enter the irreversible path of the Rule of Law and standards that get us closer to the great European family which is the dream of our entire people.

Thank you for your attention and work!

---

Græsk Makedonien - og Balkan: Mik Schack's »Hjemmeservice« er blevet nedlagt, men i sommerens løb har man genudsendt en lang række af de tidligere programmer. Programmerne kan, en måneds tid efter genudsendelsen, ses på Net-TV (så der er ikke længe til at de forsvinder). Blandt programmerne kan nævnes ét med skuespilleren Dejan Cukic (der er født i Montenegro) og ét om Græsk Makedonien - hvad det sidstnævnte angår: muntert, seriøst og en smule ... skørt. Ren Mik Schack:

Gå ind på flg. link: http://www.dr.dk/odp/player.aspx. Jeg vil anbefale at du bruger Firefox som browser til dette formål. Microsofts Explorer er rimeligt langsom.

og léd efter: Programmer > Hjemmeservice

Mik Schacks Hjemmeservice 31.07.07 kl. 15:58 Hvad er Balkan? Kender vi overhovedet noget til Balkans forskellige kulturer? Hjemmeservice inviterer skuespilleren Dejan Cukic, som oprindelig kommer fra Serbien, og revisor Carmen Nitescu, som oprindelig kommer fra Rumænien, ind i Mik Schacks køkken,

Mik Schacks Hjemmeservice 01.08.07 kl. 16:00 Hjemmeservice drager til udkanten af EU for at se hvad der er fantastisk i den græske del af Makedonien. Her fremstilles nemlig den ypperligste safran! Verdens dyreste krydderi!

---

Tyrkiet: Parlamentsvalget for nylig gav Premierminister Erdogan betydelig fremgang. Efterfølgende har han forsøgt at få sin kandidat Abdullah Gül (hidtidig Udenrigsminister) valgt som ny Præsident. Gül kunne dog ikke vælges i første eller anden omgang (hvor 2/3-dels flertal er krævet), men vil blive valgt i den tredje (hvor almindeligt flertal er tilstrækkeligt).

Nogle er bekymrede for at Erdogan og Gül vil trække landet i en mere 'Muslimsk' retning og væk fra den grundlæggende opfattelse - siden Atatürk - at staten måtte være en sækulariseret stat. Gul har dog erklæret at han vil respektere den sekulære forfatning.

Nogle er bekymrede for at Hæren (som i tidligere faser af Tyrkisk politik) vil træde ind på banen og gøre sin indflydelse gældende, herunder mht forfatningens sekulære karakter skal respekteres.

Se evt. reportage på BBC: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6961759.stm

---