MEMORANDUM ON ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL POLICIES (MEFP) FOR ALBANIA

I. BACKGROUND

1. This memorandum lays out the broad thrust of our policies over the proposed 20062009 program period, and provides a detailed description of our policy intentions for 2006. It is consistent with the November 2001 National Strategy for Socio-Economic Development (NSSED) and the May 2003, May 2004, and July 2005 NSSED Progress Reports. We have started preparing an updated NSSED for 2007-09, to be completed by end-2006, which will be formulated within the comprehensive Integrated Planning System introduced in 2005.

2. Albania’s macroeconomic performance has been solid since 1998. With the exception of the supply-induced disruptions of 2002, we have enjoyed a prolonged period of rapid, non-inflationary growth. Over the last three years in particular, confidence in the monetary framework has been enhanced and inflation expectations anchored to the 2-4 percent target range of the Bank of Albania (BoA). This has strengthened the lek and allowed the BoA to continue a prudent easing of the monetary policy stance while maintaining reserves at comfortable levels. On the fiscal front, current expenditure, the deficit, and domestic borrowing have been curtailed, and the 2005 budget delivered the first surplus on current operations since the beginning of the transition process. The public debt burden has been considerably reduced, reflecting foreign debt restructuring, fiscal consolidation, rapid economic growth, and the allocation of half the proceeds of large privatizations to redeem domestic debt. The debt to GDP ratio declined to an estimated 55 percent of GDP at end2005—a reduction of 9½ percentage points since end-2002.

3. We have also made progress in structural reform. In the banking sector, following the privatization of the Savings Bank in 2004, all commercial banks are now under private management and the banking system is displaying significantly increased levels of dynamism and competitiveness. With rapidly rising credit volumes and greater provision of services, the system is now poised to play a more pivotal role in economic development. Complementing these developments, the completion of the real-time gross settlement system, bulk settlements system, and significant progress in switching public sector salary payments from cash to the banking system are encouraging the use of banks for a variety of economic transactions. In the fiscal area, adoption of realistic revenue projections—accurately reflecting the limited capacity of tax and customs administration—and other reforms to the budget process—including greater parliamentary oversight—have enhanced the transparency of our fiscal expenditure and budget processes. The privatization process is by now quite advanced, pending the finalization of the sale of Albtelecom expected in early 2006 and given the advanced state of preparations for the sale of the Italian-Albanian Bank. Should these privatizations occur, half of the receipts will be used to reduce public debt and the other half expended in priority areas. In the statistical area, we have made progress towards producing more comprehensive and reliable national accounts and other economic and social indicators; we have also adopted our first Statistical Master Plan that sets out our priorities for the coming years. External arrears left over from before the transition have been greatly reduced.

4. Reform of our revenue agencies has also been generally positive, although much more remains to be done. The ASYCUDA system has been extended to 9 customs houses, together with related procedural reform in customs administration, including the implementation of the ASYCUDA system risk assessment module for conducting inspections in 2 customs houses. We have implemented a quick VAT refund system for exporters and progressed as planned towards eliminating the stock of VAT refund arrears—both measures aimed at providing much-needed improvement to the efficiency and equity of the tax system.

5. Progress in some key areas, however, has been less than satisfactory. Deficiencies in our business climate due to poor infrastructure and weaknesses in governance and institutions continue to deny our economy the investment—particularly foreign investment— needed to boost productivity and expand exports. The recent disruptions in electricity supply, due to poor water reserves management until early September and ill-designed procurement rules, call attention to the need for further large investments and structural reform in the energy sector. Despite the steps taken in recent years, including a FIAS supported review of administrative barriers to investment, the business environment remains uninviting. On the fiscal front, continued weaknesses in revenue administration and public debt management leave our economy vulnerable to economic shocks. Moreover, the quality of public expenditure requires improvement so that we may better utilize scarce resources for economic development and poverty reduction. Albeit to a lesser degree, further reform and modernization are also needed in the financial sector. Regarding poverty, though some key indicators have improved in recent years, advances are not uniform and a few indicators, such as enrollment ratios in education, need improvement.

II. OBJECTIVES AND POLICIES

6. Our program for the next three years will therefore concentrate on maintaining macroeconomic stability, enhancing growth potential, reducing vulnerabilities and strengthening government solvency.

* Macroeconomic stability will be ensured through further fiscal consolidation— centered on a steady reduction of domestic borrowing and improvement in the current and primary balances; and through strengthening the monetary policy framework and financial supervision capacity.

* Growth potential will be enhanced through revenue and expenditure reforms that promote high quality public and private investment; by pursuing further structural reforms, such as completing the privatization process, improving the commercial court system and the process of land title registration; and by improving the business environment. Moreover, investments in alternative energy sources and the restructuring of KESH should help reduce the inherent volatility of electricity supply, which remains one of the economy’s main sources of vulnerability.

* Declining levels of public debt relative to GDP, together with improvements in revenue administration and public debt management, as well as reforms that limit contingent liabilities (e.g., in the electricity sector), should strengthen government solvency and reduce fiscal vulnerabilities. Significantly lengthening the average maturity of domestic public debt will be a critical measure in this regard.

A. Macroeconomic Framework

7. The program is built on a realistic macroeconomic framework. Real GDP growth is projected to fall to 5 percent in 2006, from an estimated 5½ percent in 2005, as a result of the difficult situation in the electricity sector. However, as the issues in this sector are gradually resolved and import and production capacity improve, we anticipate a return to the historical 6 percent trend, reinforced by rising investment due to improvements in our business climate. An appropriate monetary policy stance, supported by a flexible exchange rate regime, should hold inflation to 3 percent—with a tolerance range for deviations of plus or minus one percent—while ongoing fiscal consolidation will allow a steady improvement in government solvency. Public savings will rise over the program period as we improve our revenue administration and reduce the share of current expenditure in total spending— including through lower interest costs resulting from better debt management. We also anticipate a rise in private—mainly corporate—savings in response to ongoing structural reform and rapid economic growth. With public and private investment rising at a lower pace, the current account will gradually improve and the growth contribution of net exports will rise. In recognition of our continued fiscal vulnerability, we have protected this framework from unforeseen shocks through the use of budgetary contingencies, conservative estimates of tax revenue and privatization receipts, and by a policy of not expending the gains from tax administration reforms before their realization. In the event additional receipts from the latter or privatization materialize, we will consult with the Fund on an appropriate division between additional priority expenditure, tax cuts, and debt reduction; and will submit to parliament a supplementary budget.

B. Monetary, Exchange Rate, and Financial Sector Policies

8. We will direct monetary policy towards keeping inflation at 3 percent—with a tolerance range for deviations of plus or minus one percent. Our current monetary policy framework—a reserve money program with quantitative targets set in consultation with the Fund and with changes to the repurchase rate as the main policy instrument—will be retained over the program period so long as it remains effective in controlling inflation. We expect over the medium term that velocity and the money multiplier will remain relatively stable, and that our existing framework will be sufficient to hold inflation within the target band. Nonetheless, we recognize that our past success in this regard took place largely in the context of a relatively underdeveloped banking system providing very low volumes of private sector credit. This environment is changing rapidly—credit growth exceeded 70 percent in October 2005, and both demand and supply of credit are expected to remain strong into the medium term. While our overwhelming preference is that monetary policy instruments remain market based, given the limited effect of policy rate changes on credit demand—particularly on foreign currency denominated credit demand—the temporary use of direct instruments for controlling credit provision—in consultation with the Fund—cannot be ruled out at this stage.

9. We will retain a flexible exchange rate regime, with foreign exchange interventions limited to smoothing seasonality and short term shocks, and maintaining an adequate reserve level. The flexible rate provides a cushion to potential macroeconomic shocks, thereby reducing overall vulnerability. Our medium-term goal of moving to an inflation targeting regime also argues for the preservation of a flexible exchange rate. In this regard, with assistance from the Fund, we are in the process of identifying the necessary steps and formulating an action plan, which we hope to be able to begin implementing soon.

10. Our efforts at structural reform in the financial sector over the program period will be guided by the recently completed Financial Sector Stability Assessment (FSSA) report. We will set up a joint government-BoA task force to work with Fund staff to develop an action plan to implement the recommendations of this report (SB; end-March 2006). Measures will aim at improving financial intermediation and supervisory capacity, reducing the use of cash in the economy, and promoting greater efficiency in the financial sector. Within the action plan, strengthening supervisory capacity in the insurance and private pension industries, and the establishment of effective and independent regulatory authority will be a priority.

11. While the action plan is being prepared, we intend to complete the reforms initiated under the previous program. The payment of public sector wages through the banking system is now in place for over 75,000 employees, which may be a practical limit as the remaining employees are located far from bank offices. However, to the extent possible, we will endeavor to extend this system further, by including additional employees of state-owned enterprises and by encouraging the payment of taxes and utility bills in this fashion. Given the rapid growth of credit, we are taking steps to prevent deterioration of the quality of commercial bank loan portfolios. In this regard, we are in discussion with the World Bank and the Albanian Bankers’ Association for assistance in setting up a credit bureau, initially inside BoA and will move ahead on this front as quickly as possible. We are also working with the Ministry of Justice to streamline the procedures for the execution of collateral, which are currently ineffective. In the insurance sector, we will seek technical assistance— including the appointment of an advisor—to strengthen prudential supervision in the short term. In addition, given the imminent launch of private pension funds, we will, as a matter of priority, seek technical assistance to modernize the legal framework for this industry. The treasury bill window at BoA will be maintained, but, in line with our goal of decreasing the use of cash for economic transactions, we will insist on the use of the new bulk settlement system as a means of payment. We will accelerate preparations to divest government’s minority interest in the remaining commercial bank; and will refrain from creating any public financial institution or from taking an equity stake or issuing any explicit or implicit government guarantee to any financial institution. We will take no legislative or regulatory action that weakens the independence of the BoA, including the full control over the Bank’s budget—including staff compensation levels—currently exercised by the BoA’s Supervisory Board.

C. Fiscal Policy

12. The 2006 budget and medium term fiscal framework have been designed to strike a balance between debt reduction and the need for growth-enhancing and poverty reducing expenditure. Over the program period, we expect a further 1 percentage point decline in public debt relative to GDP, and a fall in recourse to domestic financing from 2.8 percent of GDP in 2005 to 2.4 percent in 2008. Total expenditure relative to GDP is programmed to rise by only ¼ percentage point. This is in part a reflection of conservative revenue projections that make no allowance for revenue gains from tax administration measures, and will rise if the expected gains from revenue administration reforms materialize. Within the programmed envelope we intend to refocus expenditure towards more productive uses. Thus, over 2005-08, we project an improvement in the current balance relative to GDP of about 1½ percentage points and an improvement in the primary balance of about ½ percentage point of GDP.

13. The 2006 budget was approved by Parliament in December 2005, satisfying a prior action for approval of this program. It represents a conservative budgeting strategy that we intend to adopt throughout the program period. The budget incorporates tax measures to raise revenue by ¼ percent of GDP, but makes no allowance for immediate gains from tax administration measures. Contingencies, at about ¾ percent of GDP, are twice as large as in 2005, including allocated contingencies that will only be released, after consultation with the Fund, conditional on meeting the indicative total tax revenue target for end-June 2006 in the program. We have utilized conservative estimates for interest costs, privatization receipts, and assumptions concerning the macroeconomic framework. However, if there is a sustainable over performance—specifically if the expected gains from tax administration efficiencies materialize and/or higher privatization receipts are achieved in the first half of the year—we will, following a discussion with the Fund, submit to parliament a supplementary budget. In 2006, we will expend in full any extra revenue accruing through tax administration gains, but for privatization receipts will maintain the same formula developed during the previous program—half the revenues will be used to reduce domestic debt, and half will be spent on well-designed infrastructure projects. However, we will consider the use of a relatively small portion of this latter share to compensate former owners of property. In subsequent years, we will, in consultation with the Fund, consider applying the privatization formula to both sources of additional revenue.

14. Structural measures in the fiscal area will concentrate on reforming the revenue administrations, raising the quality and efficiency of expenditure, and improving debt management capacity. A major objective of the new program will be to reshape the revenue collection agencies into modern organizations relying on self-assessment and voluntary compliance through simple and transparent procedures, as well as vigorous enforcement. A cornerstone of this will be our full compliance with existing legislation and regulation regarding human resource issues and procedures. Having cleared almost all of the overdue VAT refund claims in 2005, we intend to deal with all current claims on a timely basis and within the terms stipulated in the law. We will strengthen the payment discipline of budgetary units—particularly with respect to the payment of electricity and water bills, and facilitate this process by ensuring the installation of electricity meters in all budgetary institutions by mid-2006. Looking ahead, we intend to approve a new organic budget law aimed at enhancing the efficiency of public expenditure management, including by improving budget classification standards and by increasing parliamentary oversight and the accountability of the public administration.

15. Measures to reform the tax administration will be guided by recommendations of a recent Fund technical assistance mission, which we developed into an action plan as a prior action for approval of this program. The action plan addresses, over the course of the program, key governance concerns and operational and administrative deficiencies that currently engender vulnerability and substandard tax compliance.

* Collection efforts will be refocused on large taxpayers. Reflecting this, as prior actions for approval of this program, we included all firms meeting set criteria within the large taxpayer unit (LTU); and integrated the audit of social security contributions into the LTU’s audit capacity.

* Subsequent actions outlined in the action plan are designed to further strengthen firms’ compliance with tax laws once inside the LTU. The share of tax revenue collected by the LTU—currently low by regional standards—will be increased to 50 percent of all tax collected by end-June 2006 (SB)1. Measures adopted in this area will include continued refinement of inclusion criteria for the LTU; as well as actions to address the large under-reporting of the numbers of employees that currently depress receipts from social security and personal income tax.

* We have cleared almost all VAT arrears originating prior to June 2004—the remainder will be cleared in 2006. To further improve VAT administration, we will prepare and provide quarterly reports to the Fund on the aggregate amounts of VAT refunds requested, paid, and rejected (SB; ongoing).

* Other reforms will be aimed at promoting the efficient utilization of General Department of Taxation (GDT) resources and improving governance. In this regard, IT systems and reporting will be improved; and higher standards of quality among employees will be developed, including through increased use of civil service examinations. Greater use will be made of risk-assessment software in the selection of audits; while the design of audits will shift from a comprehensive to a more narrow or single-issue focus. The GDT office structure will be rationalized; the role of the tax police will be reviewed; and better reporting capabilities and practices will be instituted.

* The Ministry of Finance will contract an NGO specializing in anti-corruption activities to operate tax and customs hotlines to better enable the public to report cases of corruption. In addition, we will initiate confidential questionnaire-based surveys in the customs office and the LTU, administered by an independent private firm, to collect information on corruption in these institutions and to chart improvement over time.

16. Reforms within the customs administration will be focused in the short term on completing the implementation of the ASYCUDA computer system. The ASYCUDA system—including the risk assessment-based inspection selection module—will be deployed in 10 customs houses by end-March 2006 (PC). A report on progress in the utilization of the risk module will be issued on a quarterly basis (SB; ongoing).

17. With assistance from the World Bank, measures will be pursued to raise the quality, efficiency, and productivity of expenditure and create room for additional public investment and priority spending. Civil service reform will be pursued with the goals of developing capacity to hire and retain skilled personnel, increase accountability, apply transparent procedures for promotions, and ultimately improve the effectiveness of public administration and services. In preparation for this a census of all budgetary sector employees, including their salary levels and other compensation, will be completed by end-June 2006 (SB). The institutional framework for evaluating and prioritizing public investment projects will be strengthened, including through the preparation of a public investment program as part of our Medium-Term Budget Framework (MTBF) to be reviewed by the World Bank. The MTBF will then contain all the investments already contracted by government and planned for the next three years including projected disbursements, amortization, and rate of return. In preparation for this, we will (i) establish and staff a public investment program department within the General Directorate of the Ministry of Finance (SB; end-June 2006); and (ii) prepare and issue instructions for submitting public investment proposals consistent with the budget and the medium-term budgetary plan (SB; end-June 2006). In order to safeguard the use of nonconcessional project loans, we will conduct an independent feasibility study for any large project2 financed in this manner (SB;ongoing), and provide to the Fund a biannual listing and status report of all projects being considered for nonconcessional foreign financing (SB;ongoing).

18. Improving public debt management is a central goal of the new program. The institutional capacity for public debt management is currently limited, while the short maturity of public debt raises vulnerability. A comprehensive action plan for improvement will be developed (SB;June 2006) following a Fund diagnostic mission tentatively scheduled for early 2006. The objectives would, in principle, include a significant increase in the maturity structure of public debt, improvement of terms, significantly expanded capacity in analysis and risk management, better management of data, and the ability, by the end of the program period, to independently produce debt sustainability reports. As part of the reform effort, we will also develop a public debt law that clearly defines responsibilities of different units; begin the preparation and publication of an annual debt strategy; and take steps to attract and retain qualified staff. As a first step to gaining direct access to international capital markets, the process of obtaining a country credit rating will be initiated as soon as possible.

19. We shall develop a tax reform strategy in line with our overall priorities for the coming four years and base future tax policy measures on this strategy and our medium-term fiscal framework. The most important goal for tax policy reforms is to promote employment and investment in the formal economy. Given that the tax wedge is high by international standards, we might consider using part of the revenue gains from tax administration reform, if and when they materialize, to reduce it. When deciding on tax reform measures, in order to preserve fiscal discipline, we shall pay particular attention to assessing the likely impact of different options based on quantitative analyses of tax collection data and the relevant experience of other transition economies.

D. Other Structural Reform

20. We have taken measures to restore the supply of electricity and will take further action to reverse the deterioration in the performance of KESH. We have also introduced new procurement rules that have already facilitated electricity imports and transmission from neighboring countries. We are preparing, in collaboration with the World Bank and other donors, an updated Power Sector Action Plan for 2006-2008. Meeting the targets for collection rates and losses set out in this plan will be a structural performance criterion for end-March 2006. We have reconciled the arrears between KESH and its budgetary and non-budgetary public consumers, including water supply companies, and paid the outstanding 2005 amounts. We will continue our policy, introduced in 2005, not to provide subsidies for imports of electricity. Given the high level of electricity imports expected in 2006 and the time it might take for domestic production to return to normal, we will use alternative means to support KESH during its financial recovery. These will include loans that could be contracted from the private banking sector, preferably without government guarantee, and government support for the ongoing rationalization of the electricity tariff structure to ensure cost recovery. In addition, we will re-evaluate the interpretation of the necessary collection efforts required by KESH to reclaim VAT on uncollectible invoices. We will continue the budgetary transfer to low income households and ensure that budgetary and non-budgetary public institutions honor their electricity bills in a timely manner. We will continue to work with the World Bank and other donors to restructure the water supply companies and to adjust water tariffs to properly reflect increased operating costs.

21. We aim to upgrade Albania’s transportation infrastructure to European standards. Given Albania’s limited financial resources, however, it is important that all large public investment projects are made within well-planned and prioritized national and sectoral investment strategies, consistent with the available fiscal envelope. The NSSED and Albanian National Transport Plan (ANTP), financed by the European Union, provide such a framework. Therefore, new large projects, such as the Tirana-Durrës train rehabilitation project, should first be incorporated into these strategies before advancing them further. The ANTP suggests that measures are needed to restructure the Albanian railways (HSH), improve services, support cost recovery and enhance the sustainability of railway operations. Once such restructuring is underway, some limited investments may thus be justified on the Tirana-Durres line within the context of a sound business plan for HSH.

E. External Policies

22. We will retain our liberal trade regime and continue to implement the remaining commitments made to the WTO regarding tariff policies, with an ultimate goal of concluding a Stabilization and Association Agreement and a free trade agreement with the EU. The technical negotiations with the EU in relation to the free trade agreement are at an advanced stage. On a regional level, Albania has concluded free trade agreements with its neighboring countries, which has significantly boosted its exchange with them, albeit from a low base.

23. We will continue to make good faith efforts to conclude the rescheduling of our arrears on inoperative payments agreements. We are engaged in negotiations that aim at concluding the clearance process with official creditors by mid-2007; and with private creditors by mid-2008. We will provide biannual reports to the Fund on the outstanding stock of external arrears (SB; ongoing) within one month of the end of each quarter.

F. Data Issues

24. We will improve our coverage of economic statistics over the program period as a precondition for improving economic policy formulation. In 2006, we will prepare advance GDP estimates for the first half of 2005 and prepare and publish preliminary 2004 national accounts (both SB; March 2006). With donor support we will carry out a household budget survey and publish the results of the Living Standards Measurement Survey (LSMS), which will improve our assessment of poverty. We will also implement new methods to improve GDP calculations, statistics concerning the economic activity of enterprises, and the national accounts for the agricultural sector.

G. Program Monitoring

25. The second disbursement under the PRGF/EFF-supported program will be based on the end-March 2006 quantitative performance criteria (Table 1 and the TMU); the end-March 2006 structural performance criteria (Table 2 and the TMU); and completion of the first review and financing assurances review. The first review under the PRGF and EFF arrangements is expected to be completed no later than August 1, 2006 and the second review no later than February 1, 2007. During the program period, Albania will not impose or intensify restrictions on the making of payments and transfers for current international transactions; or introduce multiple currency practices, or conclude bilateral payments agreements inconsistent with Article VIII, or impose or intensify import restrictions for balance of payments reasons. We will provide a fourth progress report on the NSSED by June 2006, taking into account the recommendations of the joint staff assessment of the 2005 progress report; and prepare a new NSSED for the 2007-09 period by end-2006.

IMF har udsendt flg. executive sumnmary vedr. samarbejdet med Albanien vedr. tacklingen af fattigdomsproblemerne. Der er flere ting der går den rigtige vej, men elektricitetsforsyningsproblemerne er særdeles alvorlige. Hele rapporten kan downloades som PDF fra: http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2006/cr0654.pdf.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This arrangement aims to prepare Albania for graduation from IMF-supported programs. If properly implemented, the policies it embodies will reduce vulnerabilities, enhance growth potential, strengthen government solvency, and protect priority spending. These policies will also contribute to improved governance—a precondition for attracting the high-quality investment needed to address the structural imbalances in the external accounts and to ensure the continuation of strong growth. Remaining vulnerabilities in the financial system are also addressed.

Policy discussions focused on measures to maintain macroeconomic stability in the wake of the electricity disruptions and other potential external shocks; and on the structural measures needed to achieve the program’s objectives.

* Despite a generally good macroeconomic performance in the past, near-term growth and external prospects have worsened due to disruptions to the electricity supply. Supply disruptions and rising costs contributed to a decline in growth from about 6 percent in 2004 to 5½ percent in 2005, and to a projected further decline to 5 percent in 2006, compared with the 6 percent for both years projected in mid-2005. Nonetheless, following the democratic and peaceful transfer of power, confidence appears relatively strong. The exchange rate is stable, and reserves, monetization, and private credit are all rising—the latter very rapidly, albeit from a low base. Despite the electricity shock and high oil prices, the outlook is for inflation to remain at 3 percent—the midpoint of the BoA target band. However, the authorities will need to be vigilant and react quickly to any second round effects. In the wake of significantly higher electricity imports, the current account deficit is projected to deteriorate to 8 percent of GDP in 2006, but to improve in subsequent years as domestic production returns to normal levels.

* The fiscal framework is designed to reduce both domestic credit to government and public debt relative to GDP. The 2006 budget is based on realistic revenue and privatization projections, and utilizes large contingencies to further protect priority expenditure. The budget excludes possible gains from tax administration which, if they occur, will be allocated in a mid-2006 supplementary budget.

* Comprehensive tax administration reforms, based on IMF technical assistance, will be pursued to enhance efficiency, with special emphasis on servicing large tax payers and improving their tax compliance. Following an early 2006 IMF evaluation mission, a detailed action plan to improve debt management will be drawn up to guide reform over the program period. In the Financial sector, the authorities will develop an action plan to implement the FSAP recommendations, with selected items set as conditionality at the first review. In the meantime, previously-initiated reforms will be completed. Other measures include civil service reform and improvements in the institutional framework for evaluating large projects; reform of the macro-critical electricity sector; and statistics.

The accompanying Letter of Intent and Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies contain policy commitments appropriate to maintain macroeconomic stability and to accelerate the pace of the reform agenda; and staff supports the request for a program.

Mjaft (NU kan det være nok!) har udsendt flg.:

Dear Friend, You will find below the text of a petition that was compiled as a result of talks of the major actors of the media and civil society in Albania, through which these actors express their concern over the approval of a law proposal of the Albanian Government on the performance of the National Council of Radio and Television and the Albanian Radio Television. If you agree with this initiative, and if you want to be part of it and express your protest against the absurdity of this law proposal, copy and email the text below to the main promoter of this law, the Albanian prime-minister, Mr. Sali Berisha at kryeministri@km.gov.al:

Dear Sir/Madam, Various actors of the media and the civil society in Albania are expressing their concerns regarding the changes that the Albanian government is attempting to make to Law No. 8410 “Over Public and Private Radio and Television in the Republic of Albania” through a law proposal approved by the Council of Ministers on February 8th,2006. During a round table discussion, organized by the MJAFT Movement on February 14th 2006, personalities of the Albanian media and civil society expressed their concerns regarding the changes that the law proposal will bring to the performance of the National Council of Radio and Television (KKRT) and the Albanian Radio Television (RTSH). Although all agreed that the performance and independence of these structures has not been correct so far, the law proposal that the Government is proposing to reform them has been written without the inclusion of the interest groups and actors of the field of media and civil society, and also bears the risk of totally politically-affiliated KKRT and RTSH. This is the reason why media institutions, journalists and the civil society in Albania call upon the Albanian Government, the Parliament of Albania, and the Parliamentary Commissions, that approval of this law proposal should be suspended, and a process of consultation with the groups of interest and scrutiny of alternatives and formulas of the functioning of these important institutions of democracy in Albania, should start immediately.

MJAFT! Crew

Rr. Elbasanit, Nr. 77, Tirana
Tel/Fax +355 4 223 661
info@mjaft.org
www.mjaft.org

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SERBIEN og MONTENEGRO. SERBIEN (alene)


Det Amerikanske UM har offentliggjort en 'Background Note' om Serbien - Montenegro: http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5388.htm • Det Engelske Udenrigsministeriums 'Country Advice' til rejsende kan findes på adressen: http://www.fco.gov.uk/servlet/Front?pagename=OpenMarket%2FXcelerate%2FShowPage&c=Page&cid=1007029390590&a=KCountryAdvice&aid=1013618386622 • En biografi over tidligere Forbundspræsident Kostunica kan læses på Serbiske Politikere • Mht ICTYs sag mod tidligere Præsident Milosevic, se (evt.) under ICTY ovenfor.


Præsidentvalg i Serbien. Boris Tadic blev i Juni 2004 valgt som Præsident. Seneste Parlamentsvalg: 031228.


Kosovo / Kosóva:



A number of Serbian government officials, the family of HRH Aleksandar Karadjordjevic and several hundred citizens attended the memorial service in the Maricevica Jaruga


I anledning af den Serbiske Nationaldag 15.2.2006 har PM Vojislav Kostunica holdt en tale om Kosovo-problemet. Den Serbiske Regering skriver:

Serbia advocates universal principles based on international law in resolving Kosovo issue

Belgrade/Orasac, Feb 15, 2006 - Serbian Prime Minister Vojislav Kostunica said today at the celebration of Serbian Statehood Day and the anniversary of the First Serbian Uprising that all principles that Serbia endorses in the resolution of the Kosovo problem are universal and based on international law. Starting from these most universal principles, Serbia is fully committed to finding a good solution based on compromise, in the form of the substantial autonomy for Kosovo-Metohija.

"Ladies and gentlemen,
Respected friends,

This day is the 203rd birthday of the modern Serbian state. That is a tradition a small number of European states can boast of because most of them were founded many decades after the Serbian state. Although it became recognised many years after the First Serbian Uprising, at the Berlin Congress in 1878, its true beginning in more recent history took place in cold February days, on Sretenje Gospodnje Day (the Visitation of the Virgin Mary) in 1804, when Serbian insurgents led by Vozd Djordje Petrovic began the process of making the modern state and nation of Serbia.

More than two centuries have passed since then, and the entire Europe of that time got to know us and recognised us by this glorious act of our predecessors. Today we are celebrating the great and distant date of the beginning of modern Serbian statehood, not only referring to historical memory, but also thinking about the present. We all know that one part of our state, and precisely the part where Serbia was born, is in big danger. That is why the memory of the First Serbian Uprising at this moment is much more than a commemorative remembrance. It should give us additional strength to persevere in the fight to keep Kosovo-Metohija within Serbia, where it had belonged centuries ago and where it was returned after the liberation wars of 1912.

When Karadjordje arose in arms in Serbia, the Serbs of Kosovo did not stand idle but like their brothers in Sumadija, they took up arms determined to liberate themselves from Turkish rule and join the grand undertaking of the revival of their state. The uprising's mainstream at the then Belgrade pashalic could not physically include Serbs from Kosovo-Metohija and that is why their attempt of uprising was soon quelled. Not even Stanoje Glavas with the foray of his troops into the valley of river Lab could help them. In the decades that followed, a new Serbia was being created as a direct outcome of two large and enduring uprisings. On the other hand, the old Serbia became a place of intensified terror aimed at preventing the revival of the Serbian state in the Balkans. The Serbian people in Kosovo-Metohija were not only subject to pressure and terror, but on several occasions, and especially after the wars between Serbia and Turkey in 1876 and 1878, they were massively expelled from their centuries old Kosovo hearth. The Serbs in Kosovo-Metohija would only be relieved for a short time in 1912 when the province was liberated.

Karadjordje and his fellow fighters showed the real strength of state-building spirit necessary for the recovery and regulation of the state. The uprising conducted by Serbian farmers aimed to shape liberated territories following the model of European states of that time. And with the expansion of the liberated territories, the hand of the new order was reaching the farthest lands ruled by insurgents, which represented the realisation of the most developed European state-building idea of that time.

We today also have to continue the mission of Karadjordje's state-building project, although historical conditions are different. Today, just like at the time of Karadjordje, that means to create and base the state on general values and principles that are foundations of international law and order. And the very foundation of the international order is the principle of inviolability of sovereignty and territorial integrity of democratic states. And today when talks on the future status of Kosovo-Metohija are beginning, I express the unanimous belief of Serbia that it is inconceivable to break a democratic European state into pieces and change Serbia's borders against its will.

Orasac is the right place for me to reiterate Serbia's position that in the talks on Kosovo all participants must bear in mind that our country is a democratic state and that every attempt of forcing a solution upon us and snatching away a part of our territory would be a demonstration of legal violence over a democratic state and at the same time, over the international order itself. The same universal principles that are valid and adhered to by all democratic states should be valid for our country as well. Partitioning Serbia by snatching away Kosovo-Metohija would be a direct violation of the most general principles of international law. Principles advocated by Serbia in the resolution of the Kosovo issue are all without exception universal principles based on international law. Starting from these most universal principles, Serbia is fully committed to finding a good solution based on compromise, in the form of the substantial autonomy for Kosovo-Metohija.

In order to defend persistently and unanimously Serbia's state and national interests and succeed in defending them, it is very important that today, when Kosovo-Metohija is concerned, Serbia actually advocates and defends universal principles and values on which peace and stability of not only the region, but of entire modern world, rest. And that is what gives us the right to request that all democratic states respect universal principles when it comes to Kosovo as well, the same principles which all countries refer to when their own issues are concerned.

By creating a modern Serbian state, Karadjordje and Milos adhered to justice first of all and they fought against brute force. Following the spirit of their state-building undertaking, today Serbia also defends the law and justice in Kosovo-Metohija, convinced that the law is stronger than force and that a compromise and historically just solution will be found.

Firmly convinced that such a solution will be found, I congratulate everyone on this statehood day with all my heart," Kostunica concluded.

The formal ceremony of observation of the Serbian Statehood Day and the anniversary of the First Serbian Uprising began today with a liturgy in the Vaznesenja Gospodnjeg (God's Ascension) Church in Orasac near Arandjelovac.

The liturgy was held by Canadian Bishop Georgije and Bishop of Sumadija Jovan, together with the clergy of the Diocese of Sumadija. It was attended by Prime Minister Kostunica, Deputy Prime Minister Mirojub Labus, Serbia-Montenegrin Minister of Defence Zoran Stankovic, His Royal Highness Prince Aleksandar and others.

The date of February 15, 1804 is recorded in Serbian history as the day when Karadjordje Petrovic launched an uprising and started the fight for final liberation from five centuries of slavery under the Turks. On the same day, in 1835, the first modern Serbian Constitution was adopted, and on July 10, 2001, Sretenje was proclaimed Serbian Statehood Day with the adoption of the Law on state and other holidays in Serbia.

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MONTENEGRO (alene)


Præsidentvalg 030511: Filip Vujanovic blev valgt. Seneste Parlamentsvalg 021020.

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MAKEDONIEN

Det Engelske Udenrigsministeriums 'Country Advice' til rejsende kan findes på adressen: http://www.fco.gov.uk/servlet/Front?pagename=OpenMarket%2FXcelerate%2FShowPage&c=Page&cid=1007029390590&a=KCountryAdvice&aid=1013618386163 • Det Amerikanske UM har offentliggjort en 'Background Note' om Makedonien: http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/26759.htm

Der er omkring 25 % etniske Albanere i Makedonien. Folketælling afholdtes 021101-021105.

Folkeafstemningen 041107 om decentralisering (= imødekommelse af Makedonien-Albanske interesser): Folkeafstemningen "faldt". Stemmedeltagelsen var kun omkring 26 %. Hvis afstemningen skulle have kunnet udvirke en ændring af decentraliseringslovgivningen, skulle deltagelsen have været mindst 50%, og desuden skulle der have været flertal mod lovgivningen. Det var ventet at stemmedeltagelsen ville have været noget større, selv om både Regeringspartierne og den Albanske minoritet anbefalede at man blev hjemme. Man kan nu gå videre i overensstemmelse med Ohrid-aftalerne.

Præsidentvalg i Maj 2004: Branko Crvenkovski - hidtidig PM - blev valgt (efter Boris Trajkovski som omkom ved en flyulykke). Seneste Parlamentsvalg fandt sted 020915. Der kan henvises til flg. OSCE/ODIHR-oversigtsside: http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/field_activities/skopje2002/.

Makedonien forhandler med EU om optagelse. Aktuel status, se: http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/fyrom/key_documents.htm. Se også den generelle side: http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/index_en.html


EU Kommissionsformand Barroso skal på besøg på Balkan. I den anledning har BBC lavet en Quiz om læsernes kendskab til Makedonien, se: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/4687276.stm


Død svane i Ohrid-søen. Fugleinfluenza? Makfax skriver:

The dead swan that was found in Ohrid Lake, has tested negative for avian flu, according to preliminary tests conducted by Veterinary Faculty.

Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry & Waterways says the preliminary tests found no sign of bird flu in dead swan. The local residents say the swan used to spend winter at Ohrid coast.

Unofficial reports say the swan had apparently died of broken wing.

Veterinary officials said in a statement that hundreds of tests on dead birds had been carried out lately, and no presence of deadly strain of bird fl virus was established.

Veterinary inspectors completed the training courses on terrain action and taking samples from dead birds. The authorities will step up the surveillance on wetlands across the country.

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GRÆKENLAND

Seneste Parlamentsvalg 040307.

Regeringsrokade. Kathimerini skriver:

Karamanlis demands government unity New Cabinet sworn in and told to continue reforms; Bakoyannis instructed to follow previous policies amid concern in Nicosia

ORESTIS PANAGIOTOU/ANA

Premier Costas Karamanlis leaves Maximos Mansion yesterday flanked by the two female ministers in his new Cabinet — Tourism Minister Fani Palli-Petralia (r) and Foreign Minister Dora Bakoyannis (c). ‘Tourism is our heavy industry and is one of the government’s priorities,’ said Palli-Petralia.

The new Cabinet was sworn in yesterday and Prime Minister Costas Karamanlis immediately called for his ministers to stick together and push on with the reforms the conservatives have already begun.

«Understanding, coordination and togetherness on the path of reforms,» Karamanlis said as he addressed his Cabinet. «We are moving forward together and in step with each other, with a joint political aim.»

The premier admitted there had been some problems with his government. «There have been some weaknesses in the past,» he said. «I accept that some of my decisions were not pleasant, either for citizens or for us.»

New Democracy's reforms in the labor and public sectors have met with opposition, especially from unions, but Karamanlis told his new Cabinet that it was vital they continued the same policies.

The prime minister asked that reforms, such as privatization of public companies, be speeded up and that the law ending jobs for life at public utilities be put into effect immediately.

Karamanlis, however, asked that changes be achieved with the broadest consensus possible, aware that his party will go to the polls in general elections at some point during the next 25 months.

Initial indications are that the reshuffle, in the short-term at least, will boost the government's popularity, which has been flagging lately. According to an opinion poll conducted by VPRC on behalf of Skai Radio yesterday, 44 percent of respondents said they had a positive impression of the reshuffle compared to 13 percent who said they felt negative.

However, the survey also suggested that 47 percent of voters believe the reshuffle would not change anything. Seven in 10 of those questioned felt the changes in the Cabinet were necessary and Dora Bakoyannis, the new foreign minister, was the most popular newcomer with 82 percent approving her appointment.

Karamanlis made it clear yesterday that he wants Bakoyannis to continue in the footsteps of her predecessor, Petros Molyviatis, especially in Greece's support of Cyprus.

Bakoyannis accompanied Karamanlis on a trip to Berlin yesterday, where the prime minister met with German Chancellor Angela Merkel. Thanks to a last-minute arrangement, Bakoyannis also held talks with her counterpart, Franz-Walter Steinmeier.

In Athens, meanwhile, ministers took up the reins at their new posts. A tearful Nikitas Kaklamanis gave up his seat at the Health Ministry to Dimitris Avramopoulos, who admitted he had a tough task on his hands. «It seems that it is my political fate that I be chosen to take on difficult tasks,» Avramopoulos said.

Giorgos Voulgarakis, who has moved to the Culture Ministry from Public Order after coming under fire, recognized the pressure he had been under. «There were exceptionally good moments but difficult ones as well,» he said.

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TYRKIET


UMs rejsevejledning: http://www.um.dk/da/menu/Borgerservice/FoerRejsen/Rejsevejledninger/RejsevejledningTyrkiet.htm.


Seneste Parlamentsvalg blev holdt 021103. Det blev i December 2004 aftalt (med EUs Regeringschefer)at der i Oktober 2005 skal indledes forhandlinger om optagelse af Tyrkiet i EU.

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LANDE UDEN FOR BALKAN OG ØSTLIGE MIDDELHAV. NATO-LANDE


ITALIEN


Mother Teresa. I anledning af saligkåringen ('beatificeringen') 031019 har Vatikantet etableret en internetside: http://www.vatican.va/news_services/liturgy/saints/ns_lit_doc_20031019_index_madre-teresa_en.html

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USA





PM Berisha har haft besøg af den Amerikanske Ambassadør, Marcie Ries




Ambassadør Ries har udsendt flg:

Distinguished guests, ladies, and gentlemen.

It is with great pleasure that I join the Women’s Legal Rights Initiative team to present the Convention for the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) Assessment Report on Albania.

President Bush has said, “respect for women is both a non-negotiable demand of human dignity and a foreign policy imperative of the United States.”

The fact that in the 21st century, slavery, in the form of human trafficking and forced prostitution, exists; that there are girls who are deprived of educational opportunities; and there are women who don’t feel safe in their own homes -- in other words, that some members of half the world’s population are kept from realizing their full potential -- tells us there is still much work to be done in order to assure fundamental freedoms for women and their families.

Increasingly, the international community has recognized that women’s rights equal human rights, and are essential for the development of society.

The issues addressed by the Convention for the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women -- women’s political representation, education, access to healthcare, economic opportunity, and family relations -- cut across a variety of sectors of society.

It is precisely for this reason that ensuring women’s rights and gender equality cannot be treated as a separate goal, but should be part of all policy-making. Ensuring women’s rights should also include greater awareness of how women are portrayed: in the media, popular culture, and school textbooks, for example.

Progress toward gender equality will only be achieved when everyone realizes that “women’s” issues belong not just to women but also to men, to the society as a whole: when a woman’s potential is not realized, the potential of society as a whole is not realized.

As noted in the report, Albania has made some progress in the area of gender equality. However, considerably more remains to be done.

This report is not only a requirement for each of the 140 countries signatory to the Convention, but should be used as a tool – a tool to improve the situation of women. I hope that policy-makers, civil society organizations, the media, and citizens, will work together and use the findings of this report to develop ways to advance women's rights in all spheres of society, because, as the American Ambassador to the U.N. Commission on the Status of Women (Ellen Sauerbrey) has said, "guaranteeing the human rights of women and children is essential to the creation of stable, democratic, and prosperous societies."

In my time here as Ambassador, I have met both women and men whose commitment to improving the situation of women and children has been touching and inspiring. I want to applaud them, and also groups like the Women’s Legal Rights Initiative, and express my personal support for their efforts to ensure women’s rights are not only safeguarded, but championed.

Thank you.

Amerikansk bistand til kampen mod korruptionen. Den Amerikanske Ambassade har offentliggjort flg.:

February 8, 2006

Millennium Challenge Corporation

FACT SHEET

Albania and Millennium Challenge Corporation: Combating Corruption and Streamlining the Business Environment

MCC’s Board of Directors has approved up to $13.85 million in Threshold Program assistance to initiate a multi-sectoral attack on corruption and improve the environment for business in Albania.

To support Albania’s fight against corruption, the Government of Albania has proposed a Threshold program that will reform tax administration, public procurement and business registration.

Threshold Program Overview

The Government of Albania has requested MCC assistance to fund three specific initiatives over 24 months, highlights of which are listed below:

Reduce Corruption in Tax Policy and Administration:

• Limit tax officials’ personal interaction with taxpayers and their discretion in tax assessment and collection
• Broaden the tax base by including a larger percentage of the economy
• Improve tax collection by upgrading information technology applications
• Upgrade technical expertise and improve procedures by providing training and manuals to tax collectors, internal auditors and the judiciary
• Create a better and more efficient legal tax environment

Reduce Corruption and Realize Transparency in Government Procurements:

• Improve transparency and facilitate public scrutiny of procurement procedures
• Enhance institutional mechanisms to detect, deter, and punish corrupt practices
• Bring the existing public procurement system into fuller compliance with the 1995 public procurement law
• Strengthen technical capacities at the Public Procurement Agency to enable it to function as an oversight body over other government procurement entities
• Provide continuous, professional and sustainable training for procurement officers at all procuring entities to elevate skill levels and strengthen commitment to the enhanced procurement process

Combating Corruption in Business Entry and Registration in Albania -- Establishment of a National Business Center (NBC):

• Create a unified registration form and simplified registration procedures
• Establishment of a single office (the NBC) where businesses can file electronically all documents needed to set up a new enterprise or renew the registration of an existing one
• Revise administrative rules so that approval is automatically granted if a relevant agency does not respond within a given time

Expected Results:

• Increase the total tax collected by the Large Taxpayers Office to 50 percent from the current 30.4 percent
• Reduce from 42 to 13 the percentage of firms stating that bribery in tax collection is frequent
• Reduce by 20 percent the cost of governmental procurements (adjusted by volume, currency and inflation)
• Reduce the value of the gift expected to be paid to obtain a government contract from 6.15 percent to 2 percent.
• Increase from 625 to 1000 the number of new businesses registered monthly
• Reduce the total registration cost as percentage of income per capita from 31 percent to 13 percent;
• Reduce the percentage of businesses that consider corruption a big obstacle to operation and growth from 69 percent to 30 percent;
• Reduce the percentage of businesses that paid a bribe to register from 19 percent to 5 percent
• Reduce from 47 to 1 the number of days it takes to register a business

Implementation:

The United States Agency for International Development will oversee implementation of the program on behalf of the Government of Albania.

Forsvarsminister Fatmir Mediu har været på besøg i USA. Forsvarsministeriet skriver:

3 February 2006,Tirana.. Albanian Minister of Defence Mr. Fatmir Mediu met Chancellors of Pentagon and American politics during an official visit in Washington. In Pentagon Mr. Fatmir Mediu encountered Second Secretary of Defence Mr.Peter Flory and Assistant-Second Secretary of Defence Mr.Daniel Fatta. During the meetings with the chancellors of Pentagon Mr.Fatmir Mediu emphasized the importance of undertaken reforms to reorganize the Armed Forces. One of the principal goals of these reforms is to transform the Direction of Armed Forces in a Command of United Forces in accordance with the experiences of many other armies. Albanian Minister of Defence Mr. Fatmir Mediu declared that a Battalion with the capability to be dislocated according to NATO-s standards is going to be created as soon as possible.

Minister Mediu stated that Albanian Ministry of Defence is collaborating closely with NATO´s Command in Tirana and American experts located in the Ministry about implementation of MAP and PARB´s documents. Their implementation is important in the process of approaching NATO-s structures. Mr. Peter Flory and Mr. Daniel Fatta appreciated the reforms made on the Albanian Army. They evaluated in the same time the ambitions that Ministry´ s Heads have. According to their opinion the changes are always difficult especially in the Armed Forces. For this reason is required willpower by the leading authorities.

Second-Secretary of State Mr.Peter Flory stated that Pentagon is satisfied with the process of weapons´ s destruction in Albania. Minister of Defence Mr. Fatmir Mediu declared that Albania is working intensively to fulfill the required and necessary standards for the NATO´s membership. According to his opinion Albania has the necessity for more support on the eve of NATO´s membership.

Afterwards Mr.Fatmir Mediu has have a meeting with the vice-commandant of New Jersey`s National Guard, brigadier general Maria Falca-Dodson. This important unit is involved in different military operations inside and outside the borders of USA. Brigadier general Maria Falca-Dodson declared that National Guard of New Jersey and Albanian Ministry of Defence are in some common projects. One delegation of New Jersey`s National Guard shall visit Tirana in the end of the February with the aim to close the co-operation´ s contracts. Albanian Minister of Defence Mr.Fatmir Mediu was pronounced satisfied with the actual level between two institutions and in the same time picked up the idea for strengthening the collaboration in the future.

During the official visit in USA, Albanian Minister of Defence Mr. Fatmir Mediu met members of American Convention and American Senate such as congressman Frank Wolf, senator Norm Coleman, etc. Before the speech of George W. Bush in the Congress State of the Union Mr. Fatmir Mediu met the Secretary of State Condolisa Rice. He explained the steps undertaken by the Albanian authorities to meet NATO´s standards. Albanian Minister of Defence has had many other important meetings during the Prayer Breakfast.

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ENGLAND

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TYSKLAND

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FRANKRIG

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DANMARK (NORGE, SVERIGE)


Ugerapport fra Dansk KFOR. Hærens Operative Kommando - se under: Kosova.

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LANDE UDEN FOR BALKAN OG ØSTLIGE MIDDELHAV. IKKE NATO-LANDE


RUSLAND

UMs Rejsevejledning: http://www.um.dk/da/menu/Borgerservice/FoerRejsen/Rejsevejledninger/RejsevejledningRusland.htm

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KINA

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Nye artikler på Wikipedia:


Fra Kosóva:

KOSOVO

Kosovo og Metohija er ligesom Vojvodina en provins i Serbien. Det var dermed - i sin tid - også en del af Tito's Jugoslavien.

Kosovo og Metohija staves [ ... ] med kyrilliske bogstaver. Metohija betyder kirkegods. Området kaldes oftest Kosovo af serberne og af det internationale samfund, hvorimod det albanske befolkningsflertal kalder det Kosova (med tryk på 2' stavelse: Kosóva).

Provinsens hovedstad er Priština skrevet på serbisk og Prishtina skrevet på albansk.


Indholdsfortegnelse

* 1 Befolkningsforholdene. Albanerne er i klart flertal
* 2 1800- og 1900-tallet
* 3 Fra 1974 og frem til 1999
o 3.1 Selvstyre i 1974
o 3.2 Ophævelsen af selvstyret 1989
o 3.3 Opbygning af parallelt system
o 3.4 Dayton-forhandlingerne
o 3.5 Begyndende guerillakrig
+ 3.5.1 Se også
o 3.6 Våbenhvile efteråret 1998
o 3.7 Massakren i Racak. Forhandlingerne i Rambouillet
* 4 Guerillakrigen. NATO-intervention
* 5 KFOR, UNMIK og SRSG, den Særlige Repræsentant
* 6 Overgivelse af ansvar til lokale myndigheder
* 7 Præsident. Magtdelingsaftalerne
* 8 De etniske forhold i dag
* 9 Drøftelser om den kommende status
* 10 Se også
* 11 Eksterne henvisninger


Befolkningsforholdene. Albanerne er i klart flertal

Flertallet af befolkningen har i mange år været albansk, men der er forskellige opfattelser af hvornår og hvorfor det er sket.

Det er en udbredt albansk opfattelse at albanerne nedstammer fra illyrerne der beboede store dele af området ved Adriaterhavet i oldtiden og før slaverne, som serberne nedstammer fra, kom til Balkan. Illyrerne er kendt fra bl.a. romerske kilder. Teorien om den illyriske afstamning er sandsynlig, men den er ikke endegyldigt bevist, hverken ud fra skriftlige kilder, arkæologiske undersøgelser eller filologiske analyser.

I middelalderen var Kosovo et centralt område i det serbiske rige, og fra den tid stammer mange kirker og klostre. Den kristne kirke i Kosovo tilhører den græsk-ortodokse retning.

I perioden efter slaget på Solsortesletten (på serbisk: Kosovo Polje), 28. juni 1389, blev området underlagt det osmanniske rige, og fyrsterne blev efter et stykke tid - mere eller mindre frivilligt - sultanens vasaller. Slaget i 1389 var formentlig uafgjort. Der deltog serbere på begge sider, de fleste støttede den serbiske hærfører, fyrst Lazar, men nogle støttede sultanen. Både fyrst Lazar og sultanen, Murad I, blev dræbt under slaget.

Hvordan forholdet og fordelingen var mellem serbere og albanere i middelalderen er vanskeligt at sige, men det er sandsynligt at der skete en betydelig vægtfordeling - til gunst for albanerne - i slutningen af 1600-tallet, hvor mange serbere flygtede til Østrig-Ungarn som følge af en mislykket østrigsk-ungarsk invasion og den efterfølgende retræte mod nord.


1800- og 1900-tallet

I 1800-tallet opstod der en national serbisk bevægelse, der førte til dannelsen af en serbisk stat med centrum uden for Kosovo.

Efter det osmanniske riges sammenbrud i begyndelsen af 1900-tallet, blev Kosovo erobret af Serbien i 1912, og albanerne (der formentlig udgjorde et klart befolkningsflertal) har siden da opfattet serberne som undertrykkere og været enten skeptiske eller negative over for dem.

Efter 2. Verdenskrig forblev Kosovo som en del af Serbien og indgik i Tito's Jugoslavien, og der er mange eksempler på at albanerne blev undertrykt (særligt tydeligt mens Alexandar Rankovic havde magten i Serbien - og senere under Slobodan Miloševic').

Forskellige forsøg på at udvikle Kosovo økonomisk og socialt lykkedes kun delvist, og selv om der er eksempler på, at serbere og albanere har samarbejdet og har været venner med hinanden, er det tydeligt at de etniske grupper - i det store og hele - har levet hver deres liv, f.eks. er der ikke så mange eksempler på at serbere og albanere har giftet sig med hinanden.

Albanerne vedblev med at leve i klaner og patriarkalsk dominerede storfamilier og vedblev med at tale albansk, og det var kun et fåtal, der ønskede at arbejde positivt for opbygningen af det jugoslaviske samfund. Albanerne var nødt til at lære serbisk i skolen, men foretrak dog at tale albansk indbyrdes.

Nogle serbiske bønder levede som albanerne (men talte serbisk). Men man søgte - med vekslende held - at tiltrække flere serbere, både som landbrugere, som industriarbejdere og som ansatte i staten, og mange af disse serbere var skeptiske over for albanerne eller betragtede dem som andenrangs mennesker.


Fra 1974 og frem til 1999

Selvstyre i 1974

Der havde gennem mange året været gnidninger mellem serberne og albanerne, og det førte til at Tito m.fl. besluttede at give Kosovo en form for selvstyre, men ikke status som selvstændig republik inden for Jugoslavien. Formelt og i mange andre henseender var Kosovo fortsat en del af Serbien.

I de følgende år følte Kosovo serberne sig i stigende grad holdt væk fra politisk og anden form indflydelse, flere af dem hævdede at de blev chikaneret, og mange af dem frygtede at albanerne ville forsøge at opnå fuldstændig uafhængighed og dermed føre et serbisk kerneområde ud af Serbien.

Ophævelsen af selvstyret 1989

I slutningen af 1980'erne tilspidsedes uoverensstemmelserne, og Kosovos parlament opgav ævred og besluttede i 1989 at anmode Serbien om at ophæve selvstyret. Afstemningen var i nogen grad manipuleret, men mange af medlemmerne følte sig givetvis også under pres fra Serbien - og af et massivt militæropbud.

I de følgende år overtog Serbien og Kosovo serberne regeringsapparatet i Kosovo. De mange albanere der var ansat blev afkrævet en loyalitetserklæring, og hvis de ikke ville underskrive den (hvad de fleste ikke ville), blev de afskediget.

På den albanske side var der forskellig opfattelse af hvordan man skulle gribe situationen an. Man enedes imidlertid efter nogen tid om at etablere et illegalt parlament, om at vælge en præsident (Ibrahim Rugova) og om at proklamere Kosovo som en selvstændig stat.

Staten blev ikke anerkendt af udlandet (bortset fra af Albanien).


Opbygning af parallelt system

I takt med at albanerne blev skubbet væk fra stillinger i det offentlige, f.eks. på hospitalerne, i politiet og i uddannelsessystemet, opbyggede de et illegalt parallelt system med egne sundhedsklinikker og egne skoler i private hjem.

Det alternative system blev i høj grad finansieret af penge, der blev opkrævet i frivillig skat fra de mange Kosovo albanere, der opholdt sig som emigrantarbejdere forskellige steder i Europa.


Dayton-forhandlingerne

Nogle Kosovo albanere, hvoriblandt Ibrahim Rugova, havde forhåbninger om at Kosovo-problemet ville blive inddraget under Dayton-forhandlingerne. Dayton-forhandlingerne drejede sig imidlertid om de meget vanskelige forhold i Bosnien-Hercegovina, og der var ikke plads til også at drøfte forholdene i Kosovo dér.

Ibrahim Rugovas linie, der ofte blev sammenlignet med Gandhis linie i Indien, nød en vis respekt i udlandet, men den havde ikke nogen egentlig gennemslagskraft, og tilsyneladende var Slobodan Miloševic' m.fl. indstillet på at leve med situationen.


Begyndende guerillakrig

Omkring 1997 blev det tydeligt at et stigende antal Kosovo albanere, især i visse geografiske områder og især blandt de yngre, mente at tiden var inde til en militær rejsning. Nogle begik handlinger, der må karakteriseres som terroristiske, men i det store og hele forsøgte man at etablere en organiseret guerillahær under navnet UÇK.

Der var, så vidt det kan formodes, flere hensigter med guerillakrigen:

* Man ville genere serberne og udvirke at nogle af dem forlod Kosovo,

* man ville fremkalde en samling om en mere aktivistisk politik og på længere sigt en omfattende rejsning i den albanske befolkning,

* og man ville provokere serberne til at overreagere, hvilket man håbede på ville fremkalde politisk og eventuelt også militær intervention fra udlandet.

I 1998 forsøgte serberne at undertrykke guerillaerne, bl.a. ved et angreb og en massakre på Jashari-familien 5. marts 1998. Massakren virkede imidlertid modsat og medvirkede til at UÇK fik en større tilslutning og til at guerillakrigen blev udvidet hen over sommeren.

Se også

* Ibrahim Rugova
* Hashim Thaçi
* Adem Demaçi


Våbenhvile efteråret 1998

I efteråret 1998 overbeviste den amerikanske diplomat Richard Holbrooke Slobodan Miloševic' om at Serbien skulle iværksætte en ensidig våbenhvile og trække tropperne tilbage. Derefter blev der indsat en overvågningsmission fra OSCE.


Massakren i Racak. Forhandlingerne i Rambouillet

I januar 1999 fandt man flere end 40 dræbte albanere uden for landsbyen Racak. Det er ikke endeligt klartlagt, hvem der dræbte albanerne eller under hvilke omstændigheder det skete, men lederen af OSCE's overvågningsmission, amerikaneren William Walker erklærede straks efter, at han var kommet til stede, at der måtte være tale om en serbiske massakre på civile.

Massakren førte, hvad enten der var tale om manipulation eller ej, til, at USA m.fl. indkaldte til forhandlinger i Rambouillet. Forhandlingerne resulterede ikke i en aftale mellem de stridende parter, men USA m.fl. fremlagde et aftaleudkast, som den albanske side skrev under på.


Guerillakrigen. NATO-intervention

Herefter gennemførte NATO en militær intervention i slutningen af marts 1999.

Interventionen blev gennemført på initiativ af USA og England, men med tilslutning af de øvrige NATO-lande, hvoriblandt Danmark. Interventionen var ikke i overensstemmelse med gældende international ret, som - på det tidspunkt - forudsatte, at sådanne interventioner skulle være besluttet af FN's Sikkerhedsråd.

Den militære intervention blev gennemført som en luftkrig mod militære og efterhånden også civile mål i Kosovo, Serbien og Montenegro. Blandt de civile mål var radio- og TV-stationer, partihovedkvarterer og broer. Også den kinesiske ambassade i Beograd blev bombet. Fra amerikansk side blev det hævdet at der var tale om en fejltagelse, og at man havde villet bombe et militært lager. Man måtte efterfølgende undskylde over for Kina og betale en erstatning. Nogle iagttagere mener imidlertid at der ikke var tale om et tilfældigt angreb, men om at man ville ramme militær kommunikation.

Serbien gav op i sommeren 1999, og der blev indgået en aftale, der efterfølgende blev tiltrådt af Sikkerhedsrådet med resolution 1244. Derved blev invasionen ikke formelt anerkendt, men det militære resultat blev tydeligvis accepteret.


KFOR, UNMIK og SRSG, den Særlige Repræsentant

Straks efter blev der indsat en militær landstyrke, KFOR, til at sikre fredens opretholdelse, serbisk tilbagetrækning og afvæbning af UÇK. Endvidere blev der etableret et civilt styre, UNMIK, United Nations Mission in Kosovo, der er en FN ledet organisation, der består af komponenter fra EU, OSCE m.fl.

UNMIK ledes af en Særlig Repræsentant for FN's generalsekretær. Blandt dem der har været Særlig Repræsentant er to danskere, tidligere forsvarsminister Hans Hækkerup og den nuværende, Søren Jessen-Petersen.


Overgivelse af ansvar til lokale myndigheder

Der er siden 1999 gjort forskellige forsøg på at overdrage politisk og administrativt ansvar til lokale myndigheder. Med enkelte undtagelser har det serbiske mindretals repræsentanter dog boykottet de nye politiske og administrative organer, i nogen grad på grund af påvirkning fra Serbien.


Præsident. Magtdelingsaftalerne

Den første præsident siden sommeren 1999 blev den albanske Ibrahim Rugova. Rugova var litteraturforsker af uddannelse og var gennem 1990-erne illegalt valgt præsident.

Valget fandt sted i 2002 efter at der først var blevet udarbejdet et sæt rammebestemmelser (a legal framework), dernæst var afholdt parlamentsvalg, og endelig efter at der var indgået en magtdelingsaftale mellem Ibrahim Rugova og hans Demokratiske Alliance og Hashim Thaçi fra det største af de partier, der var udsprunget af UÇK. Med aftalen fik Rugova præsidentposten, UÇK'erne posten som premierminister (Bajram Rexhepi).

Ved det efterfølgende parlamentsvalg blev der indgået en ny magtdelingsaftale, denne gang mellem Ibrahim Rugova og Ramush Haradinaj, fra et andet af de partier, der var udgået af UÇK.

Efter Rugovas død i januar 2006, valgtes Fatmir Sejdiu som hans efterfølger 10. februar 2006.


De etniske forhold i dag

Der er i dag flere etniske mindretal; det største er det serbiske, og de fleste serbere i Kosovo bor nord for floden Ibar, der går gennem byen Mitrovica. Mange Kosovo serbere flygtede i 1999 og opholder sig i Serbien. Det er uklart hvor mange af dem der ønsker at vende tilbage til Kosovo.


Drøftelser om den kommende status

FNs Sikkerhedsråd har omkring årsskiftet 2005-2006 besluttet at der skal påbegyndes drøftelser om den kommende statsretlige status. Martti Ahtisaari, tidligere præsident i Finland er udpeget af FNs generalsekretær til at forestå forhandlingerne.

Fra serbisk side fastholder man at Kosovo ifølge international ret er en del af Serbien, men man indvilger i at området skal tildeles vidtgående autonomi under fourdsætning af at det serbiske mindretal i det nordlige Kosovo får en tilsvarende autonomi og at de Kosovo serbere der er flygtet til Serbien får mulighed for at vende tilbage på betryggende vis.

Fra albansk side insisterer man på at Kosovo skal være udelt og helt selvstændigt i forhold til Serbien. Det er omkring 2005-2006 ikke tænkeligt at albanerne og serberne i Kosovo kan nå til enighed.


Se også

* Georg Christian Holstein. Om den habsburgske invasion i Kosovo i 1689-1690, nederlaget og retræten.

* TMK


Eksterne henvisninger

* Konstantin fra Kostenec: Den serbiske Despot Stefan Lazarevics liv og levned. Oversat og kommenteret af Gunnar Svane. Stefan Lazarevic var søn af fyrst Lazar. Beretningen beskriver tiden efter slaget på Solsortesletten i 1389.

* Noel Malcolm: Kosovo. Om Kosovos ældre og nyere historie på engelsk.

* Bjørn Andersen: Fra Kosovo til Kosóva (1999). Om Kosovos historie med udgangspunkt i Malcolms beskrivelse. Om den politiske diskussion i Tito-tiden. Gennemgang af interventionsforløbet i 1999.

* Hvor uafhængig skal Kosovo/Kosova være? Hvornår? Situationen lige før statusforhandlingerne skal begyndes. Ambassadør Eide's rapport, oktober 2005. Baggrundsmateriale på dansk og engelsk

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Fatmir Sejdiu

Fatmir Sejdiu er en Kosovo albansk politiker. Han er født 23. oktober 1951 i Kosovo.

Fatmir Sejdiu er jurist af uddannelse og professor i jura på Prishtina Universitet.

Han er, som sin afdøde forgænger, Ibrahim Rugova, medlem af Den Demokratiske Liga. Han var blandt stifterne i 1991 og har været generalsekretær for partiet.

Fatmir Sejdiu var blandt de jurister fra Kosovo, der bidrog til udformningen af de overordnede rammebestemmelser (the legal framework), der dannede grundlag for udskrivningen af parlamentsvalg m.v.

Han var medlem af parlamentet og af dettes formandsskab.

Han blev valgt som præsident for Kosovo [på albansk: Kosova med tryk på 2' stavelse] 10. februar 2006 efter tre hemmelige afstemninger i Parlamentet. Ved valget af Sejdiu bekræftes magtbalancen mellem dem, der støttede den fredelige kampagne mod Serbien og serberne frem til NATO-interventionen i 1999, og dem der indgik i den væbnede kamp i UÇK.

Mens Den Demokratiske Liga har beklædt præsidentposten, har repræsentanter for to forskellige politiske retninger, der begge er udsprunget af UÇK, beklædt premierministerposten. Først var det Bajram Rexhepi, nu er det Bajram Kosumi. [redigér]


Eksterne henvisninger

* Præsentation af Fatmir Sejdiu på Kosovo Parlamentets web-site; foto

* Den Demokratiske Ligas web-site

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Veton Surroi

Veton Surroi

Veton Surroi er en Kosovo albansk politiker. Han er født 17. juli 1961 i Prishtina, Kosovo som søn af Rexhai Surroi, der var diplomat for Titos Jugoslavien.

Han har en eksamen fra det humanistiske fakultet på Universitetet i Mexico City, Mexico.

Han er udgiver af avisen Koha Ditore [frit oversat: Dags-Aktuelt]. Avisen og Veton Surroi selv har forholdt sig uafhængigt af de politiske partier og af det daværende UÇK, indtil han stiftede partiet Ora i 2004. Ordet ora er dobbelttydigt, det betyder dels klokken, dels den gode fe.

Veton Surroi anses for at være moderat og åben mod den vestlige verden. Han havde - i Clintons præsidenttid - en høj stjerne i USA.

Han har gennem flere år samarbejdet med IWPR. Han deltog i Project Ethnic Relations’ The New York Roundtable: Toward Peaceful Accommodation in Kosovo i april 1997 og i Rambouillet-forhandlingerne som medlem af den Kosova albanske delegation. Han siges at have spillet mæglerens rolle i delegationen.

Han blev tilbudt at blive udenrigsminister i Hashim Thaçis provisoriske regering, men afslog for at stå uafhængigt.

Han forblev i Prishtina under krigen i 1999, men skjult.

Han blev medlem af UNMIKs Overgangsråd.

Han har vedblivende udtalt sig klart mod forfølgelser af etniske serbere efter afslutningen af krigen. [redigér]


Eksterne henvisninger

* Kilde: Bjørn Andersen: Albansk navnebog 2000

* Præsentation af Veton Surroi på Kosovo Parlamentets web-site; foto

* Præsentation af Veton Surroi på Ora's web-site; foto

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